Schauer v. City of Miami Beach
| Decision Date | 08 May 1959 |
| Parties | Theresa SCHAUER et al., Petitioners, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Sibley, Grusmark, Barkdull & King, Miami Beach, for petitioners.
Ben Shepard, Miami, and Joseph A. Wanick, Miami Beach, for respondents.
Cypen & Salmon, Miami Beach, for intervenor-respondents.
This court granted a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, on the representation that it conflicted with decisions of this court on the same point of law.
Suit had been instituted in the circuit court for declaratory decree, injunction and other relief and had culminated in a final decree declaring invalid Ordinance No. 1253 of the City of Miami Beach, which amended Ordinance No. 289 of the city, and enjoining enforcement of it.
It was the purpose of the amendatory ordinance to effect a change in the zoning of a large area so that it would not be restricted to use as sites for private residences but could be used as locations for multiple-family buildings and hotels. To pass the ordinance required the affirmative vote of five of the seven members of the city council. Of the five approving votes one was cast by S. J. Halperin who will gain $600,000 by reason of the increase in value of property owned by him in the territory.
The chancellor held, in effect, that because of his interest in the property affected, the councilman was disqualified to vote on the enactment of the ordinance and that, therefore, it failed to carry, hence was unenforceable.
An appeal was taken to the District Court of Appeal. Third District, and that court in a unanimous opinion reversed the decision of the chancellor. It is this decision which the petitioners claim directly conflicts with ones rendered by this court in City of Leesburg v. Ware, 113 Fla. 760, 153 So. 87, and City of Coral Gables v. Coral Gables, Inc., 119 Fla. 30, 160 So. 476.
Adverting to the opinion of the district court of appeal, we find that one basic question was presented to it, namely, whether or not a court may investigate the motive of a council in voting for amendment of a zoning ordinance when the power to enact is vested in the council and is exercised in accordance with law. The court stated its understanding that the motives of a governing body of a municipality in adopting an ordinance of legislative character are not subject to judicial inquiry while actions of judicial tribunals or bodies acting quasi-judicially can be reviewed. With that preface, the court observed that it was not clear from the chancellor's decree in just what category he placed the enactment of the amending ordinance. Then the court announced the opinion that the passage of the original zoning ordinance as well as the amending ordinance were the exercise of a legislative function. We agree with the conclusion notwithstanding the decision in Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J.Super, 495, 127 A.2d 190, upon which the chancellor relied, but which, in the view of the district court and, now of this court, is isolated authority for the proposition that such action by a city council is quasi-judicial.
It is obvious to us that the enactment of the original zoning ordinance was a legislative function and we cannot reason that the amendment of it was of different character.
In its opinion the district court referred to abundant respectable authority for the position that once the legislative nature of the action is established the barrier against judicial incursion is erected. For instance, it was written in Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 151 U.S. 1 14 S.Ct. 240, 247, 38 L.Ed. 55, 64, as the district court related, that 'whever an act of the legislature is challenged in court the inquiry is limited to the question of power, and does not extend to the matter of expediency, the motives of the legislators, or the reasons which were spread before them to induce the passage of the act. * * *' As a reason for the rule the court continued: 'It would not be seemly for either of the three departments [of the government] to be instituting an inquiry as to whether another acted wisely, intelligently, or corruptly. * * *' (Italics supplied.)
We come now to the question whether or not the district court of appeal in classifying the act of the council as legislative and announcing that there should, therefore, be no judicial interference collided with decisions of this court in City of Leesburg v. Ware, and City of Coral Gables v. Coral Gables, Inc., both supra.
In the former case was involved the propriety, or legality, of the action of a bond trustee, who was also president of a bank, in arranging for the transfer from his bank to the trustees of unmarketable bonds of another city and the cancellation of a certificate of deposit held by the trustees so that the bank profited by the manipulation of substituting securities of little or no value for a sizeable amount of money. The dissimilarity of the factual situation then before the court and the one in the present litigation is plain.
The action of the person who served both as bond trustee and president of the bank was condemned as being violative of the public policy of the state. But the question of the motive of one empowered to cast a vote for or against the adoption of an ordinance was not involved, and we understand that the rules by which the tax situations should be judged are entirely different. We cannot agree that the wrongdoing in the cited case and the action claimed now to have been improper justify our interfering with the action of the city council on the theory that one of the councilmen should not have voted at all on the question of the adoption of the amending ordinance since he, admittedly, would gain if the ordinance passed. Such a conclusion would result in judicial investigation of legislation to determine what personal interest legislators had when their votes were cast, on the theory that those who had a personal interest in the outcome violated public policy by casting their votes. This theory we reject.
In the latter case the facts are more nearly like the present ones because the incorporator of Coral Gables, Inc., had become a commissioner of the City of Coral Gables and voted on resolutions which had the effect of relieving the corporation of the responsibility it had assumed to make certain street improvements and placing that burden on the city. But it was stated in the opinion that the court did [119 Fla. 30, 160 So. 478] 'not understand that the motive of the city commissioners * * * [was] being attacked.' Even so the court said that it was 'settled that the courts [would] not inquire into the motives of the Legislature in enacting laws.'
We think that the apparent disharmony between the decision in City of Coral Gables v. Coral Gables, Inc., supra, and the decision of the district court of appeal under study may have resulted from a comparison with that part of the opinion in the cited case, chosen by the circuit judge as support for his conclusion but evidently not considered by the district court of appeal as relevant to the principal point involved, that '[w]hether in the form of ordinances or resolutions the acts of municipal corporations may be looked into by the courts to determine whether they were legally exercised or whether the purpose accomplished by them was within the scope of its power, or whether they were in fact consummated through fraud or overreaching.'
The second portion quoted from the opinion in City of Coral Gables v. Coral Gables, inc., supra, is inapplicable while the first is apposite.
We have not discovered in the record that the council lacked power to amend the zoning ordinance or illegally exercised it; nor have we found evidence of fraud or overreaching. At the worst the councilman had a selfish interest, possibly with others similarly situated, in changing the status of his property to his financial advantage. But this human quality did not amount to fraud or overreaching. No attempt was made by him to conceal his interest; on the contrary he stated publicly that he would benefit greatly by the adoption of the ordinance.
Aside from the reasons for the general rule given in the cited cases, that is, the preservation of the independence of the three branches of government, it is not difficult to picture the havoc that would be wrought in legislative bodies if each member of them could by decree of the judiciary be declared disqualified to participate in any legislation that affected a class, race, creed, business, profession, occupation, association or trade to which he belonged.
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