Saucedo ex rel. Sinaloa v. Salvation Army

• Decision Date: 24 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 00-0272.,1 CA-CV 00-0272.
• Citation: 200 Ariz. 179,24 P.3d 1274
• Parties: Cresencio S. SAUCEDO, as personal representative of the Estate of Exiquio S. SINALOA, and on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries, including Armando S. Saucedo, Julia Saucedo, Leopoldo Saucedo, and Alberto Silva, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The SALVATION ARMY, an Arizona corporation; Edward Stettinius Stuart and Jane Doe Stuart, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

24 P.3d 1274

200 Ariz. 179

Cresencio S. SAUCEDO, as personal representative of the Estate of Exiquio S. SINALOA, and on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries, including Armando S. Saucedo, Julia Saucedo, Leopoldo Saucedo, and Alberto Silva, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The SALVATION ARMY, an Arizona corporation; Edward Stettinius Stuart and Jane Doe Stuart, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants.

No. -0272.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department D.

May 24, 2001.

Burch & Cracchiolo, P.A. by Brian Kaven and Daryl Manhart, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants.

Timbanard Kamper Borrelli, L.L.P. by Timothy J. Kamper and Roger W. Miller, Esq., Phoenix, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

OPINION

GARBARINO, Judge.

¶ 1 The Salvation Army and Edward Stuart appeal from the trial court's denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of punitive damages, its denial of their motion for a new trial on all issues, its grant of a partial new trial only as to the amount of punitive damages, and its entry of judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Exiquio Sinaloa was struck and killed at 9:25 p.m. on March 26, 1996, while jay-walking across Broadway Road near 16th Street in Phoenix. Mr. Sinaloa was struck by a Salvation Army van, driven by its employee, Edward Stuart, who at the time was driving on a suspended license. At the time of his death, Mr. Sinaloa was wearing a dark jacket and gray pants, and had a blood alcohol content of 0.22. Mr. Stuart claims that he thought he had merely struck a black garbage bag containing aluminum cans, considering he was passing in front of a recycling plant. Mr. Stuart did not stop at the scene of the accident.

¶ 3 Mr. Stuart was being closely followed by two undercover Phoenix police officers when the accident occurred. The officers realized that Mr. Stuart had struck a person and, while one of the officers tended to Mr. Sinaloa, the other pursued Mr. Stuart to the Salvation Army facility approximately two blocks from the scene of the accident. Mr. Sinaloa either died on impact or within an extremely short time thereafter.¹

¶ 4 The personal representative of Mr. Sinaloa's estate, Cresencio Saucedo, filed suit against Mr. Stuart and the Salvation Army on behalf of the estate and various statutory beneficiaries, alleging that the defendants were negligent, and further alleging that the defendants' "conduct was willful, wanton, malicious, and grossly negligent." The plaintiffs demanded compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' punitive damages claim, which the trial court denied. The case proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law² on the plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. The trial court denied the motion, stating that

[t]his is obviously not the strongest case for punitive damages, but there's evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the Defendant Stuart acted with a reckless mental state required to establish punitive damages. As I indicated to the parties before, this is the sort of controversy that we leave to resolve by juries.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $10,817.72 in compensatory damages and $1.00 in punitive damages. The jury found Mr. Sinaloa and the defendants each fifty percent at fault.

¶ 5 The plaintiffs filed a motion requesting a new trial as to the amount of punitive damages, claiming that the alleged misconduct of defense counsel invoked the passions and prejudices of the jury, rendering the punitive damages award insufficient. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion.

¶ 6 The defendants then moved for a new trial on all issues or, in the alternative, renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing, among other things, that the issue of punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury. Prior to the court's ruling on the defendants' motions, the defendants requested that the court reconsider its prior ruling granting a new trial only on the issue of punitive damages. The court then entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the compensatory award including costs, denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration, and reaffirmed its prior order setting aside the jury verdict as to punitive damages only and ordered a new trial for a determination of the amount of punitive damages. The court subsequently denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the punitive damages issue and their motion for new trial on all issues. The defendants filed a timely notice of appeal, see Ariz. R. Civ.App. P. 9(b)(4), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-2101(B) and (F)(1) (1994).

