Jex v. Utah Labor Comm'n

• Decision Date: 09 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 20120347.,20120347.
• Parties: Layne JEX, Petitioner, v. UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, Precision Excavating, and Owners Insurance Company, Respondents.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

306 P.3d 799

738 Utah Adv. Rep. 39

Layne JEX, Petitioner,

v.UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, Precision Excavating, and Owners Insurance Company, Respondents.

No. 20120347.

Supreme Court of Utah.

July 9, 2013.

Aaron J. Prisbrey, Trevor C. Sanders, St. George, for petitioner.

Bret A. Gardner, Kristy L. Bertelsen, Salt Lake City, for respondents Precision Excavating and Owners Insurance Company.

Alan L. Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for respondent Utah Labor Commission.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Justice LEE, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 While traveling home from work in his personal vehicle, petitioner Layne Jex sustained back injuries in a roll-over accident. He filed a workers' compensation claim shortly thereafter, which was denied. Jex appealed, first to the labor commission and then to the court of appeals. In each forum, Jex argued that in light of the benefits his employer received through various work-related uses of his vehicle, he was “in the course of employment” during his accident and thus entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. SeeUtah Code § 34A–2–401(1).

¶ 2 Both the labor commission and the court of appeals rejected Jex's claim under the general rule that employees are not in the course of their employment when traveling to or from work. In affirming the labor commission, the court of appeals also concluded that Jex did not qualify under the “instrumentality” exception to the “going and coming” rule. We affirm. We clarify the nature and scope of the going and coming rule and the instrumentality exception, conclude that Jex falls within the rule and not the exception, and reject Jex's claim to the benefit of “any doubt” about his right to workers compensation.

I

¶ 3 Jex began working for Precision Excavating as a heavy equipment operator in St. George, Utah. After a slump in the construction industry made work in St. George scarce, Jex accepted Precision's offer to work at a jobsite near Cedar City—some sixty miles north.

¶ 4 Though Jex and his fellow workers were ultimately responsible for making and paying their own way to the new jobsite, Precision designated a location for employees to meet to carpool together if they so desired. Precision also provided a company-owned truck at the meeting spot each day to ferry at least some employees. Jex rode in this truck several times, but drove his own vehicle most days. While traveling home from the jobsite in his vehicle on one such day, Jex sustained back injuries when his pickup truck rolled after a tire failure.

¶ 5 After the accident, Jex applied for workers' compensation benefits. His application was denied under the “going and coming rule”—a workers' compensation principle deeming injuries occurring during a work commute outside the “course of employment” and thus not compensable. Jex sought review of that denial before an administrative law judge (ALJ), contending that he qualified for an exception to the going and coming rule—an exception deeming a commuting accident in the “course of employment” if the vehicle is an “instrumentality” of the employer's business.

¶ 6 In advancing this exception, Jex claimed that his vehicle was employed for a number of business purposes, which in his view converted the vehicle into an instrumentality of Precision's business. First, Jex claimed that he provided transportation to Precision employees in his pickup truck. According to Jex, his supervisor at Precision asked him on several occasions to wait ten extra minutes at the company-designated meeting spot to give a ride to a chronically late employee, Nick. Jex also asserted that, on the day of the accident, he approached his supervisor and asked if he should give another employee, James, a ride home, to which the supervisor responded “Yeah go ask if he wants to go now, and give him a ride.” At the same time, the supervisor also asked Jex to give James the option of leaving with Jex or working overtime and riding home with the supervisor. For whatever reason, Jex did not relay the supervisor's second message to James, and the two left together in Jex's vehicle.

¶ 7 Next, Jex reported that he transported hydraulic fluid belonging to Precision and his personal tools—including a tape measure, a large pipe, a crescent wrench, a sledge hammer, a heavy chain, a trailer hitch, and a homemade level—in his pickup truck to Precision's jobsite for use there. Finally, Jex twice, at his supervisor's request, ran errands in his vehicle for Precision that required him to leave the jobsite and travel to Cedar City.

