Satterwhite v. State
| Decision Date | 20 February 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 46788,46788 |
| Parties | John SATTERWHITE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Mark A. Schwartzman and Mark J. Sideman, San Antonio, for appellant.
Ted Butler, Dist. Atty., Gus Wilcox, Fred Rodriguez & Michael P. Hodge, Asst. Dist. Attys., San Antonio, Jim D Vollers, State's Atty., and Buddy Stevens, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
The appellant was convicted of the offense of burglary with intent to commit theft. Punishment was assessed by the court at six years' imprisonment.
Both of appellant's grounds of error on this appeal are based upon his contention that the trial court should have upheld his plea of former jeopardy. Appellant was previously put to trial in the same court and on the same indictment, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict and was discharged by the court, over appellant's objection.
Appellant's ground of error urging that the court committed reversible error in failing to provide a statement of facts from the first trial is now moot. By an order of this Court, delivered December 4, 1973, the trial court was ordered to provide a transcript of testimony from the first trial, and such statement was received by this Court on January 25, 1974. The statement of facts from the first trial is necessary to the determination of the double jeopardy issue in situations such as this. See Lindsey v. State, 393 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.Cr.App.1965).
With regard to appellant's plea of former jeopardy, it is contended that the court abused its discretion in discharging the jury at the first trial before they had been kept together for such a time as to render it altogether improbable that they could reach a verdict. See Art. 36.31, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.
A jury which is unable to agree on a verdict may be discharged by agreement of the parties, or upon the court's own motion when they have been kept together for such a time as to render agreement altogether improbable. See Art. 36.31, supra, and Lindsey v. State, supra.
The exercise of discretion by the trial court, in discharging the jury upon his own motion, is measured by the amount of time the jury deliberated in light of the nature of the case and of the evidence. See O'Brien v. State,455 S.W.2d 283 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) and cases there cited. In order to determine whether a jury has been prematurely discharged, we must '. . . know some of the facts to indicate the amount and length of testimony the jury was called upon to consider in their deliberations, we must know the time consumed by the trial and then weigh this time element against the time that the jury deliberated prior to their discharge.' See Lindsey v. State, supra, 393 S.W.2d at p. 908.
The record from the first trial shows that the State's case consisted of circumstantial evidence presented by two witnesses. The presentation of this case required about one hour and eight minutes. Appellant presented no evidence at the trial.
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Bowles v. State, 59178
...that such a jury spent deliberating was, to say the least, somewhat longer than the jury in the case before us. In Satterwhite v. State, 505 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) the jury deliberated three times as long as was required to present the evidence; in Willis v. State, 518 S.W.2d 247 (Tex......
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Brown v. State
...own motion, is measured by the amount of time the jury deliberated in light of the nature of the case and evidence. Satterwhite v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 505 S.W.2d 870 (1974); O'Brien v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 455 S.W.2d 283; Art. 36.31, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. In order to determine whether a jury h......
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Montemayor v. State
...of the nature of the case and the evidence. Patterson v. State, 598 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Satterwhite v. State, 505 S.W.2d 870, 871-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Galvan v. State, 869 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref'd). The judge trying the case has su......
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Ex Parte Bernadette Perusquia.
...evidence were sufficient to support the court's decision to discharge the jury upon their notice of deadlock. See Satterwhite v. State, 505 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); see also Willis v. State, 518 S.W.2d 247, 248–49 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); see also Brown v. State, 508 S.W.2d 91, 93 (......