ISSUES

¶ 7 The defendants raise the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred by denying the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs' punitive damages claim;

2. Whether the trial court erred by granting the plaintiffs a new trial solely to determine and award punitive damages; and

3. In the alternative, if the trial court did not err by ordering a new trial, whether the trial court erred by limiting the issues to be re-tried solely to the amount of punitive damages, rather than granting a new trial as to all issues.

¶ 8 Because we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider the plaintiffs' punitive damages claim, we need not reach the additional issues raised by the defendants on appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we review the trial court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Monaco, 196 Ariz. at 302, ¶ 6, 995 P.2d at 738. A party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law "only when the facts presented in support of a claim have so little probative value that reasonable people could not find for the claimant." Id.

DISCUSSION

The Trial Court's Denial of the Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

¶ 10 In Arizona, to recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a "defendant's wrongful conduct was guided by evil motives or wilful or wanton disregard of the interests of others." Piper v. Bear Med. Sys., Inc., 180 Ariz. 170, 180, 883 P.2d 407, 417 (App. 1993); see also Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v. Winston & Strawn, 184 Ariz. 120, 132, 907 P.2d 506, 518 (App.1995). Punitive damages serve to punish wrongdoers and deter others from engaging in similar conduct. Jacobson v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 430, 431, 743 P.2d 410, 411 (App.1987).

¶ 11 To recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove something more than the underlying tort. Piper, 180 Ariz. at 180, 883 P.2d at 417. That is, "a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in aggravated and outrageous conduct with an `evil mind.'" Hyatt Regency, 184 Ariz. at 132, 907 P.2d at 518 (citing Thompson v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Prods. Co., 171 Ariz. 550, 556-57, 832 P.2d 203, 209-10 (1992), Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 162, 726 P.2d 565, 578 (1986), and Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 331-32, 723 P.2d 675, 680-81 (1986)). Although the element of a tortfeasor's intent may be inferred, a plaintiff must always prove "outwardly aggravated, outrageous, malicious, or fraudulent conduct." Linthicum, 150 Ariz. at 331, 723 P.2d at 680.

¶ 12 Here, the plaintiffs argue that Mr. Stuart "consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant harm to others," Gurule v. Ill. Mut. Life & Cas. Co., 152 Ariz. 600, 602, 734 P.2d 85, 87 (1987) (quoting Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at 162, 726 P.2d at 578), namely, that Mr. Stuart allegedly left the scene of a fatal accident, and that the evil mind element may properly be inferred. In support of their position, the plaintiffs argued during the motion for judgment as a matter of law that the evidence established the requisite intent:

We can prove circumstantially an evil mind....

He killed the man. He ran. Why did he run? What were his motives? What shows the evil mind here?

He was worried about his job. He knew he had a suspended license. He knew he was a black man in South Phoenix. If he got stopped, he was going to get arrested. He might lose his job. He had a tremendous motive to try to get away with it, and he thought he did, down the street not a half a block, not one block, but two blocks, gets into the lot.

A police officer follows him in. He does a circle. He's ordered to stop. He still gets out of his van, gets in the car to get a day planner, whatever it was, then attempts to get in the van and flee, until the officer has to restrain him.

This is clearly a situation where Mr. Stuart acted to serve his own interests in total disregard of Mr. Sinaloa, who was dead in the roadway. But he had an obligation to stop, to render assistance. He did not do that. He fled. And that's what subjects Mr. Stuart to punitive damages in this case. I think the evidence is overwhelming.

(Emphasis added.) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and assuming that the plaintiffs' arguments have merit, we conclude that the evidence does not establish a prima facie entitlement to punitive damages.

¶ 13 Assuming Mr. Stuart did know that he hit Mr. Sinaloa rather than a bag of cans in the street, and further assuming that he intentionally fled the scene without rendering assistance, we find that this alleged aggravated course of conduct was not shown to have caused harm to Mr. Sinaloa. The requisite intent and outrageous and egregious conduct must occur in tandem with the conduct giving rise to the injury in order to recover...