Sawyers v. Atlas Logistics, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 October 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:20-cv-0393
• Parties: MARY SAWYERS et al. v. ATLAS LOGISTICS, INC. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

MARY SAWYERS et al. v. ATLAS LOGISTICS, INC. et al.

Case No. 3:20-cv-0393

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

October 30, 2020

Chief Judge Crenshaw

Magistrate Judge Holmes

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On October 9, 2020, a motion to intervene was filed by Marylin Hosendove (in her individual capacity and as the identified executrix of the probate estate of Christopher Mayes¹), Curtis Hosendove, Jr., and Reginald F. Mayes (individually by name or collectively the "movants" or the "intervenors"). (Docket No. 22.) Plaintiff Mary Sawyers ("Sawyers") filed a response in opposition on October 23, 2020. (Docket No. 23.)² Movants filed a reply on October 28, 2020. (Docket No. 25.) On October 29, 2020, the Court entered an order granting the movants' motion to intervene. (Docket No. 27.) The Court's ruling is further explicated as follows.

I. BACKGROUND

Familiarity with this case is presumed and only those facts or circumstances necessary for context to the Court's ruling are recited. The underlying facts of this specific contest are generally not disputed. Sawyers originally brought a wrongful death action against Atlas Logistics in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, Tennessee on March 13, 2020 for the death of Christopher Mayes that occurred on November 5, 2019. (Docket No. 1-1.)³ By notice of removal on May 6, 2020, the action was removed to this Court by defendant Atlas Logistics under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) and (b) and the Court's diversity jurisdiction. (Docket No. 1.)

An initial case management order setting up a case management schedule was entered on July 1, 2020. (Docket No. 13.) An order setting the case for a bench trial on March 15, 2022 was entered on July 2, 2020. (Docket No. 14.) A second amended complaint was filed on October 29, 2020 (Docket No. 28) adding additional defendants identified in discovery, upon Sawyers' motion for leave filed on October 8. (Docket No. 21.)

The original plaintiff Sawyers, and movants Marylin Hosendove, Curtis Hosendove, Jr. and Reginald Mayes, are siblings of the decedent Christopher Mayes.⁴ The movants seek tointervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure⁵ or, alternatively, by permission under Rule 24(b)(1)(B). Sawyers opposes the requested intervention.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) does not include motions to intervene as dispositive motions that would require the issuance of a report and recommendation. Some courts, including this one, have treated the denial of motions to intervene as being functionally equivalent to a dispositive motion, see, e.g., Meeks v. Schofield, No. 3:12-CV-545, 2013 WL 1826438, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 30, 2013); Washington Mut. Bank v. Chiapetta, No. 1:07-CV-00683, 2011 WL 1743389, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 6, 2011), based on the reasoning that the denial to intervene is dispositive for the party seeking to intervene. Other courts have, however, treated motions to intervene as non-dispositive, even when intervention is denied. See United States v. Marsten Apartments, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 265, 267-69, n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Oakland Cty. v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 276 F.R.D. 491, 493, n.1 (E.D. Mich. 2011); In re Wholesale Grocery Prod. Antitrust Litig., No. 09-MD-2090 ADM/TNL, 2015 WL 4992363, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2015); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. ex rel. Holley v. United States, No. CIV.A. 02-1799, 2003 WL 1873089, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 10, 2003). Because the motion to intervene is granted, and therefore not dispositive of any party's rights, the Court has considered the motion to intervene as a non-dispositive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).⁶

A. Intervention of Right

In the Sixth Circuit, "to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2), a proposed intervenor must establish the following four elements: (1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) the proposed intervenor has a substantial legal interest in the subject matter of the case; (3) the proposed intervenor's ability to protect that interest may be impaired in the absence of intervention; and (4) the parties already before the court may not adequately represent the proposed intervenor's interest." United States v. Michigan, 424 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1999)). "The proposed intervenor must prove each of the four factors; failure to meet one of the criteria will require that the motion to intervene be denied." Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989). Upon consideration of the required elements, the Court finds that the movants have a right to intervene in this action.

