Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes

• Decision Date: 19 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. A10–2143.,A10–2143.
• Citation: 823 N.W.2d 627
• Parties: Mitchell SAWH, Respondent/Cross–Appellant, v. CITY OF LINO LAKES, Appellant/Cross–Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

823 N.W.2d 627

Mitchell SAWH, Respondent/Cross–Appellant,

v.CITY OF LINO LAKES, Appellant/Cross–Respondent.

No. A10–2143.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 19, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The hearings that the City conducted allowing respondent to contest the designation of his dog as “dangerous” and the order to destroy the dog satisfied respondent's right to procedural due process.

2. The City's designation of respondent's dog as “dangerous” was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

3. The City's decision to destroy respondent's dog was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Marshall H. Tanick, Teresa J. Ayling, Hellmuth & Johnson PLLC, Edina, MN, for respondent.

Patricia Y. Beety, James J. Mongé III, League of Minnesota Cities, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

STRAS, Justice.

This appeal arises out of three biting incidents involving a dog owned by respondentMitchell Sawh. After the first bite, appellant City of Lino Lakes (“the City”) designated Sawh's dog as “potentially dangerous.” After the second bite, the City designated the dog as “dangerous.” And after the third bite, the City ordered the dog's destruction. Sawh appealed the City's decisions by writ of certiorari. The court of appeals reversed the City's decisions, holding that Sawh's inability to challenge the “potentially dangerous” designation violated his right to procedural due process. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 800 N.W.2d 663, 670 (Minn.App.2011). Because we conclude that Sawh was not constitutionally entitled to a hearing to challenge the “potentially dangerous” designation, and substantial evidence supports the City's decisions, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

I.

This case is about a dog named Brody. Respondent Mitchell Sawh owns Brody, a dog that was involved in three biting incidents. The first incident took place on April 8, 2010, when Brody injured C.S., who was walking near Sawh's home. C.S. told the police that Brody “ran at him barking aggressively” and “jumped up and bit his left arm.” Sergeant Kyle Leibel saw C.S.'s injury and described it as “a fairly large series of bloody scratches” that “appeared consistent with a dog's teeth.” Because of the incident, Community Service Officer Kristen Wills determined that Brody should be designated as “potentially dangerous” under Lino Lakes, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 503.15 (2011) (all references herein to the Lino Lakes City Code of Ordinances predate the substantive amendments that the City passed on October 10, 2011). Wills sent Sawh's son a letter advising him of her decision and warning him that a future bite or attack by Brody could lead the City to designate Brody as “dangerous” and possibly to order the dog's destruction. However, the City's designation of Brody as “potentially dangerous” did not result in any restrictions or limitations on Sawh's possession or enjoyment of Brody.

On October 15, 2010, approximately six months after the first incident, a second biting incident occurred. Sawh's wife was grooming Brody on the front patio of their home when D.I. crossed Sawh's yard to investigate a pile of burning leaves on a neighboring property. As D.I. walked back toward the street, Sawh's wife approached D.I. to ask about the fire. Once Sawh's wife and D.I. began chatting about the fire, Brody bit D.I. on the arm and pulled off her jacket. When Sawh's wife attempted to place Brody on the front stoop and return D.I.'s jacket, Brody bit D.I. a second time—this time on her hip. The doctor who treated D.I.'s wounds stated before the Lino Lakes City Council (“the City Council”) that the bite on D.I.'s elbow “went through every layer of the skin.” Officer Wills, who responded to the incident, designated Brody as “dangerous.” The notification to Sawh stated that “due to incidents that occurred on 04/08/2010 and 10/15/2010,” the City had designated Brody as a “dangerous animal,” which meant that the Sawhs had 14 days to remove Brody from the City. The letter further stated that, if Sawh wished to appeal the City's “dangerous animal” designation, he could schedule a hearing before the City Council.

