Sauceda v. Univ. of Tex. At Brownsville, Civil No. B–11–259.

• Decision Date: 26 July 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. B–11–259.
• Citation: 958 F.Supp.2d 761
• Parties: Mary Jane SAUCEDA, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT BROWNSVILLE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

958 F.Supp.2d 761

Mary Jane SAUCEDA, Plaintiff,

v.UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT BROWNSVILLE, Defendant.

Civil No. B–11–259.

United States District Court,

S.D. Texas,

Brownsville Division.

July 26, 2013.

Katie Pearson Klein, William Daniel Mount, Jr., Dale Klein LLP, McAllen, TX, for Plaintiff.

Erika M. Laremont, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HILDA TAGLE, Senior District Judge.

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on July 26, 2013, the Court considered Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, Dkt. No. 32; the response and reply Dkt. Nos. 59, 61; Defendant's motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds not raised in the motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 62; the filings related to that motion, Dkt. Nos. 60, 62–63, 64–65; ¹ and the record in this case. The Court, predicting Texas law, dismisses Plaintiffs claim of national-origin discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.051, as time-barred. The Court denies summaryjudgment on Plaintiffs claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), finding that genuine fact issues exist on Defendant's affirmative defense that the salary differential between the female plaintiff and male professors in Defendant's School of Business is based on cognizable factors other than sex. See29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

I. Background²

Plaintiff Mary Jane Sauceda (“Sauceda”) has been an associate professor at The University of Texas at Brownsville's (“UTB”) School of Business since 1994 and has taught accounting courses continuously since 2001.³See Decl. of Mary Jane Sauceda ¶¶ 8–9, Dkt. No. 58 Ex. A. In this lawsuit, she alleges that UTB has subjected her to unlawful pay discrimination based on her sex and national origin. See Pl.'s First Am. Compl. 6–7, Dkt. No. 58. Sauceda filed a charge of national origin discrimination with the Texas Workforce Commission—Civil Rights Division (“TWC”) on March 19, 2010, Dkt. No. 32 Ex. L; Dkt. No. 59 Ex. A–9. After receiving a right-to-sue letter, ⁴ She brings her claim of national origin discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.051, (“TCHRA”) ⁵ and her sex-discrimination claim under the federal Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), (the “Equal Pay Act”). See Pl.'s First Am. Compl. 7. UTB moves for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 32. It argues primarily that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing her TCHRA claim and that Sauceda cannot carry her burden to show that a genuine dispute exists over whether UTB's proferred non-discriminatory reasons for the alleged pay disparities are pretextual.

Sauceda attaches an affidavit to her response to UTB's motion for summary judgment in which she declares: “I am Hispanic. I am a female.” Dkt. No. 59 Ex. A at 1. In her First Amended Complaint, she compares her salary to that of other professors she describes as “Anglo/Caucasian” women and men. Dkt. No. 58 at 3, 4, 5, 6. UTB disputes none of these factual propositions. That is, the parties do not dispute that Sauceda's national origin differs from that of her proposed comparators for TCHRA purposes, and they further agree on Sauceda's sex and that of her comparators.

A. Salaries of Sauceda and Proposed Comparators

UTB apparently set the salaries of all of the faculty members teaching in its School of Business each academic year by issuing one-year memoranda of appointment. See Summary of Starting Salaries of UTB AQ Faculty, Dkt. No. 32 app. A; Sauceda Decl. ¶ 20 (setting forth annual salaries by academic year); Mem. Appointing Faculty for Each Academic Year, Dkt. No. 32 Ex. C–10 to C–12; Dkt. No. 59 Ex. B, C–5, C–6. In the 2007–08 academic year, Sauceda earned $79,620 annually. Summary of Starting Salaries, Dkt. No. 32 app. A. UTB paid her $82,009 in the 2008–09 academic year and $82,830 in the 2009–10 academic year. Id. She received $90,212 in the 2010–11 academic year and $90,212 the following academic year. Id.

In her First Amended Complaint, Sauceda compares her salary to that of five present and former School of Business faculty members. UTB categorizes its School of Business faculty members as either academically or professionally qualified under accreditation standards promulgated by the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB). Dkt. No. 32 Ex. ¶¶ 6–7. The first two comparators—Carol Collinsworth (“Collinsworth”) and Lauran Schmid (“Schmid”)—do not hold terminal degrees. See Dkt. No. 59 Ex. G at 22:20–21 (Deposition of Collinsworth); id. Ex. H at 9:4–21 (Deposition of Schmid). UTB considers them professionally qualified. Dkt. No. 32 Ex. H ¶ 7. The other three faculty members—Paul G. Robertson (“Robertson”), David Boyd (“D. Boyd”) and Sanithia Boyd (“S. Boyd”)—earned doctoral degrees, and UTB considers them academically qualified. Id. ¶ 6.