1. Timeliness

Sawyers does not dispute that the motion to intervene is timely. See Response, Docket No. 23 at 2. This first required element is therefore met.

2. Substantial Legal Interest

The Sixth Circuit has adopted an expansive notion of the interest sufficient to invoke intervention of right. See e.g. Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 947-48 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing the liberality of construction of the terms "substantial" and "interest," including that a specific legal or equitable interest is not required nor is standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit); Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1987) ("interest" is liberally construed citing Hatton v. County Bd. of Educ. of Maury County, Tenn., 422 F.2d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 1970)). Seealso Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging expansive construction of substantial legal interest requirement for intervention of right). Further, the rules governing intervention are to be broadly construed in favor of the proposed intervenors. Id. at 1246 (quoting Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995)). At a minimum, the interest must be one that is "significantly protectable." Grubbs, 870 F.2d at 346.

Given this liberal and expansive construction of "substantial legal interest," the Court finds Sawyers' arguments unavailing. Without addressing the distinction in every case relied upon by Sawyers, the Court is satisfied that none of them compels any different outcome.⁷ Fatal to Sawyers' position is the undisputed fact that the movants hold legal interests in this wrongful death claim that are identical to that held by Sawyers.⁸

Sawyers does not dispute - nor could she - that, as other siblings of the decedent, the movants are also beneficiaries of the claim arising from the decedent's allegedly wrongful death. The Tennessee Court of Appeals has cogently explained the structure and application of the wrongful death statute:

Wrongful death actions are governed purely by statute in Tennessee. At common law, there was no action that survivors could bring for the wrongful death of arelative. Foster v. Jeffers, 813 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). As a result, it was more economically prudent in some cases to kill a person than to merely inflict a nonfatal injury. Id. To negate that moral dilemma, legislatures enacted wrongful death statutes aimed at keeping a decedent's cause of action from dying with the decedent. Id. Tennessee's wrongful death statute provides:

The right of action that a person who dies from injuries received from another, or whose death is caused by the wrongful act, omission, or killing by another, would have had against the wrongdoer, in case death had not ensued, shall not abate or be extinguished by the person's death but shall pass to the person's surviving spouse and, in case there is no surviving spouse, to the person's children or next of kin[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a). Notably, the statute does not create any right of action existing independently of that which the decedent would have had, if he or she had survived. Kline v. Eyrich, 69 S.W.3d 197, 206-07 (Tenn. 2002). Although the living beneficiaries of the action may seek limited recovery for their own losses in addition to those of the decedent, the right of action itself remains one that is single, entire, and indivisible. Id. at 206 (citing Hill v. Germantown, 31 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Tenn. 2000); Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hosp., 984 S.W.2d 593, 598 (Tenn. 1999)).

Because multiple actions may not be brought to resolve a single wrongful death claim, the wrongful death statutes carefully prescribe the priority of those who may assert the action on behalf of the decedent and his or her other beneficiaries:

The [wrongful death] action may be instituted by the personal representative of the deceased or by the surviving spouse in the surviving spouse's own name, or, if there is no surviving spouse, by the children of the deceased or by the next of kin[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-107(a). The statutes governing intestate succession govern priorities among next of kin. See House v. Gibson, 827 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

Thus, the superior right to bring a wrongful death action falls first to a surviving spouse, then to any children, then to a parent, then to a sibling, then to a grandparent. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-104. An inferior beneficiary may not sue until those persons with a superior right waive their right of action. Koontz v. Fleming, 62 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933). Notably, however, an adult beneficiary may waive his or her superior right to maintain a wrongful death action by permitting an inferior beneficiary's action to stand without objection. Busby v. Massey, 686 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1984) (citing Koontz, 62 S.W.2d at 824).

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A beneficiary may impliedly waive his or her superior right to file a wrongful death action by permitting the plaintiff's action to stand without objection. See Busby, 686 S.W.2d at 62. ... Furthermore, the statute prescribing the priority of those who may assert a wrongful death action is intended to protect defendants from the expense of defending multiple lawsuits arising from a single injury to a

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