Saum v. Savage
| Decision Date | 07 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:13-CV-00872 |
| Parties | MATTHEW SAUM, Plaintiff, v. KATHY SAVAGE, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Kathy Savage and City of Mount Vernon, Ohio's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Matthew Saum is a resident of Delaware County, Ohio. At all times relevant to this case, Defendant Kathy Savage was employed as the Clerk of the Mount Vernon Municipal Court. Defendant City of Mount Vernon, Ohio ("City"), in which the Mount Vernon Municipal Court sits, is located in Knox County, Ohio.
On September 4, 2012, Plaintiff appeared before Judge Paul E. Spurgeon of the Mount Vernon Municipal Court to resolve a warrant issued in July 2012 for alleged unpaid child support. (Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶ 6). At the hearing, Judge Spurgeon cancelled the warrant against Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 7). Immediately following the hearing, Plaintiff received a release of warrant document as well as a release of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles hold on his driving privileges.(Id., ¶ 8). At this time, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Savage and City failed to remove the now invalid warrant from its records and computerized data system ("LEADS"). (Id., ¶ 11).
On September 22, 2012, upon running Plaintiff's license plate number through LEADS and discovering a warrant for his arrest (id., ¶ 13), an Ashley, Ohio police officer detained Plaintiff on the warrant that was cancelled on September 4, 2012. (Id., ¶ 16). During the stop, Plaintiff offered the officer documentation to prove he did not have a warrant, but the officer handcuffed Plaintiff, who was ultimately taken to Knox County Jail, where he remained incarcerated for approximately nine hours. (Id., ¶¶ 15-17). As a result of his incarceration, Plaintiff missed his aunt's funeral, to which he was on his way when he was arrested. (Id., ¶¶ 12, 20).
Following Plaintiff's incarceration, on September 24, 2012, Savage called Plaintiff and left a voicemail apologizing for the "mix-up" and explaining that Plaintiff's void warrant was not cleared from the computer system because the September 4, 2012 hearing was unscheduled. (Id., ¶¶ 22-23). The same day, Savage filed notice of the cancellation of the warrant. (Id., ¶ 24).
On September 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed his Complaint, alleging three causes of actions: (1) false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (id., ¶¶ 27-36); (2) false imprisonment in violation of Ohio law (id., ¶¶ 37-41); and (3) infliction of emotional distress in violation of Ohio law (id., ¶¶ 42-48). On September 25, 2013, Defendants Savage and City, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows for a case to be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," "is a test of the plaintiff's cause of action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff's factual allegations." Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 958-59 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Although liberal, Rule 12(b)(6) requires more than bare assertions of legal conclusions. Allard v. Weitzman, 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Generally, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). But the complaint must "'give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is, and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 470 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007)). In short, a complaint's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). It must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff only alleges one federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Savage and City. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 27-36). Plaintiff brings his claim against Defendant Savage in both her individual and official capacities for her failure to remove the void warrantfrom the computer system in a timely manner. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 36). He is suing Defendant City for failing adequately to train its employees. (Id., ¶ 34).
In response to Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant Savage asserts judicial immunity (Doc. 4 at 3-4) and the City argues that the Complaint's legal conclusion that the Municipal Court is a subdivision of the City is erroneous, and that the City cannot be liable for acts of the Municipal Court (id. at 6).
Plaintiff also asserts two state law claims against both Defendants, on the grounds of supplemental jurisdiction. (Doc. 1, ¶ 1).
Plaintiff alleges that Savage violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Savage "failed to clear the warrant from Defendants' computer system and/or LEADS until September 24, 2012 -approximately twenty (20) days after Judge Spurgeon cancelled the warrant, and two (2) days after Plaintiff Saum's false imprisonment which caused him to miss his aunt's funeral." (Doc. 1, ¶ 4) (emphasis in original). Savage argues that she was performing a quasi-judicial function and is thereby protected. (Doc. 4 at 3). Plaintiff, however, contends that Savage was not performing a quasi-judicial function but rather acted as a municipal supervisor, and is therefore amenable to suit. (Doc. 10 at 3-4).
To establish a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two elements: (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law. McQueen v. Beecher Cmmt'y Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 2006).
It is well-established that judges "enjoy judicial immunity from suits arising out of the performance of their judicial functions." Leech v. Deweese, 689 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). This immunity applies in cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and extends "to any person acting as an arm of the absolutely immune judicial officer," such as the court clerk. Id. (citing Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994)). Thus, "court clerks and other court employees have absolute immunity against liability for actions arising out of the performance of judicial or quasi judicial functions." Sampson v. City of Xenia, 198 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (citing Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 418 (6th Cir. 1988)). The central and decisive issue here, then, is whether the cancellation of a warrant is a judicial or non-judicial function.
In determining if an act is judicial, and thus protected by judicial or quasi-judicial immunity, courts look to the nature and function of the act, not the act itself. Johnson v. Turner, 125 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991)). If the act is not normally performed by a judge, Courts examine the act's relation to a general function normally performed by a judge. Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13). Courts also consider whether the task is "an integral part of the judicial process." Gallagher v. Lane, 75 F. App'x 440, 441 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Johnson, 125 F.3d at 333).
An omission can still be a judicial act. Sampson, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 830. In Sampson, this Court found that not sending a judge's dismissal order to the County jail to be "an integral part of the judicial process," and therefore protected by judicial immunity. Id. Thus, judicial immunity attaches to both affirmative actions and omissions, i.e., not sending an order. Id.; see also Lyle v. Jackson, 49 F. App'x 492, 494 (6th Cir. 2002) (); Mwonyonyi v. Gieszl, No. 89-5495, 1990 WL 10713, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 9, 1990) (); Brown v. Glasser, No. 88-3993, 1989 WL 20614, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 28, 1989) ().
Just as the clerk in Sampson mistakenly failed to send a court order to a plaintiff, Savage mistakenly failed to remove Plaintiff's invalid warrant from the computer system. (Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶ 25). While the omissions are not identical, the clerks in both cases failed to perform a task that is integral to the judicial process. Disseminating a ruling is no more integral to the judicial process than filing and removing warrants in a database. See Moore v. State of Tennessee, No. 3:03-CV-559, 2005 WL 1668365, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2005) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial