Scarlette v. Grindstaff, 377
| Decision Date | 21 November 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 377,377 |
| Citation | 258 N.C. 159,128 S.E.2d 221 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Alice G. SCARLETTE v. Everette GRINDSTAFF, Charles Whitney, and Kenneth Scarlette. |
W. H. Steed, Thomasville, for plaintiff appellee.
Jordan, Wright, Henson & Nichols, by Charles E. Nichols, and G. Marlin Evans, Greensboro, for defendant Whitney.
Walser & Brinkley, by Walter F. Brinkley, Lexington, for defendant Scarlette.
Each defendant assigns a single error--the refusal to allow his motion to nonsuit. Each asserts the evidence is insufficient to establish his negligence. Each asserts the evidence establishes as a matter of law plaintiff's contributory negligence barring recovery.
The evidence would permit a jury to find these facts: The drivers agreed before the towing started that Whitney would warn Scarlette before Whitney reduced his speed. The agreed warning signal was the waving of a hand extended out of the window. Additionally Searlette would be warned by the brake lights when pressure was applied to the brake pedal of the Whitney car. The towing operation had covered seventy-five miles or more before the accident occurred. The cars traveled at a maximum speed of 40 to 45 m. p. h. They passed over several bridges before reaching the Yadkin. Whitney always slowed down in approaching and crossing a bridge. Traveling eastwardly, as the cars were, there is a crest to a hill and then a decline to the bridge. Seventyfive to a hundred feet from the bridge there is a thirty-degree curve to the left. The paved portion of the highway is slightly wider than the bridge. As the cars approached the bridge, a truck, going west, was crossing the bridge. When within a few feet of the bridge, Whitney abruptly slowed his car without giving the agreed hand signal. Scarlette swerved his car and struck the side of the bridge. This collision caused plaintiff's injuries.
Every operator of a motor vehicle is required to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to persons or property of another. G.S. § 20-140. A failure to so operate proximately resulting in injury to another gives rise to a cause of action. Black v. Gurley Milling Co., 257 N.C. 730, 127 S.E.2d 515; McEwen Funeral Service v. Charlotte City Coach Lines, 248 N.C. 146, 102 S.E.2d 816; Tatem v. Tatem, 245 N.C. 587, 96 S.E.2d 725; Cox v. Lee, 230 N.C. 155, 52 S.E.2d 355.
Undoubtedly the parties recognized towing the Scarlette vehicle in the manner described on much-traveled highways, U. S. 40 and 64, was not a normal operation. It called for more than ordinary alertness and caution on the part of each driver. 5A Am. Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffic, s. 424. The Scarlette car was measurably under the control of the Whitney car. In recognition of that fact, the drivers agreed upon a system of signals to be given by Whitney which would permit Scarlette to conform his operation to the movement of the towing car. The evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding that Whitney failed to give the agreed signal, and this failure was one of the causes of the collision.
The agreement with respect to signals did not, however, relieve Scarlette of his duty of keeping a proper lookout and controlling the movement of his car as best he could to avoid hazards which he observed or should have observed. Rhyne v. Bailey, 254 N.C. 467, 119 S.E.2d 385; Currin v....
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Miller v. Lucas, U-H
...property of another. A failure to so operate proximately causing injury to another gives rise to a cause of action. Scarlette v. Grindstaff, 258 N.C. 159, 128 S.E.2d 221, and cases Considering plaintiff's evidence in the light most favorable to her, and considering so much of U-Haul Company......
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