Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Hodge

Decision Date08 July 1947
Docket NumberCase Number: 33158,Case Number: 33161
Citation183 P.2d 575,199 Okla. 81,1947 OK 220
PartiesSCHOOL DIST. NO. 25 v. HODGE
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Syllabus

¶0 1. STATUTES - Subjects and titles - Act (H. B. 85) 1947 Legislature embraces one subject expressed in title thereof.

House Bill 85 (1947) embraces but one subject and this subject is clearly expressed in the title thereof.

2. SAME - SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS - Sections 1 and 2 of Act do not levy a tax - Provisions for furnishing aid to school district held to operate uniformly.

No tax is levied by sections 1 and 2, art. 1, of the Act; said sections operate uniformly and without discrimination throughout the state.

3. SAME - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Sections 1 and 2, apportioning revenue derived from different sources, do not constitute appropriation of funds, and are not violative of section 56, art. 5, Constitution.

Section 1, with apportions certain revenue derived from the Motor Vehicle Registration Act, and section 2, article 1, which apportions revenue derived from the Gross Production Act, do not constitute an appropriation of these classes of revenue and are not violative of section 56, art. 5, in that the Act as a whole embraces two subjects in one appropriation act.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS - Powers granted by article 2 of Act (1947) relating to annexation of school districts and authorizing exercise of power in connection therewith, held not to contravene section 5, art. 13, Constitution.

The constitutional provision, section 5, art. 13, vesting the power of supervision of instruction in the public schools in the State Board of Education is not a limitation but a grant of power. The powers granted by article 2 of the act relating to the annexation of school districts and authorizing the exercising of power in connection therewith by the State Board of Education do not contravene said section 5, art. 13 of the Constitution.

5. SAME - Funds apportioned to counties under sections 1 and 2 of Act for use and support of common schools, held not to become part of common school funds and provisions of article 11, Const., do not apply.

By sections 1 and 2, art. 1 of the act, apportionment is made of funds accumulated from vehicle license fees and gross production taxes to counties, thereafter to be apportioned to school districts for the use and support of the common schools of the counties. These funds never become a part of the common school fund and the constitutional provisions of article 11 have no application.

6. TAXATION - SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS - Provisions of Act relating to distribution and allotment of revenue held to constitute apportionment upon reasonable classification basis.

The provisions of article 1, section 1 (b) and section 2 of the act, providing for distribution of a portion of the auto and farm truck license tax and the gross production tax to schools, requiring that said portions be paid to the county treasurer of the respective counties and by him allotted within his county on an average daily attendance per capita distribution basis to the school districts of the county where pupils attend school, constitute an apportionment upon a reasonable classification basis.

7. STATUTES - TAXATION - Act (sec. 5a, art. 1) neither attempts nor makes mandatory a levy of ad valorem taxes.

No levy of ad valorem taxes is attempted to be made by section 5 (a), art. 1 of the act, nor is any levy made mandatory thereunder.

8. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Subjecting taxable property in annexed territory to taxation not violative of sec. 26, art. 10, Const.

Section 26, art. 10 of the Constitution is not violated by subjecting the taxable property in annexed territory to taxation to pay the pre-existing and continuing debts of the district to which it is annexed.

Application for writ of prohibition by petitioners as taxpayers and residents, in behalf of School District No. 25, Woods County, Oklahoma, et al. against Oliver Hodge, State Superintendent of Public Instruction of the State of Oklahoma, et al., to prohibit respondents from any proceedings under H.B. 85 of 1947 Legislature. Consolidated with case No. 33161, School Districts Nos. 1, 2, 3, et al. of Kay County, Oklahoma, et al. v. Oliver Hodge, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al. Writs denied.

L.Z. Lasley and H.C. Crandall, both of Alva, Bruce B. Potter, of Blackwell, Ross & Ross, of Newkirk, John Drennan and Ellis Eddy, both of Medford, T.R. Wise of Sayre, Marshall Word, of Arnett, F.C. Duval, of Ponca City, and Charles G. Ozmun, of Lawton, for petitioners.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., and Richard M. Huff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

ARNOLD, J.

