Saville v. Quaker Hill Place

• Citation: 531 A.2d 201
• Parties: Raymond SAVILLE, Complainant Before the State Human Relations Commission, Appellee Below-Appellant, v. QUAKER HILL PLACE, Respondent Before the State Human Relations Commission, Appellant Below-Appellee. . Submitted:
• Decision Date: 23 June 1987
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 201

531 A.2d 201

Raymond SAVILLE, Complainant Before the State Human Relations Commission, Appellee Below-Appellant, v. QUAKER HILL PLACE, Respondent Before the State Human Relations Commission, Appellant Below-Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: June 23, 1987.

Decided: Sept. 10, 1987.

Upon Appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

Neilson C. Himelein, Community Legal Aid Soc., Inc., Wilmington, for appellee below-appellant.

Richard R. Wier, Jr., Prickett, Jones, Elliott, Kristol & Schnee, Wilmington, for appellant below-appellee.

Before CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY and WALSH, JJ.

HORSEY, Justice:

This appeal presents this Court with a question of first impression: the construction and application of Delaware's "Equal Rights to Housing" Act, 6 Del.C., chapter 46, as amended in 1980 (62 Del.Laws, chapter 330), in the context of a claim by a handicapped person of housing discrimination through disparate treatment in violation of section 4603(1). ¹ Raymond Saville appeals from a Superior Court decision reversing a finding by the State Human Relations Commission (the "Commission"), that the appellee, Quaker Hill Place ("Quaker Hill") unlawfully discriminated against him, in violation of 6 Del.C. § 4603(1).

On the basis of the briefs and the record we find that Saville elected to pursue a claim for disparate treatment and not a claim for disparate impact against handicapped persons generally. We further find Saville to have failed to produce substantial evidence of an intent to discriminate by Quaker Hill. Hence, Saville's section 4603 claim fails, and we must affirm the judgment of Superior Court reversing the final order of the Commission and dismissing Saville's complaint. However, we also conclude that section 4603(1) does encompass and authorize housing discrimination claims based on disparate impact (as well as disparate treatment) for which an intent to discriminate is not a prerequisite for relief.

I

The facts underlying these proceedings are fully set forth in two Superior Court opinions. Quaker Hill Place v. State Human Relations Comm'n, Del.Super., 498 A.2d 175 (1985) ("Quaker Hill I "); Quaker Hill Place v. Saville, Del.Super., 523 A.2d 947 (1987) ("Quaker Hill II "). They will thus be repeated here only as necessary.

Saville, a Vietnam war veteran, was diagnosed by his treating psychiatrist as suffering from a "Bi-Polar Disorder, Mixed Type," an apparent form of manic depression. Saville applied for housing at Quaker Hill, a private, federally subsidized housing project which provides apartments to handicapped and elderly persons. On his application, Saville wrote that he was "mentally handicapped, disabled." He submitted with his application the names of three personal references. In addition, in response to an inquiry by Quaker Hill, Saville's landlord at the time rated Saville a "good" tenant, the highest rating, and remarked that he possessed "good character." Saville's treating psychiatrist, in an attending physician's report to Quaker Hill, opined that Saville's condition was "stable," and his prognosis "good--with treatment." However, the psychiatrist also remarked that Saville "has had some charges for unusual behavior in the past." The Superior Court opinion contains a comprehensive list of the unusual behavior in which Saville had in fact or allegedly engaged. Quaker Hill II, 523 A.3d at 951-52.

Quaker Hill rejected Saville's application. Saville brought suit before the Commission, claiming that Quaker Hill had unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of a handicap, in violation of 6 Del.C. § 4603(1). Quaker Hill countered that it rejected Saville not because of his handicap, but because of his past unusual behavior. The Commission initially ruled in favor of Saville, but the Superior Court reversed and remanded. Quaker Hill I, 498 A.2d at 184. On remand, the Commission again ruled in Saville's favor. The Superior Court again reversed, this time dismissing Saville's complaint. Quaker Hill II, 523 A.2d at 968. Saville appeals that second reversal and dismissal.