The following table summarizes the annual salaries of faculty categorized as academically qualified from the 1992–93 academic year through the 2012–13 academic year. Dkt. No. 32 Ex. 1.⁶ Additionally, the table sets forth Collinsworth and Schmid's salaries between the 2008–09 and 2011–12 academic years. SeeDkt. No. 32 Ex. C–11 & C–12.

Tabular or graphic material set at this point is not displayable.

B. Procedural History

Sauceda originally filed this case in Texasdistrict court. See Dkt. No. 1 Ex. 5. UTB removed it to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1331 because Sauceda's Equal Pay Act claim arises under federal law. See Notice of Removal 1, Dkt. No. 1. Discovery concluded on October 1, 2012. Dkt. No. 23 at 1.

UTB has moved for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 32, and the Court also has before it jurisdictional memoranda and a motion to dismiss addressing the question whether Sauceda has exhausted her administrative remedies regarding Robertson as to her TCHRA claim. UTB argues that Sauceda's TCHRA claim is time-barred.

UTB also seeks summary judgment dismissing Sauceda's Equal Pay Act claim. As discussed more fully in Part III, UTB alleges that it paid Robertson and the Boyds a higher salary to attract them and thereby bolster UTB's efforts to obtain AACSB accreditation for its School of Business. SeeDkt. No. 32 Ex. ¶ 18; Id. Ex. G at 43:9–12. AACSB accreditation guidelines require at least 50% of a business school's faculty to be academically qualified. Dkt. No. 32 Ex. ¶ 9. Based on its conclusion that Sauceda had not produced sufficient qualifying academic publications or other intellectual contributions, UTB did not consider Sauceda academically qualified when it hired Robertson and the Boyds. See id ¶¶ 8–9. UTB asserts that it set what it believed to be the most competitive salary it could to attract academically qualified faculty like Robertson and the Boyds from other institutions. See id. Ex. G at 29:12–24. It contends that due to a phenomenon known as salary compression, new hires from outside an institution can often command a greater salary than existing faculty members, and the salary disparities between Sauceda on the one hand and Robertson and D. Boyd on the other resulted from this legitimate, non-discriminatory phenomenon. Dkt. No. 32 at 33.

II. Timeliness of TCHRA Claim

UTB's motions raise two jurisdictional challenges to Sauceda's national origin discrimination claim under the TCHRA. Both rely on the theory that Sauceda failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit. First, UTB argues that Sauceda's national origin discrimination claim is time-barred because no cognizable act of intentional discrimination occurred within 180 days of March 19, 2010, the date on which she filed her charge of discrimination with the Texas Workforce Commission. SeeTex. Lab.Code § 21.202(a) (West 2013). Second, UTB asserts in its pending motion to dismiss that Sauceda cannot compare her salary to that of Paul G. Robertson because his name does not appear on that charge. The Court finds the first question dispositive and consequently does not reach the second.

A. Legal Standard

“The [T]CHRA ... establishes a ‘comprehensive administrative review system,’ under which the ‘exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to filing a civil action alleging violations of the [T]CHRA.’ ” Hoffmann—La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 446 (Tex.2004) (quoting Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485, 488 (Tex.1991)); see also City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 149, 154 (Tex.2008). As more fully discussed below, TCHRA claims must generally be filed within a 180–day limitations period. SeeTex. Lab.Code § 21.202(a) (West 2013). This 180–day limitations period has been construed as “ ‘mandatory and jurisdictional’ under Texas law.” Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 281 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex.1996) (per curiam)); accord. Collins–Pearcy v. Mediterranean Shipping Co. (USA), Inc., 698 F.Supp.2d 730, 742 (S.D.Tex.2010) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Poindexter, 306 S.W.3d 798, 807 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009)); see also Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 513–14 (Tex.2012) (explaining that Texas legislature affected limited waiver of sovereign immunity in TCHRA and holding that professor's “failure to comply with the requirements of Section 21.202 is a jurisdictional bar to her suit against the University”).

The parties do not dispute the facts relevant to the timeliness inquiry under § 21.202(a), only their legal significance. The Court therefore resolves the jurisdictional questions raised by UTB in its motion for summary judgment based on the undisputed facts just as a Texas court would. See Univ. of Tex. v. Poindexter, 306 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009) (citing Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004)) (“If, however, the facts relevant to jurisdiction are undisputed, the court should make the jurisdictional determination as a matter...