Schendel v. Chi. Great W. Ry. Co.

• Citation: 198 N.W. 450,159 Minn. 166
• Decision Date: 17 April 1924
• Docket Number: No. 23898.,23898.
• Parties: SCHENDEL v. CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RY. CO.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

159 Minn. 166

198 N.W. 450

SCHENDEL

v.CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RY. CO.

No. 23898. ^*

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 17, 1924.

Appeal from District Court, Yellow Medicine County; Harold Baker, Judge.

Action by A. D. Schendel, as special administrator of E. L. Ring, deceased, against the Chicago Great Western Railway Company. Verdict for plaintiff, and, from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

An interstate train in the act of taking a siding to meet a train, separated because a drawbar pulled out. A chain coupling was made to get the train off the main line. The decedent, a brakeman, with the conductor, undertook to unhook the chain to uncouple the train from the defective car. The head brakeman uncoupled the engine, and the train was caused to move backward. He then caused the brakes to be applied on the cars ahead of the defective car. When the train moved backward, decedent locked his arms about the axles of the defective car and swung his body over the chain, and when the front part of the train stopped, the chain became taut and squeezed decedent's body against the car above him, causing injuries from which he died 15 days later. Verdict for $5,000 for pain and suffering and $20,000 for loss from death. Held:

(1) That there was no break in the chain of events between the pulling out of the drawbar and the injury and that the facts bring the case within the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act.

a. The defective drawbar was a proximate cause of the injury.

b. In a case based upon federal Safety Appliance Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8605-8623) it is not necessary to prove negligence. A disregard of the statute is a wrongful act, and, where it results in damage to one of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied.

a. Contributory negligence not a defense.

b. Whether a violation of rules, which were in evidence, was the proximate cause of decedent's injury, was sufficiently covered by a general charge, and defendant was not entitled to a specific charge in reference thereto.

c. Before a violation of rules could avail defendant it would have to constitute the sole proximate cause of the injury.

Various assignments of error as to the charge to the jury without merit.

Damages not excessive. A. V. Junkin and Briggs, Weyl & Briggs, all of St. Paul, for appellant.

Davis & Michel, of Minneapolis, for respondent.

WILSON, C. J.

This is an action to recover damages for pain and suffering and also damages for the death of one Ring, who was employed by defendant as a brakeman at the time he sustained injuries from which he died. The deceased was working on an interstate train which, on arriving at Budd, Iowa, undertook to take a siding and meet an east-bound train. The switch was thrown and in starting the train to pass on to the side track a drawbar pulled out, permitting the train to separate. The crew consisted of the conductor, decedent. Another brakeman, and the engine men. The train was backed up to the cars which had broken loose. The front car of the portion of the train which had broken loose was coupled with a chain hooked on its front axles with the car ahead so as to pull the rear part of the train off of the main line onto the siding. Decedent under direction of the conductor aided in this work. The train was pulled onto the side track and brought to a standstill. The plan was to switch the defective car out of the train. This was in the nighttime. The conductor asked decedent if he could unhook the chain, and he replied that he did not know, but set his lantern down and tried, and replied that he could not do it. Then the conductor tried it. The chain was heavy, and one man could not handle it. Decedent got on the other side of the chain and reached down to lift up the chain to give the slack to the conductor so he could unhook the chain. The brakeman Quist uncoupled the engine from the train for the purpose of permitting it to go out on the main track and to the rear of the train so as to get that part of the train back of the defective car, and, when this uncoupling was made, the disconnected portion having the air brakes released, and, perhaps started by the movement of the engine, moved back; but Quist caused the air to be applied and thereby stopped the movement. The train backed up without warning, and the conductor straightened up and walked back with the movement of the train. The decedent, however, reached in and locked his arms around the axle of the bad order car and the chain at the time was slack and was not unhooked, and he swung his body up over the chain apparently to ride thereon in the brief movement of the train, and the slack ran back, by the head cars stopping, and, as the chain was pulled straight, it squeezed the body of decedent between the chain, then under him, and the bottom of the draft timbers of the car above him. This so injured decedent that he suffered severe pain until his death 15 days later.

This action was brought by the administrator of decedent's estate to recover for the benefit of the widow and child of decedent. A verdict was rendered for $25,000, of which $5,000 was for pain and suffering, and $20,000 for loss from death. Defendant has appealed from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

The defendant claims that the facts do not bring the case within the Safety Appliance Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8605-8623); that the defective drawbar did not proximately contribute to the injury; that the question of decedent's violation of rules should have been submitted to the jury; that errors occurred in the charge to the jury; and that damages are excessive.

[1] 1. Do the facts bring this case within the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act? The defendant asserts that nothing happened while this car was chained up and hauled on to the side track, and that it there came to rest, and that it at that instant ceased to be ‘used’ by the carrier. It attempts to put this defective car in the status of the car in McCalmont v. Penn. Ry. (D. C.) 273 Fed. 231, affirmed (C. C. A.) 283 Fed. 736, wherein a car was placed on a dead track where an employee was later injured. In this case the defective car was not yet placed to be left, and in fact the equipment, the chain, used to replace the defective coupling, was still intact and the car remained in the train of which it was a part. There was here no break in the chain of events between the pulling out of the drawbar and the injury, Defendant argues that on the theory of the plaintiff, if the defendant would haul the car, it would violate the act, and, if it did not haul it, it violated the act. Such is not the case. If defendant hauled the car in use, knowing it was defective, it would be subject to a penalty. It had the right however to haul the car to a repair track without incurring penalty, but such movement should, notwithstanding, be at the sole risk of the carrier. Clearly the facts bring this case within the Safety Appliance Act. Otos v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 128 Minn. 283, 150 N. W. 922; Id., 239 U. S. 349, 36 Sup. Ct. 124, 60 L. Ed. 322;San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U. S. 476, 36 Sup. Ct. 626, 60 L. Ed. 1110;Goneau v. M., St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 154 Minn. 1, 191 N. W. 279;Frye v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (Minn.) 195 N. W. 629.

2. That the defective drawbar did proximately contribute to the injury is clearly established. As above indicated, the unbroken chain of events, from the moment the car became defective until the accident happened, the circumstances, the character of the injury, and the happening thereof,...