Sawyer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs. & Jordan Sch. Dist., 20120850.
| Decision Date | 06 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 20120850.,20120850. |
| Parties | Amy SAWYER, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES and Jordan School District, Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Troy L. Booher, Julie J. Nelson, Tracey M. Watson, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Amanda B. McPeck, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 The Department of Workforce Services (DWS) denied Amy Sawyer's application for unemployment benefits based upon its finding that she quit her job without good cause. Ms. Sawyer appeals from the denial, arguing that (1) we should review DWS's good cause determination de novo and (2) DWS's good cause determination was in error. We conclude that good cause to quit is a fact-like mixed question of law and fact that we review deferentially. We also conclude, however, that the administrative law judge and appeals board applied an incorrect legal standard to this mixed question, and we therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 8 Prior to the formation of the court of appeals, this court did not consistently articulate the precise standard of review it applied to the cases before it. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268, 1270 n. 11 (Utah 1993). The addition of an intermediate court of appeals, however, created a greater incentive to establish standards of review that could be uniformly applied by both appellate courts. Id. Moreover, established standards of review allow attorneys to better advise clients on appellate matters and facilitate an appellant's ability to select and properly frame arguments.
¶ 9 In line with our efforts to better define the standard of review applied by appellate courts, we created an analytical framework for choosing the standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). In Pena, we held that the amount of discretion afforded in an appeal from a district court's application of a rule of law to a given set of facts is an institutional policy determination made by the appellate court.2 Id. at 938–39. Depending on the nature of the legal question at issue, we determined that varying levels of deference should be afforded to a district court's resolution of mixed questions. Id. at 937–38. We envisioned multiple standards of review for various types of mixed questions, occupying a spectrum of deference falling between the nondeferential de novo standard of review and the highly deferential clearly erroneous standard of review:
[The amount of deference] permitted a trial judge will vary depending on the legal issue, although the terminology we use to describe the operative standard of review does not begin to reflect the many shades of this variance. The best we can do is to recognize that such a spectrum of discretion exists and that the closeness of appellate review of the application of law to fact actually runs the entire length of this spectrum.
¶ 10 Although a broad spectrum of standards of review affords appellate courts a great amount of flexibility, the principal drawback of this approach is that it leads to indefinite standards that are difficult to describe and even more difficult for litigants or appellate courts to predict and apply. In Pena, for example, we held that the mixed question at issue in that case “conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge,” but “[p]recisely how much discretion we cannot say.” Id. at 939. The Pena court went on to describe this standard of review as “something less than de novo” and acknowledged that “this ‘some discretion’ standard is less than precise.” Id. at 940 & n. 6. Applying the principles announced in Pena, we have arrived at similarly indefinite standards of review, such as “some scrutiny,” “limited deference,” and “conditionally deferential.” Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997); State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 34, 137 P.3d 787;
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2007 UT 4, ¶ 15, 153 P.3d 179.
¶ 11 While we have not rejected the broad spectrum approach espoused in Pena or the various standards of review adopted in subsequent cases, in our more recent cases we have applied a binary method for determining the appropriate standard of review for mixed questions. In Manzanares v. Byington ( In re Adoption of Baby B.), 2012 UT 35, ¶¶ 42, 44, 308 P.3d 382, we stated that mixed questions can either be law-like or fact-like. See also Jex v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 40, ¶ 15, 306 P.3d 799; Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2013 UT 39, ¶ 15, 310 P.3d 1204; Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 37, 308 P.3d 461; Swallow v. Jessop ( In re United Effort Plan Trust ), 2013 UT 5, ¶ 19, 296 P.3d 742. Law-like mixed questions are reviewed de novo, while fact-like mixed questions are reviewed deferentially. Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ¶ 42, 308 P.3d 382. We took this approach in another case involving unemployment benefits, Carbon County v. Workforce Appeals Board., 2013 UT 41, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 477, and similarly conclude that the standard of review for the mixed question at issue here turns on whether it is properly characterized as either law-like or fact-like.
¶ 12 In determining whether a mixed question should be deemed law-like or fact-like, we evaluate the “marginal costs and benefits” of conducting either a searching de novo review or a deferential review of a lower tribunal's resolution of the mixed question. Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ¶ 42, 308 P.3d 382. This cost-benefit analysis is conducted through the three-factor Levin evaluation, in which we consider
(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to trial courts.
State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 25, 144 P.3d 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 13 The first and second Levin factors assess whether a particular mixed question is best resolved by either a fact-finding tribunal or an appellate court based on the relative competencies of these two types of courts. District courts and fact-finding administrative bodies are in a superior position to weigh facts that depend upon credibility determinations, the direct observation of witness testimony, and other evidence not fully captured in a written appellate record. The degree to which a mixed question is based upon facts observed by a lower tribunal determines whether the second factor weighs for or against a deferential standard of review. Appellate courts, on the other hand, have the capacity to create broad rules that can create a greater degree of consistency and predictability to future cases involving a particular mixed question. The degree to which a mixed question is based upon a complex variety of facts determines whether an appellate court can create useful precedent and, thus, whether the first factor weighs for or against de novo review.
¶ 14 The third Levin factor is a catchall category under which an appellate court may weigh other considerations. A prime example of these other policy reasons for reviewing mixed questions de novo can be found in our search and seizure jurisprudence. Despite the fact-intensive nature of determining whether police officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a search or whether a warrant was supported by probable cause, we review these questions de novo in order to provide guidance to law enforcement officials:
We have not retreated ... from exercising de novo review of equally fact-intensive matters that arise in the realm of search and seizure. We have not ceded deference in these cases both because they concern constitutional rights and because irrespective of the difficulties inherent in extracting general rules from fact-intensive matters, we nevertheless believe it a worthy endeavor to offer some guidance to law enforcement officials charged with the duty of conducting their affairs within constitutional bounds.
Salt Lake City Corp., 2007 UT 4, ¶ 15 n. 1, 153 P.3d 179. 3 The mixed question of whether a defamatory statement was made with actual malice and the issue of whether speech may be punished as obscene are likewise reviewed de novo. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ¶¶ 91–92, 130 P.3d 325; City of St. George v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929, 932–33 (Utah 1993). Other mixed questions with constitutional dimensions that we have reviewed de novo for policy reasons include whether a police interrogation was custodial, Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶¶ 41–42, 144 P.3d 1096, and whether a confession was voluntary, Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271.
¶ 15 In determining whether a lower tribunal's good-cause-to-quit determination is either law-like or fact-like, we first look to prior cases in which we have articulated a standard of review for this question. Because unemployment benefit cases are typically handled by the court of appeals, we have not decided a good-cause-to-quit case since developing a framework and terminology for determining the standard of review for mixed questions in Pena, Levin, and Baby B. Cases that predate Pena, however, are still relevant. Pena and its progeny State v....
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