Sauter v. Bravo
| Decision Date | 25 October 2000 |
| Citation | 771 So.2d 1213 |
| Parties | (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 2000) MATILDA SAUTER, as Successor Trustee of the Vincent J. Bravo Revocable Trust Agreement (as amended), and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Vincent J. Bravo, Deceased, Appellant, v. ROSE BRAVO, Appellee. NO. 4D99-3950 JULY TERM 2000 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; John D. Wessel, Judge; L.T. Case No. CP 95-1490 IY.
James A. Herb of Herb & Mednick, Boca Raton, for appellant.
William Jay Palmer of Adorno & Zeder, P.A., Miami, for appellee.
We affirm an order, as clarified by the trial court, directing payment by Matilda Sauter (Sauter), as trustee under a "pour over" trust, in favor of Rose Bravo (Bravo), the income beneficiary of the trust.
This is the second time this case has been before this court. See Bravo v. Sauter, 727 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). There, the facts were summarized as follows:
On January 2, 1980, Vincent J. Bravo ("decedent") created an inter vivos revocabletrust agreement and executed his last will and testament. Approximately seven months after the decedent married [Bravo], he amended his will and trust to substitute Bravo in place of his first wife who had predeceased him. The decedent died in 1993, and in his will he specifically devised a life estate to Bravo of all his tangible personal property, with its remainder to his children from his first marriage. The will provided that upon the decedent's death, the rest, residue and remainder of the property, both real and personal, would pour over to the trust, which allowed income for life to Bravo and distribution upon Bravo's death to the decedent's children, one of whom was [Sauter], who was also the successor trustee of the trust and personal representative of the decedent's estate.
Bravo made an election, pursuant to section 732.201, Florida Statutes (1993), to claim an elective share in the decedent's probate estate. Sauter then contested Bravo's right to share in the trust since she had taken her statutory elective share of the estate. After many proceedings, the trial court ruled that Bravo's election to take her statutory share of the estate did not preclude her from receiving her beneficial interest in the trust.
Id. at 1104-05. In the earlier appeal, this court concluded that Bravo's election of her statutory share did not extinguish her interest in the trust income. See id. at 1107. In reaching this determination, this court noted that "if the wife did not receive income from the probate assets transferred to the trust, the wife would receive very little, if any, income from the remaining trust assets." Id. Such a result would be inconsistent with the testator's intent not to deprive Bravo of her interest under the trust. See id. The case was then remanded for further proceedings.
Following remand, Bravo moved for summary judgment, arguing that she was entitled to receive "a minimum of three percent of the combinedvalue of the net assets of the...estate and trust" pursuant to section 738.12(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides:
If the total principal of a trust does not in any year yield a net income of at least 3 percent of its market value (including as income the value of any beneficial use of the property by the income beneficiary), the trustee shall pay to the income beneficiary an amount equal to the excess of 3 percent of the value of the principal, based upon the market value at the beginning of the calendar year, over the trust income paid to the income beneficiary in that year. This amount shall be paid to the income beneficiary using the first principal cash available.
738.12(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). At the hearing, Bravo argued that she was entitled, as a matter of law, to the statutory three-percent payments. Sauter countered that the decedent waived application of section 738.12(1)(a), as evidenced by the language of the trust. In so arguing, Sauter pointed to different portions of the trust, in which the decedent permitted the trustee to retain, hold, or acquire unproductive realty or personalty and to invest and re-invest trust assets in any type of property or security regardless of whether the new asset produced any income.
The trial court correctly found that the provisions of the trust authorizing the trustee to retain underproductive property did not waive application of section 738.12(1)(a) and awarded Bravo three percent of the value of the assets contained in the estate that were payable to the trust, as well as three percent of the value of the assets contained in the trust. For the years Bravo did not occupy the marital home, the court found that Bravo was also entitled to income equal to...
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Janien v. Janien
...Article Second (A) does not make Cedric an income beneficiary of the nominee trust. We reject Christopher's reading of Sauter v. Bravo, 771 So.2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) that the right to live in real property equate[s] to (and therefore satisfie[s]) the right to all the income on the prop......