II

We first address the general question of the scope of Delaware's housing discrimination statute, as amended in 1980 to extend its coverage to protect the handicapped from such discrimination. In determining the scope of the housing discrimination statute, this Court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law as expressed by the Legislature in the statute itself. The first sentence of section 4602 of the housing discrimination statute, prior to the 1980 amendments, sets forth its purpose:

4602. Purpose and Construction.

This chapter is intended to eliminate, as to housing offered to the public for sale or rent, discrimination based upon race, age, marital status, creed, color, sex or national origin, and to provide an administrative procedure through which disputes concerning the same may effectively and expeditiously be resolved with fairness and due process for all parties concerned.

6 Del.C. § 4602. The Legislature emphasized that the statute "be liberally construed to the end that its purposes may be accomplished." Id. As seen by the language adopted by the Legislature, the scope of the statute is broad, encompassing all situations where the basic purpose of the statute (the elimination of discrimination) may be achieved.

On July 8, 1980, the Delaware Legislature amended the housing discrimination statute to expressly protect the handicapped from discrimination in housing. The definition of "handicap" is set forth in section 4601, which provides, in partinent part, that:

Handicap means, with respect to a person:

a. A physical or mental impairment which substantially limits 1 or more of such person's major life activities;

b. A record of having such an impairment; or

c. Being regarded as having such an impairment.

6 Del.C. § 4601(7). The scope of this protection for the handicapped is as broad as the scope created by the pre-amendment statute because the Legislature inserted the term "handicap" to the list of protected groups in section 4602. See 6 Del.C. § 4602. Additionally, to fully incorporate the handicapped into the housing discrimination statute, the Legislature inserted the term "handicap" into the introductory language and pertinent subdivisions of section 4603 (defining the practices which the statute will deem as unlawful). See 6 Del.C. § 4603(4), (6).

Although 6 Del.C. § 4603(1) prohibits discrimination in housing based on a handicap, the parties disagree as to whether the statute requires proof of an intent to discriminate. Since this case represents the Court's first construction of this provision, the underlying elements and rationale of section 4603(1) must be determined. ²

In the absence of Delaware decisions construing this provision, the parties understandably urge reliance on decisions construing various federal antidiscrimination statutes. We agree that they are of assistance in determining what elements must be proven under section 4603. Cf. Riner v. National Cash Register, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 375, 376 (1981). Saville urges reliance on decisions construing Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631, especially section 3604 (banning discrimination in sale or rental of housing), and Section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. He emphasizes that these decisions would not require a showing of intentional discrimination. But see Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299-301, 105 S.Ct. 712, 720, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). Quaker Hill urges reliance on decisions construing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e--2000e-17 (banning discrimination in employment), decisions that would require a showing of intentional discrimination.

Saville asserts that section 3604 of Title VIII is "virtually identical" to 6 Del.C. § 4603(1); therefore, he argues, the cases construing Title VIII should be relied upon in the instant case. Indeed, but for the Delaware statute's use of the word "creed" instead of "religion," and the addition of protected classes to include age, marital status, and handicap, 6 Del.C. § 4603(1) closely resembles 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Although such similarity exists between section 4603 and Title VIII, federal case law indicates that there is considerable overlap between analysis under Title VII and analysis under other federal antidiscrimination statutes, including Title VIII. See, e.g., Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 2d Cir., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038, 1040 n. 13 (1979); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-147 (3d Cir.1977). Additionally, a comprehensive body of decisional law has developed under Title VII involving analysis of the issue of whether particular evidence demonstrates an intent to discriminate. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S.Ct. 295, 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). For these reasons, we decline to look only at one line of cases construing a particular federal antidiscrimination statute (whether it be Title VII or Title VIII cases) to the exclusion of cases construing other federal antidiscrimination statutes. The applicability of the existing federal antidiscrimination decisions must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

III

Apart from defining the "universe" of federal discrimination cases that may be relevant to determining the elements of a discrimination claim under section 4603, the parties also differ over whether this is a case of disparate treatment or of disparate impact. The determination of the type of case involved in turn determines whether proof of "intentional discrimination" is required. In the instant case, Saville argues that the issue facing this Court is whether the evidence establishes a disparate impact on the handicapped generally. Quaker Hill argues that the issue is whether the evidence...