Scherer v. Dept. of Labor
| Decision Date | 14 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 123 Sept. Term, 2006.,123 Sept. Term, 2006. |
| Citation | 918 A.2d 1218,173 Md. App. 284 |
| Parties | SCHERER TAX SERVICE, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Daniel C. Conkling, Glen Burnie, MD, for Appellant.
Matthew A. Lawrence (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: SALMON, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.
Section 8-1005(a)(2) of the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Code (1999 Repl. Vol.),1 with exceptions not here applicable, states that a claimant who otherwise is eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits is disqualified from receiving such benefits if the Secretary of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation ("DLLR") finds that "the individual, without good cause, failed to accept suitable work when offered."
Sharon A. Long ("Long") commenced receiving unemployment insurance benefits during the week of January 9, 2005. On January 20, 2005, she was offered a full-time job that would have lasted twelve weeks, i.e., until April 15, 2005. Long rejected the job offer because she wanted a permanent job — not a seasonal one.
The question to be resolved in this appeal is whether a claimant, such as Long, who rejects an offer of full-time, suitable employment has "good cause" to do so, within the meaning of section 8-1005(a)(2), when the sole reason for the job refusal is that the claimant wants to find permanent employment. We shall answer that question in the negative.
The appellant, Scherer Tax Service, Inc. (hereinafter "STS"), is owned and operated by Daniel C. Conkling, Esq., a Maryland attorney. STS is in the business of preparing income tax returns. Its office is in Glen Burnie, Maryland, and is open only during the tax season — mid-January to April 15.
Long, who retired from Verizon Communications in 1997, was employed by STS as a receptionist during the 2004 tax season. She worked forty hours per week and earned $11 an hour. Immediately after April 15, 2004, she was terminated by STS due to lack of work. Nevertheless, Mr. Conkling offered Long a part-time job at one of his other offices where he provided certified public accounting services. Long declined that offer.
In September 2004, Long commenced her search for a full-time job. Her search from September to December 2004 was unsuccessful.
On January 9, 2005, Long commenced receiving unemployment compensation. Less than two weeks later, on January 20, 2005, a representative of STS offered Long her old job back at a higher pay rate. She was to work as a receptionist for the same number of hours per week as she had worked previously, and she was to be paid $500 per week ($12.50 per hour × 40 hours). The job offer was for seasonal employment, however, in that the job, like her previous one, would terminate at the end of the "tax season." Long considered STS's offer for about two days but then turned it down because she wanted to find a permanent, full-time job.3
On February 1, 2005, STS notified the DLLR of Long's refusal to accept its job offer.
A DLLR claims specialist determined, on May 17, 2005, that Long had refused an offer of suitable work from STS, but because STS had failed to timely notify DLLR of the claimant's refusal, her failure to accept work could not be considered a basis for disqualification under section 8-1005. The claims specialist also found that for the workweek ending February 5, 2005, Long was able, available, and actively seeking work. STS appealed these adverse determinations.
On June 14, 2005, a DLLR Hearing Examiner conducted an evidentiary hearing. Long testified at the hearing that she conducted her job search exclusively by use of the internet and submitted numerous job applications by that means. No evidence was introduced that indicated that Long could not have continued her search for a permanent job if she had accepted STS's January 20, 2005, offer.4
By separate decisions, the Hearing Examiner ruled: (1) STS had timely notified DLLR of Long's refusal of its job offer; (2) nevertheless, the claimant had good cause to reject STS's offer; and (3) Long, on all relevant dates, was able, available, and actively seeking work. The net effect of the Hearing Examiner's decision was to affirm the determination of the claims examiner that Long was eligible to continue receiving unemployment compensation benefits from January 9, 2005, until she found employment in May 2005.
STS appealed both decisions to the Board of Appeals ("Board"). By order dated August 1, 2005, the Board remanded the "able, available and actively seeking work" issue to the DLLR Hearing Examiner so that he could take additional evidence concerning the duration and extent of the claimant's job search.
By decision dated August 8, 2005, the Board affirmed the portion of the DLLR Hearing Examiner's June 14, 2005, decision in which it was found that the claimant had "good cause" within the meaning of section 8-1005 to refuse STS's job offer.