Sawh timely requested a hearing before the City Council. At the hearing, Officer Wills described the April 8 and October 15 events to the City Council members, and Police Chief Kent Strege presented photographs of the injuries suffered by C.S. and D.I. D.I. also presented her account of the October 15 incident. Finally, Sawh, his wife, and his son each had an opportunityto speak. The Sawhs argued that the April injury was a scratch, not a bite, and that D.I. had provoked the October incident. The Sawhs also argued that Brody was a friendly dog who was not dangerous or aggressive.

Although the parties presented facts about the April incident, the City Council did not formally review the designation of Brody as “potentially dangerous.” Rather, based on the April incident, Chief Strege informed the City Council that Brody had already “reached that first threshold.” The City Council then unanimously voted to sustain Brody's designation as a “dangerous” animal. Instead of requiring Brody's destruction or permanent removal from the City, however, the City Council permitted Sawh to maintain possession of Brody if Sawh complied with a series of conditions, such as providing notice to the public that Brody is dangerous, keeping Brody enclosed or muzzled at all times, and maintaining $300,000 in liability insurance.

On November 9, 2010, the day after the hearing, a third incident involving Brody occurred. When the Sawhs were having furniture delivered to their home, the deliveryman, C.H., walked into the Sawhs' basement to view the potential location for a sofa when Brody bit C.H. once on his left hand. The police subsequently seized Brody and impounded him. The next day, Chief Strege sent Sawh a letter notifying him that the third incident constituted a “subsequent bite” under a City ordinance, requiring the City to destroy Brody.

Sawh again appealed, resulting in a second hearing before the City Council. At the hearing, the Sawhs presented numerous testimonials from friends and an animal behavior expert, all of whom stated that Brody was not aggressive or dangerous. Sawh also argued that he would take all necessary steps to ensure that Brody received proper training so that he would not pose a threat to others. Chief Strege informed the City Council that an animal control officer must order the destruction of the dog upon a finding of a subsequent violation of the City Code. After reviewing the police report of the third incident and a photograph of C.H.'s hand, the City Council found that Brody bit C.H. without provocation. The City Council also determined that the third incident constituted a “subsequent offense” under the City Code, requiring Brody's destruction.¹

Sawh sought review by writ of certiorari, and the court of appeals reversed. Sawh, 800 N.W.2d at 664, 670. The court concluded that Sawh's inability to challenge the designation of Brody as “potentially dangerous” after the first incident violated Sawh's right to procedural due process. See id. at 668–70. The court rejected the City's argument that the two hearings—the first after Officer Wills designated Brody as “dangerous” and the second after the incident involving the deliveryman—provided adequate due process to Sawh. Id. at 669. Rather, the court held that, when a city relies on a “potentially dangerous” designation as the predicate for a subsequent finding that an animal is “dangerous,” due process requires a meaningful opportunity for the animal's owner to challenge the “potentially dangerous” designation. Id. at 670. Because the City deprived Sawh of such an opportunity in this case, the court reversed both the City's designation of Brody as “dangerous” and the order to destroy the dog. Id.

We granted the City's petition for further review. We also granted Sawh's petitionfor cross-review, which challenges the City's decisions on their merits.

II.

The first question presented by this case is whether the City violated Sawh's right to procedural due process. Whether the government has violated a person's procedural due process rights is a question of law that we review de novo. See Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Minn.2005). We conduct a two-step analysis to determine whether the government has violated an individual's procedural due process rights. Id. at 768;see also Ky. Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). First, we must identify whether the government has deprived the individual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest. Carrillo, 701 N.W.2d at 768. If the government's action does not deprive an individual of such an interest, then no process is due. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570–71, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). On the other hand, if the government's action deprives an individual of a protected interest, then the second step requires us to determine “whether the procedures followed by the [government] were constitutionally sufficient.” Swarthout v. Cooke, –––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011). To determine the constitutional adequacy of specific procedures, the Supreme Court of the United States established a three-factor balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, which requires us to consider:

[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Put differently, if a protected life, liberty, or property interest is at stake, we must weigh the Mathews factors to...