¶1 In an effort to more adequately fulfill its duty under the Constitution to maintain a system of free public schools wherein all the children of the state may be educated (article 13, sec. 1, Constitution) the 1947 Session of the Legislature passed engrossed House Bill No. 85. It presents a comprehensive plan of reorganization. of school districts, transferring of pupils and equitable distribution to complying districts of $18,000,000 appropriated by the same Legislature and other funds on a uniform basis to school districts so that all the children of the state might have the benefits of education according to the minimum standards of education set up by the Legislature in the act. The act says "the right of every child to a free common school education, including high school but not including kindergartens and junior college, is hereby guaranteed."

¶2 Though the purposes of the act are known to be commendable and in furtherance of the foregoing constitutional mandate, it is not for the courts to say that the legislation is good, bad advisable or inadvisable in whole or in part. The determination of the policy to be pursued in matters of enactment. of legislation to discharge its constitutional responsibility to the people in matters of education is a question that rests solely with the Legislature. In such an attack as is here made on the act, the only justiciable question is: Did the Legislature act within the powers granted to it or did it exercise its authority arbitrarily and capriciously, thereby transcending its power?

¶3 Where the constitutionality of an act. of the Legislature is in question, all reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of the questioned authority and the act will be declared constitutional unless it can be clearly demonstrated that the Legislature did not have the power or authority exercised or that its authority was exercised arbitrarily and capriciously, for instance, as to classification or delegation of authority, to the prejudice of the rights of some of the citizens. Particularly is this true where the act in question is, as here, of great public concern involving the performance of an absolute duty imposed on the Legislature by the basic law of the state. See Associated Industries of Oklahoma v. Industrial Welfare Comm. et al., 185 Okla. 177, 90 P.2d 899; Herrin et al. v. Arnold, Judge, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977; Townsend et al. v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 81 L.Ed. 1211; Excise Board of Ottawa County v. St. Louis, S. F. Ry. Co., 176 Okla. 641, 57 P.2d 261; Pawnee County Excise Board v: Kurn, 187 Okla. 110, 101 P.2d 614; Gibson Products Co. of Tulsa v. Murphy, State Labor Com'r, et al., 186 Okla. 714, 100 P.2d 453; Brown v. State Election Board et al. (Foley, Intervener), 197 Okla. 169, 170 P.2d 200.

¶4 The act is severable and therefore the unconstitutionality of any severable part of the act will not affect the validity of otherwise constitutional parts of the act. Johnson v. State Election Board, 197 Okla. 211, 167 P.2d 891; Sterling Refining Co. v. Walker 165 Okla. 45, 25 P.2d 312; Musick, County Supt., v. State ex rel. Miles, 185 Okla. 140, 90 P.2d 631; Dowell v. Board of Education, 185 Okla. 342, 91 P.2d 771.

¶5 Any severable portion of the act, though invalid, will not be discussed by us nor determined at this time because not of demanding present importance and the other circumstances maintaining, unless it appears that the enforcement thereof would adversely and prejudicially affect the parties hereto or those similarly situated. The applications herein, both alleging various grounds of unconstitutionality, on behalf of various school districts of the same and different counties, were filed June 9, 1947, and June 13, 1947, respectively. The act became effective by its terms on July 1, 1947. Some of the features of the act which are alleged to be unconstitutional will not become operative or be put into operation except upon the happening of a future contingency that may not occur, though respondents admit that they shall, to the best of their ability, put all of the valid provisions of said act into operation if, as and when the contingency arises which would demand their enforcement; other severable portions of the act, if enforced, might not affect the parties here or those similarly situated adversely. The importance of this matter of great public concern and the urgency of a decision as to the constitutionality of the act generally have demanded great speed on the part of the attorneys for petitioners and respondents and the court. It is not deemed advisable under all the circumstances to pass upon questions raised which will arise only under the happening of a future contingency that may not occur or that relate to severable matters that may not affect the parties, or any one similarly situated, prejudicially.

¶6 It is first contended that the act is invalid because its title is insufficient under the provisions of article 5, sec. 57, of the Constitution of Oklahoma. That section of the Constitution, insofar as its language is material to be considered here, reads:

"Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title . . . provided, that if any subject be
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