Saunders v. VanPelt

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
• Citation: 497 A.2d 1121
• Parties: Bruce T. SAUNDERS v. John C. VanPELT.
• Decision Date: 03 September 1985

Page 1121

497 A.2d 1121 Bruce T. SAUNDERS
v.
John C. VanPELT. Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Argued June 4, 1985.
Decided Sept. 3, 1985.

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Markos & Roy by Peter R. Roy (orally), Ellsworth, for plaintiff.

Eaton, Peabody, Bradford & Veague, P.A. by John E. McKay (orally), Bangor, Libhart & Ferm by Wayne P. Libhart, Ellsworth, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, ROBERTS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN and GLASSMAN, JJ.

GLASSMAN, Justice.

In this slander action, the defendant, John C. VanPelt, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court, Penobscot County, entered on the jury's verdict awarding the plaintiff, Bruce T. Saunders, $75,000 compensatory damages and $25,000 punitive damages. Because we reject the defendant's contentions that (1) the case should not have been submitted to the jury, (2) the evidence does not support the verdict, (3) the compensatory damages are excessive and (4) punitive damages were improperly awarded, we affirm the judgment.

I.

From 1976 to 1979, the plaintiff, a psychologist, was the Clinical Director of the Department of Psychology at Eastern Maine Medical Center (EMMC) in Bangor and also engaged in private practice. In September of 1979, EMMC disbanded the Department of Psychology. EMMC and the plaintiff mutually agreed upon the termination of the plaintiff's employment as Director, and thereafter the plaintiff concentrated on his private practice. The plaintiff had contracts with several school unions, including School Union 93, for the psychological testing of any child referred to him.

The defendant, a pediatrician, was the Director of the Child Development Center (CDC) at EMMC. The function of the CDC was to provide a multi-disciplinary diagnosis and recommendation for treatment of children referred to it. Union 93 had referred to the CDC children having difficulties in school. During the fall of the 1979-80 school year, the CDC did no psychological testing of those children. However, during the course of the plaintiff's employment with EMMC, he had done the psychological testing of some of the children referred to CDC.

In late 1979, the defendant medically evaluated a child from School Union 93. On learning that the plaintiff would be performing psychological testing of the

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child, the defendant made comments about the plaintiff to the child's parents which were apparently reported to school officials. Thomas Poole, Superintendent of School Union 93, and Harold White, Assistant Director of the Hancock County Educational Cooperative, initiated telephone calls to the defendant concerning these comments. The statements of the defendant during these two telephone calls led to the present litigation.

In his action for slander against the defendant, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, with actual malice and with the wrongful and willful intent to injure the plaintiff in his professional capacity, had made statements to the effect that the plaintiff "was incompetent and not qualified to work with children and was ineffective with [them]" and "had been dismissed by the CDC based upon his incompetence." Claiming that he had been injured in his reputation and good standing in the community and in his profession, he sought both compensatory and punitive damages. ¹

In his answer, the defendant denied making the alleged statements about the plaintiff and affirmatively pleaded that "anything [he] had ever said about [the] plaintiff was true and did not constitute a publication."

At trial, both Poole and White testified as to the purpose for and content of their respective telephone conversations with the defendant. The defendant by his testimony continued to deny the alleged statements and offered his version of the purpose for and contents of the conversations.

The court denied the defendant's timely motions for a directed verdict. At the request of the defendant the court instructed on conditional privilege.

By special verdict the jury found that the defendant stated to Poole of the plaintiff:

He is incompetent to work with children. We had him here and we got rid of him. I don't care who you tell.

and had stated to White of the plaintiff:

He is incompetent to work with children. We had him here and got rid of him.

Further, the jury found the defendant's "remarks were made deliberately and intentionally, with evil or malicious intent primarily to defame and slander Plaintiff, rather than made in response to questions from White or Poole regarding the treatment of a patient." The jury also found that the plaintiff had suffered actual damages "including mental suffering, humiliation or injury to his feelings," and awarded the plaintiff $75,000 compensatory damages and $25,000 punitive damages.

The court denied the defendant's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial and the defendant appealed.

II.

First, the defendant contends that because both parties testified as to the absence of antagonism or animosity between the two and the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant exhibited a reckless disregard of the truth, the plaintiff could not have met his burden of showing an abuse of a conditional privilege, and accordingly the court erred in submitting the case to the jury. ² We disagree.

As early as 1850 in Barnes v. Trundy, 31 Me. 321, we held that words falsely spoken are slanderous per se if they

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relate to a profession, occupation or official station in which the plaintiff was employed. Malice is implied as a matter of law in such cases, and the claimant may recover compensatory damages without proving special damages. Farrell v. Kramer, 159 Me. 387, 390, 193 A.2d 560, 562 (1963). Words otherwise slanderous per se may not be actionable if privileged. See Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 A. 411 (1896); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 582-598A (1976). ³

When the issue is properly raised, the defendant has the burden of proving the circumstances necessary for the existence of a conditional privilege. Id., § 613(2). A conditional privilege does not change the actionable...