Schad v. Schriro

Decision Date28 September 2006
Docket NumberNo. CV-97-2577-PHX-ROS.,CV-97-2577-PHX-ROS.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Arizona
PartiesEdward Harold SCHAD, Petitioner, v. Dora SCHRIRO, et al.,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>, Respondents.

Denise I. Young, Tucson, AZ, Henry Martin, Kelley J. Henry, Federal Public Defender's Office, Nashville, TN, Petitioner.

Jon George Anderson, Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, for Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SILVER, District Judge.

Petitioner Edward Harold Schad filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that he is imprisoned and sentenced to death in violation of the United States Constitution. (Dkt.1).2 The Amended Petition raised twenty-eight claims, including numerous subclaims. (Dkt.27). In an Order dated May 8, 2000, the Court found that Claims C, D, E, F, G, I (in part), K, N (in part), P (in part), T, U (in part), X, Z, AA (in part), and BB were procedurally barred, and that Claims S, V, W, and Y were meritless. (Dkt.59.) The Court found that Claims A, B, H, I (in part), J, L, M, N (in part), O, P (in part), Q, R, U (in part), and AA (in part) were properly exhausted, and ordered Petitioner to file a memorandum regarding the merits of those claims. (Id.) Petitioner filed a merits brief. (Dkt.82.) Respondents filed an answering brief on the merits (Dkt.91), and Petitioner filed a reply (Dkt.98).

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

BACKGROUND

On December 14, 1978, Petitioner was indicted for first-degree murder. (ROAPCR 2.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarized the facts of the crime as follows:

On August 9, 1978, a badly decomposed body of an elderly male was found approximately nine miles south of Prescott, Arizona, adjacent to a roadway pull-off on U.S. Highway 89. The body was discovered after a highway department worker had detected the odor of decaying human flesh the previous day while driving past the pull-off. Although the worker and his coworker had stopped briefly to investigate the odor on August 8, the body was not actually discovered until the next day due to the fact that it was well concealed in the brush. After the corpse was discovered, the Yavapai County Sheriff's Department and the County Medical Examiner observed a small rope tied around the victim's neck. It was later established that the cause of death was strangulation.

Because of the advanced state of decomposition, the body was not identified until October 11, 1978, when it was established that the deceased was Lorimer "Leroy" Grove, a 74-year-old Bisbee resident. Grove had last been seen on August 1, 1978, in Bisbee, Arizona. On that morning, Grove left Bisbee driving a new Cadillac, pulling a camper-trailer. His ultimate destination was Everett, Washington, where he had intended to visit his sister.

On August 3, 1978, a dark green Ford Fairmont was found abandoned 30 miles north of Flagstaff, Arizona, alongside U.S. Highway 89 by a Department of Public Safety Highway Patrolman. It was subsequently determined that the Fairmont had been rented by the defendant from a Ford dealership in Sandy, Utah, on December 31, 1977. Although the vehicle had been rented for the weekend, it was never returned and had been reported as stolen. The vehicle was turned over to the Coconio County Sheriffs Department and was impounded at a local towing yard. On September 12, 1978, two officers examined the vehicle in connection with an investigation of possible homicide charges against defendant. Several items belonging to the victim were found in the Fairmont, including a mirror device which was identified as being similar to one used by the deceased to hook the trailer to the automobile by himself.

On September 3, 1978, defendant was stopped by a New York Highway Trooper, for speeding, while driving the victim's Cadillac. When the defendant could not produce a registration on the vehicle, the officer asked for an explanation. Defendant replied that it wasn't his car but that he was delivering it for a friend to an area five or ten miles from where the officer stopped him. Asked who was [sic] the friend was, defendant said he was an elderly gentleman by the name of Larry Grove.

Defendant was arrested in Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 8, 1978, for parole violation. Defendant had been on parole from the Utah State Penitentiary where he had been serving a sentence for second degree murder conviction. After defendant was arrested and taken into custody, the Cadillac was taken to the Salt Lake City Police Department impound lot where it was searched. Various personal items were found in the car which were identified as belonging to the victim.

State v. Schad, 129 Ariz. 557, 561-62, 633 P.2d 366, 370-71 (1981) (Schad I).

On October 5, 1979, a jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder. (ROA-PCR 56). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to death. (M.E.12/27/79). The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Schad I, 129 Ariz. 557, 633 P.2d 366. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. Schad v. Arizona, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982). Pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), which the trial court denied. Upon petition for review, however, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Schad, 142 Ariz. 619, 691 P.2d 710 (1984) (Schad II).

Petitioner was retried, and on June 27, 1985, a jury again convicted him of first-degree murder. (ROA-PCR 196). On August 29, 1985, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to death. (M.E.8/29/85). Petitioner appealed, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. State v. Schad, 163 Ariz. 411, 423, 788 P.2d 1162, 1174 (1989) (Schad III). Petitioner sought certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence.3 Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 648, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991). The Court also denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing. 501 U.S. 1277, 112 S.Ct. 28, 115 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1991).

Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in the trial court by filing both a preliminary petition for post-conviction relief (ROA-PCR 245) and a supplemental statement of grounds for relief (ROA-PCR 319). The court found most of the claims contained in both the preliminary and the supplemental PCR precluded. (M.E.3/27/96.) The court reviewed the merits of the remaining claims and dismissed the petitions. (M.E.6/21/96.) The court also denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing. (M.E.7/24/96.) Petitioner filed a petition for review (ROA-PCR 347), which the Arizona Supreme Court denied without comment.

On December 16, 1997, Petitioner filed a Preliminary Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. (Dkt.1.) He filed his Amended Petition on August 3, 1998. (Dkt.27.)

LEGAL STANDARD FOR FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF

Petitioner's claims are governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). For properly preserved claims "adjudicated on the merits" by a state court, the AEDPA established a more rigorous standard for habeas relief. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (Miller-El I). As the Supreme Court has explained, the AEDPA's "`highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' . . . demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2059).

As set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the AEDPA provides two avenues of habeas relief:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

"The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [petitioner] seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the "clearly established Federal law," if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. "Clearly established" federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's state court conviction became final. Id. at 365, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir.2005) ("AEDPA limits the source of clearly-established federal law to Supreme Court cases"); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.2003). Habeas relief cannot be granted if the Supreme Court has not "broken sufficient legal ground" on a constitutional principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is binding, circuit court precedent may be of "persuasive value" in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 655 (collecting cases); see Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069.

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