Sauve v. Lamberti

• Decision Date: 01 December 2008
• Docket Number: Case No. 07-61575-CIV.
• Citation: 597 F.Supp.2d 1312
• Parties: Kevin SAUVE, Plaintiff, v. Al LAMBERTI, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, and; Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc., a Florida corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

597 F.Supp.2d 1312

Kevin SAUVE, Plaintiff, v. Al LAMBERTI, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, and; Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc., a Florida corporation, Defendants.

Case No. 07-61575-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

December 1, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Dion J. Cassata, Cassata & Hanson PL, Greg McNeill Lauer, Gregory M. Lauer, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.

Richard Thomas Woulfe, Bunnell Woulfe Kirschbaum Keller McIntyre & Gregoire, Daniel Lee Losey, John W. Mauro, Billing Cochran Lyles Mauro & Ramsey PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAM P. DIMITROULEAS, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Lamberti's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE-28] and Defendant Armor Correctional Health Services' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE-32], filed herein on October 3, 2008. The Court has carefully considered the Motions, the Statement of Facts [DE-29; DE-33], the Notice by Defendant Lamberti of Joinder in Defendant Armor's Motion [DE-31], the Exhibits [DE-30; DE-34], Plaintiffs Response [DE-49], Plaintiffs Statement of Disputed Facts [DE-50], Defendant Armor's Reply [DE-51], Defendant Lamberti's Notice of Joinder in the Reply [DE-52], Defendant Lamberti's Reply [DE-53], and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons addressed below, the Court finds that the Motions for Summary Judgment are due to be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kevin Sauve ("Sauve") filed the above-styled action on November 2, 2007 against Al Lamberti, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, and Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc., a Florida corporation that provides medical/health care to Broward County Jail prisoners pursuant to a contract. Plaintiff brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that while incarcerated in the Broward County jail system he was denied access to HIV/AIDS medications. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).

Plaintiff was diagnosed with HIV in the early to mid-1990s. [Armor Medical Records page 2; B.H. Intake Data Summary dated 6/29/07]. He was diagnosed with AIDS in 1997 or 1998. [Pl. Dep. 6/4/08, page 88, lines 13-15]. Sauve was arrested on May 1, 2007. He informed Defendants that he had HIV/AIDS, was currently under a doctor's care, and was currently taking medications. The Complaint also indicates that Defendants contacted a friend of Sauve's, who confirmed his HIV-positive status and recited the names of medications directly from his current prescription bottles. Plaintiff was released on July 31, 2007. During his incarceration, Sauve lodged approximately 16 complaints regarding his health, including his lack of AIDS medication. Sauve contends that he was denied any medication for his HIV/ AIDS throughout his ninety-plus days of incarceration. As a result, he claims, his health deteriorated irreparably and substantially.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and seeks actual, compensatory, and punitive damages. On January 25, 2008, 247 F.R.D. 703, this Court granted Defendant Lamberti's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim under the Eighth Amendment and Defendant Lamberti's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Claim for Punitive Damages. [DE-16]. The Motions for Summary Judgment address Plaintiffs Claim in Count I against Defendant Lamberti and Count II against Defendant Armor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations under the Fourteenth Amendment.¹

On October 3, 2008, Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment arguing that his HIV positive/AIDS status constitutes a serious medical need within the meaning of a Section 1983 claim. [DE-35]. Defendants did not dispute this and the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion on October 29, 2008. [DE-47]. See Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir.2004) (HIV constitutes a serious medical need).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Courts may grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party faces the stringent burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact before summary judgment may be granted. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When deciding such a motion, a court will not grant summary judgment unless it is clear that a trial is unnecessary. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If uncertainty exists in regards to the necessity of a trial, the court will resolve any doubts against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).

The burden of production for a summary judgment motion rests first with the movant. It is the movant that "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To satisfy this burden, the movant must demonstrate that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Only after the movant has discharged its burden does the burden of production shift to the nonmoving party. If the burden does shift, then the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). To meet their burden, the nonmoving party "may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleadings," but instead must come forward with "specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

Essentially, so long as the nonmoving party has had an ample opportunity to conduct discovery, it must come forward with affirmative evidence to support its claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "A mere `scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990). If the evidence advanced by the nonmoving party "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

B. Motions for Summary Judgment

Defendants filed their instant Motions for Summary Judgment arguing that the evidence fails to support Plaintiffs claims. A prisoner asserting a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical must present evidence beyond medical malpractice. "Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); see also, Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir.1986). An inmate must demonstrate (1) an objectively serious medical need that, left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) that the response made by public officials to that need was poor enough to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and not merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law. Faison v. Rosado, 129 Fed.Appx. 490, 491-92 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000)).

A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he knows the inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm, yet disregards it by failing to take reasonable measures or provide care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 (11th Cir.1997); Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 788 (11th Cir.1989). "Delay in access to medical attention can violate the Eighth Amendment," Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, depending on the "nature of the medical need and the reason for the delay." Harris v. Coweta County, 21 F.3d 388, 393-94 (11th Cir.1994); see also, Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir.2005); Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058. However, "whether governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment `is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment' and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability...." Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107, 97 S.Ct. 285).

Liability under Section 1983 of a municipality requires the showing of a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In this way, municipal liability is limited to acts of the municipality versus acts of its employees—respondeat superior liability is not available. Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir.2003). A private entity contracting with a county to provide medical services for prisoners performs a traditional state function and thus the Monell requirement applies to it as well. Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir.1997).

1. Armor's Motion

Armor argues that a prisoner cannot demand particular medical treatment when a physician is exercising medical judgment. Defendant argues that it is recognized, including by one of Plaintiffs treating doctors, Dr. Robert Hunt, that barriers to adherence and compliance must be assessed before an HIV patient is treated with antiretroviral medications. Two known barriers to adherence would include substance abuse and mental health problems....