Sch. Dist. of Escambia Cnty. v. Santa Rosa Dunes Owners Ass'n, Inc.
Decision Date | 30 May 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 1D18-91,1D18-91 |
Citation | 274 So.3d 492 |
Parties | The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ESCAMBIA COUNTY, Florida, Appellant, v. SANTA ROSA DUNES OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
David C. Willis, Daniel J. Gerber, and Christian H. Tiblier of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A., Orlando; William A. VanNortwick, Jr. of Akerman LLP, Jacksonville; and Diane G. DeWolf of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Edward P. Fleming and R. Todd Harris of McDonald Fleming Moorhead, Pensacola, for Appellee.
The Santa Rosa Dunes Owners Association, Inc., sued the Escambia County Property Appraiser and Escambia County Tax Collector, disputing a tax assessment of property underlying the Association's condominium development. The Association claimed that its property was exempt from ad valorem taxation under section 196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2016). The School District of Escambia County intervened in the suit and asserted that the Association's property should be taxed because the statutory exemption was unconstitutional. The Association challenged the District's standing to intervene, arguing that the public official standing doctrine barred the District's constitutional challenge. The trial court agreed that the District lacked standing and entered summary judgment for the Association on the District's affirmative defenses. This appeal follows.
The public official standing doctrine, first explained in State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co. v. State Board of Equalizers , 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681 (1922), provides that "a public official may not defend his nonperformance of a statutory duty by challenging the constitutionality of the statute." Crossings At Fleming Island Cmty. Dev. Dist. v. Echeverri , 991 So.2d 793, 794-803 (Fla. 2008). The doctrine, grounded in the separation of powers, recognizes that public officials are obligated to obey the legislature's duly enacted statute until the judiciary passes on its constitutionality. Id. at 683. For that reason, a public official's "[d]isagreement with a constitutional or statutory duty, or the means by which it is to be carried out, does not create a justiciable controversy or provide an occasion to give an advisory judicial opinion." Dep't of Revenue v. Markham , 396 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1981) (, )superseded by statute , § 195.092(2), Fla. Stat. (1980), as recognized in Crossings At Fleming Island , 991 So.2d at 802-03 ( ).
The parties do not dispute that the District is a public entity and its officers are public officials. But the District contends that the public official standing doctrine applies only when the challenged statute is one that the public officials are "charged with administering." Section 196.199(2)(b) exempts from ad valorem taxation certain leasehold interests in government-owned property used for non-governmental purposes. The plain language of the statute does not require the District to perform any duty. The District's lack of a duty under the statute, however, does not resolve whether the District has standing to challenge the statute.
The Florida Supreme Court and this Court have on several occasions considered challenges to the constitutionality of section 196.199(2)(b) brought by public officials. First, in Crossings At Fleming Island , a county property appraiser challenged the constitutionality of the statute. 991 So.2d at 798. The supreme court held that the property appraiser lacked standing to challenge the statute because the property appraiser was a public official charged with performing a specific duty under the statute—the duty of determining whether property owners are entitled to an exemption from taxation under the statute. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court reaffirmed the public official standing doctrine and its holding in Atlantic Coast Line . Id. at 797.
Next, in Island Resorts Investments, Inc. v. Jones , 189 So.3d 917, 922-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), this Court considered whether the public official standing doctrine barred a challenge to the statute brought by two public officials—the property appraiser, who is charged with performing a duty under the statute, and the tax collector, who is not charged with performing any duty under the statute. Though the plain language of the statute did not require the tax collector to perform any duty, this Court, citing the decisions in Crossings at Fleming Island and Atlantic Coast Line , concluded that the tax collector lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 196.199(2)(b). Island Resorts , 189 So.3d at 922.
The District is in the same position as the tax collector in Island Resorts . Neither are charged with performing any duty under section 196.199(2)(b). Still, the District argues it had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. The District misunderstands the public official standing doctrine. The doctrine exists to prevent public officials from nullifying legislation through their refusal to abide by the law and requires them instead to defer to the judiciary's authority to consider the constitutionality of a legislative act. Atl. Coast Line , 94 So. at 682-83 (). The prohibition against public officials attacking the constitutionality of a statute is therefore not limited to those public officials charged with a duty under the challenged law. Consistent with the purpose of the doctrine, the prohibition extends to public officials whose duties are "affected" by the challenged law. See Crossings At Fleming Island , 991 So.2d at 800 ( )(emphasis added); Dep't of Educ. v. Lewis , 416 So.2d 455, 458 (Fla. 1982) () (emphasis added); Santa Rosa Cty. v. Admin. Comm'n, Div. of Admin. Hearings , 642 So.2d 618, 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) [hereinafter Santa Rosa Cty. I ], approved in part, disapproved in part , 661 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 1995) [hereinafter Santa Rosa Cty. II ] (same); Miller v. Higgs , 468 So.2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) disapproved on other grounds by Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker , 613 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1993) (same); Markham , 396 So.2d at 1121 () (emphasis added).
Even though section 196.199(2)(b) does not specifically require the District to perform any duty, the statute's operation affects the District's duty to levy ad valorem taxes under other statutory provisions. See Art. VII, § 9, Fla. Const.; § 1011.71(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) ( ); § 1011.04, Fla. Stat. (2016) ( ); § 1001.42, Fla. Stat. (2016) ( ). The District argues that applying section 196.199(2)(b) to grant the Association's property an exemption will affect the District's ability to levy ad valorem taxes. Because the public official standing doctrine broadly prohibits ministerial officers from challenging legislative enactments, and because the statute at issue affects the official duties of the District, the trial court correctly found that the District lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 196.199(2)(b).
The District argues that it may nonetheless attack the constitutionality of the statute because the personal injury exception to the public official standing doctrine applies. This exception confers standing on a public official to bring a constitutional challenge when the official can show injury to his person, property, or other material right by the statute in question. Crossings At Fleming Island , 991 So.2d at 799 (quoting Barr v. Watts , 70 So.2d 347, 350 (Fla. 1953) (en banc)). The District alleges it would have to refund about seven million dollars in ad valorem tax revenue it has already collected and...
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