Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr.
| Decision Date | 11 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. A11–1171.,A11–1171. |
| Citation | 811 N.W.2d 643 |
| Parties | Andrea A. SCHATZ, Relator, v. INTERFAITH CARE CENTER and New Hampshire Insurance Company/Chartis, Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. No conflict exists between Minn.Stat. § 176.135, subd. 1 (2010), and Minn.Stat. § 176.136, subd. 1b(d) (2010), with respect to an employer's liability for the amounts charged for treatment furnished by a medical provider located outside of Minnesota. Specifically, Minn.Stat. § 176.136, subd. 1b(d), operates to limit the liability of an employer to pay an out-of-state medical provider in accordance with the workers' compensation fee schedule of that state.
2. Minnesota Statutes § 176.136, subd. 1b(d), as applied, does not violate relator's constitutional rights to interstate travel, equal protection, or due process.
James B. Peterson, Falsani, Balmer, Peterson, Quinn & Beyer, Duluth, MN, for relator.
Nicole B. Surges, Erstad & Riemer, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondents.
Relator, Andrea A. Schatz, who was employed by Interfaith Care Center, was injured in a work-related accident in Minnesota, and then moved to Wyoming where she received medical treatment. The Wyoming medical providers submitted their charges to New Hampshire Insurance Company, the employer's workers' compensation insurer. Relying on Minn.Stat. § 176.136, subd. 1b(d) (2010), the insurer made payments in the amount provided under the workers' compensation benefit structure in Wyoming. Schatz filed a workers' compensation medical request for the unpaid balance, arguing that Minn.Stat. § 176.135, subd. 1 (2010), was controlling. The workers' compensation judge agreed and found for Schatz, and the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed. Because we conclude that Minn.Stat. § 176.136, subd. 1b(d), limits a Minnesota employer's workers' compensation liability to an out-of-state medical provider to the amounts provided in the workers' compensation schedule of benefits in the state where the provider is located, and that section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), is not unconstitutional as applied, we affirm.
Schatz injured her left shoulder in a work-related accident on January 26, 2009. At the time of the accident, Schatz resided in Minnesota. Interfaith Care Center and the workers' compensation insurer, New Hampshire Insurance Company, accepted liability for the injury.
Subsequently, Schatz moved to Wyoming where she received medical treatment for her shoulder injury. Her medical treatment included surgery to her left shoulder in October 2009, and a second surgery in January 2010. The surgeries were performed by a physician from Thunder Basin Orthopaedics in Gillette, Wyoming; anesthesia for both surgeries was provided by Wyoming Regional Anesthesia.
Both Wyoming medical providers submitted their bills to the workers' compensation insurer for payment. The workers' compensation insurer relied on section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), to limit the amounts of its payments to those set forth in the workers' compensation schedule of benefits in Wyoming. Subsequently, Thunder Basin Orthopaedics billed Schatz for the balance of $5,796.92, and Wyoming Regional Anesthesia billed Schatz for the balance of $1,401.44.
After Schatz requested and Interfaith and the workers' compensation insurer refused to pay the remaining balance of either Wyoming medical provider, Schatz filed a workers' compensation medical request for payment. 1 The parties stipulated to the relevant facts, but disputed whether section 176.135, subdivision 1, or section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), governed the outcome of the case. Schatz argued that section 176.135, subdivision 1, was dispositive, and required respondents to pay for all medical expenses reasonably required; respondents argued that section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), applied when a Minnesota employee injured in a work-related accident received medical treatment in a different state, limiting respondent's responsibility to the amount provided in the workers' compensation fee schedule for that state.
The workers' compensation judge concluded that section 176.135, subdivision 1, was controlling, and that the employer and insurer were liable for the balances due to the Wyoming medical providers. In a 2–1 decision, the WCCA reversed, concluding that Minn.Stat. § 176.136, subd. 1b(d), was controlling. Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 2011 WL 3373690 (Minn. WCCA June 16, 2011). The WCCA reasoned that section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d) plainly limits an employer's liability for the costs of medical treatment provided by a health care provider located outside of Minnesota and concluded that the statute was intended to contain the cost of medical treatment for employers who are subject to the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). Id. at *4. The WCCA concluded that the workers' compensation judge's decision awarding full payment of the providers' charges was erroneous and must be reversed. Id. The dissent concluded that section 176.135, subdivision 1, was controlling, and that the workers' compensation judge's decision should be affirmed. Id. at *5–6 (Stofferahn, J., dissenting).