The DLLR Hearing Examiner, on August 25, 2005, held the remand hearing ordered by the Board.5 After considering additional testimony, the Hearing Examiner, on August 28, 2005, once again affirmed the decision of the claims specialist that the claimant was able, available, and actively seeking work during the period in question. STS appealed this decision. The Board, by decision dated October 31, 2005, affirmed the August 28 decision of the Hearing Examiner.
STS filed two separate petitions for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The circuit court rejected STS's contentions in both appeals and affirmed the Board's decisions. This consolidated appeal by STS followed.
The Board's finding of fact that Long turned down STS's offer of employment because it was an offer of a seasonal job — and not a permanent one — was supported by substantial evidence. We therefore may not reject the Board's finding that Long had "good cause" to turn down the job offer unless it is determined that the Board's "good-cause" finding was wrong as a matter of law. See Thomas v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 170 Md.App. 650, 657-58, 908 A.2d 99 (2006); see also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480, 490-91, 796 A.2d 75 (2002).
We apply the same standards as does the circuit court when reviewing an agency's legal conclusions and accord "a degree of deference" to the agency's construction of the statute that it administers. See Board of Physician Quality Assur. v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68, 729 A.2d 376 (1999); see also Maryland Aviation v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571-72, 873 A.2d 1145 (2005).
Sections 8-1005(a) and (b) read, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Grounds for disqualification.— . . . [A]n individual who otherwise is eligible to receive benefits is disqualified from receiving benefits if the Secretary finds that the individual, without good cause, failed to:
(1) apply for work that is available and suitable when directed to do so by the Secretary;
(2) accept suitable work when offered; or
(3) return to the individual's usual self-employment when directed to do so by the Secretary.
(b) Determination of suitability.—(1) In determining whether work is suitable for an individual, the Secretary shall consider:
(i) the degree of risk involved to the health, morals, and safety of the individual;
(ii) the experience, previous earnings, previous training, and physical fitness of the individual;
(iii) the length of unemployment of the individual and the prospects for securing local work in the usual occupation of the individual; and
(iv) the distance of available work from the residence of the individual.
(Emphasis added.)
When interpreting a statute like the one here under review, it is important to keep in mind the statute's legislative purpose. What the Court of Appeals said in Taylor v. Dep't of Employment & Training, 308 Md. 468, 471-72, 520 A.2d 379 (1987), is therefore relevant, viz.:
As we have often recognized, Maryland's Unemployment Insurance Law is designed to alleviate the consequences of involuntary unemployment and ease the burden of economic distress. Board of Educ. Mont. Co. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 491 A.2d 1186 (1985); Employ. Security Adm. v. Browning-Ferris, 292 Md. 515, 438 A.2d 1356 (1982); Sec., Dept. Human Resources v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 409 A.2d 713 (1979); Saunders v. Unemp. Comp. Board, 188 Md. 677, 53 A.2d 579 (1947); [Unemployment] Compensation Board v. Albrecht, 183 Md. 87, 36 A.2d 666 (1944). To accomplish this important purpose, weekly income benefits are paid to individuals who have become involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own, and who are otherwise eligible. In determining the scope of the statute and the eligibility of claimants, we have held that the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Law should be liberally construed to effectuate its legislative intent, and any disqualifying provisions in the remedial statute should be strictly construed. Saunders v. Unemp. Comp. Board, 188 Md. at 681-683, 53 A.2d 579 [(1947)].
(Emphasis added.) See also section 8-102 ().
About twenty years before Taylor was decided, the Court of Appeals, in Barley v. Maryland Dep't of Employment Sec., 242 Md. 102, 110, 218 A.2d 24 (1966), described the purposes of the unemployment compensation statute by quoting at length from Lowell v. Maine Employment Sec. Comm'n, 159 Me. 177, 190 A.2d 271 (1963), an opinion authored by Justice Williamson of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. The Barley court quoted Chief Justice Williamson as follows:
"The purpose of the Employment Security Act was well stated by Justice Brennan, then of the New Jersey Supreme Court and now of the Supreme Court of the United States in Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., [13 N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277, 281]:
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