¶ 8 After hearing this evidence, the ALJ denied Jex's claim on the ground that these services were insufficient to qualify Jex for the instrumentality exception. As to Jex's transportation of Precision employees, the ALJ determined that the arrangement between Precision and Jex regarding Nick's ride to work was merely “loose cooperation” and “not mandated by the employer.” In the ALJ's view, though Jex complied with Precision's requests concerning Nick, it was not a job requirement for him to do so. The ALJ further noted that, on the day of the accident, Jex “offered” to give his co-worker a ride home; it was not the result of an “employer instruction.” And in the ALJ's view, the ride offered no benefit to Precision.

¶ 9 As to the personal tools Jex brought and used on the job site, the ALJ concluded that that “was not a job requirement, and was not necessary,” because Jex was able to perform his job “without problem” the days he rode in the company truck and did not have his personal tools. Finally, the ALJ concluded that though Jex used his own vehicle for two errands, a company truck was available for use on both occasions, he was compensated for his time while on these errands, and the lack of employer control over the use of the truck weighed against a finding of compensability.

¶ 10 Jex renewed the same instrumentality arguments in a motion for review to the labor commission. But the labor commission agreed with the ALJ—expressly adopting the ALJ's factual findings—and denied benefits based on the going and coming rule.

¶ 11 Jex then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. The court of appeals began with the premise that “Utah's appellate courts ... have not excepted an employee's travel to or from work from the usual rule when the travel did not confer a substantial benefit on the employer.” Jex v. Labor Comm'n, 2012 UT App 98, ¶ 12, 275 P.3d 1078. It then invoked a “substantial benefit” requirement it found in past cases, including Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT 4, 153 P.3d 179, as “a frame of reference for assessing” whether Jex's vehicle had become a limited purpose instrumentality based on its use on the day of the accident and whether it had become an all-purpose instrumentality based on the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding its use to benefit Precision generally. Jex, 2012 UT App 98, ¶¶ 13–16, 275 P.3d 1078.

¶ 12 As to the former, the court concluded that Jex's transportation of James back to St. George on the day of the accident “was not required by Precision” and did not “provide the company with any substantial benefit.” Id. ¶ 15. It thus determined that his vehicle was not an instrumentality on the day of the accident. Id. It reached the same conclusion on the second question. According to the court of appeals, “each of the activities Jex relie[d] on provided the employer with only minimal or occasional benefit” and the use of his vehicle to benefit Precision was typically “the result of his unilateral decision, rather than a requirement of his position.” Id. ¶ 23. The court ultimately concluded that absent a showing of “more regular demands” on the use of Jex's vehicle or the presence of “a more pervasive benefit,” the court would not disturb the commission's decision. Id.

¶ 13 Jex filed a petition for certiorari, seeking review of the court of appeal's decision that the “going and coming rule” defeated his claim for workers' compensation benefits because his vehicle did not qualify as an all-purpose instrumentality of Precision's business. We granted that petition.

¶ 14 We consider the court of appeals' decision under a correctness standard of review, affording no deference to its consideration of the labor commission's decision. Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997). In evaluating the correctness of the court of appeals' decision, however,we consider “whether the court of appeals reviewed the decision of the Commission with the appropriate standard of review.” Id.

¶ 15 Whether the commission correctly or incorrectly denied benefits is “a traditional mixed question of law and fact.” See Murray v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 34, 308 P.3d 461, 2013 WL 3246403. “The standard of review we apply when reviewing a mixed question can be either deferential or non-deferential.” Id. ¶ 36. Deference on a mixed question is warranted when “the mixed finding is not ‘law-like’ because it does not lend itself to consistent resolution by a uniform body of appellate precedent” or “ is ‘fact-like’ because the [factfinder] is in a superior position to decide it.” Id. ¶ 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 16 Whether benefits are barred by the “going and coming” rule is such a mixed question. Given the varied factual postures possible in “going and coming” cases and the fact-intensive nature of the question, the matter does not lend itself easily to consistent resolution through a “uniform body of appellate precedent.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And because the ALJ and the commission have firsthand exposure to the evidence in such cases, their view of the matter is superior to ours. The commission's decision denying benefits is accordingly entitled to deference.

II

¶ 17 Under our Workers' Compensation Act, employees who are accidentally injured “in the course of [their] employment” are entitled to compensation. Utah...