On appeal, Schatz argues that the WCCA erred in concluding that section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), not section 176.135, subdivision 1, was controlling in this case. Alternatively, Schatz argues that section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), is unconstitutional as applied to her. We address each argument in turn.
Schatz contends that the WCCA erred in applying section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), rather than section 176.135, subdivision 1, to this case for three reasons. Specifically, Schatz argues that there is a conflict between section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), and section 176.135, subdivision 1; that construing section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), as controlling will lead to absurd results; and that section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), improperly extends the subject matter jurisdiction of workers' compensation courts.
First, Schatz argues that there is a conflict between Minn.Stat. § 176.135, subd. 1, and Minn.Stat. § 176.136, subd. 1b(d). If there is a conflict between the provisions, Schatz's position is that Minn.Stat. § 176.135, subd. 1, must control in order to comply with the general principle that employees are not liable for reasonable medical expenses under the Act.
The interpretation and construction of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. See Varda v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 692 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Minn.2005). Our goal in statutory construction is “ ‘to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.’ ” U.S. Bank N.A. v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 802 N.W.2d 363, 375 (Minn.2011) (quoting Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2010)). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, our task is limited to construing the words of the statute according to their plain and ordinary meaning. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 776 N.W.2d 693, 698 (Minn.2009). And we construe a statute, if possible, in a way that “give[s] effect to all its provisions.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16.
The canons of construction describe how we should resolve a potential conflict in statutes. See Minn.Stat. § 645.26 (2010). Generally, we must examine the statutes to determine whether a conflict exists, and whether the conflict is irreconcilable. See State v. Kalvig, 296 Minn. 395, 397–98, 209 N.W.2d 678, 680 (1973). A conflict is “[a] state of disharmony between incompatible or antithetical persons, ideas, or interests.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 386 (4th ed.2009). If the conflicts are irreconcilable, the specific provision of the law “shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision.” Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1.
We turn first to an examination of the statutes to determine whether an irreconcilable conflict exists. Section 176.135, subdivision 1, provides:
The employer shall furnish any medical, psychological, chiropractic, podiatric, surgical and hospital treatment, including nursing, medicines, medical, chiropractic, podiatric, and surgical supplies ... as may reasonably be required at the time of the injury and any time thereafter to cure and relieve from the effects of the injury.
Pursuant to this statute, the employer shall “furnish” medical, surgical and hospital treatment to an injured employee as may be reasonably required to cure and relieve that person from the effects of the injury. Section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), provides:
An employer's liability for treatment, articles, and supplies provided under this chapter by a health care provider located outside of Minnesota is limited to the payment that the health care provider would receive if the treatment, article, or supply were paid under the workers' compensation law of the jurisdiction in which the treatment was provided.
We conclude that no conflict exists between section 176.135, subdivision 1, and section 176.136, subdivision 1b(d), with respect to an employer's liability for the amounts charged for treatment furnished by a medical provider located outside of Minnesota. Specifically, section 176.135, subdivision 1, does not address the topic. Instead, section 176.135, subdivision 1, merely provides, in relevant part, that the employer shall “furnish” medical, surgical and hospital treatment to an injured employee as may be reasonably required to cure and relieve that injured employee from the effects of the injury. The statute does not address, one way or another, the amount of an employer's liability for medical treatment when the treatment is furnished by a medical provider located outside of Minnesota.
Schatz urges us to interpret section 176.135, subdivision 1, to require the employer to pay all of the “usual and customary charges” of out-of-state medical providers. Schatz's argument relies on our decision in Roraff v. Department of Transportation, 288 N.W.2d 15 (Minn.1980). In Roraff, w...
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