Schiavone v. Falango

Decision Date07 March 1962
Citation149 Conn. 293,179 A.2d 622
PartiesJohn SCHIAVONE v. Eugenia FALANGO. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Walter M. Pickett, Jr., Waterbury, for appellant (defendant).

William B. Hennessy, Waterbury, with whom was Leonard M. Caine, Naugatuck, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, SHEA and ALCORN, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

This action was brought on behalf of the plaintiff, a minor, by his father and next friend to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained because of the negligence of the defendant and because of a nuisance maintained by her. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant has appealed, claiming that the subordinate facts do not support the conclusions reached by the court. She has also assigned as error the overruling of certain claims of law made by her at the trial.

The facts are not in dispute. In September, 1956, the defendant was the owner of a tenement house consisting of three floors, each of which contained a separate tenement. The plaintiff's family had occupied the first floor since June, 1956. The plaintiff had two brothers, one aged six years and the other aged one year. Near the rear door to the first-floor tenement there was an outside wooden stairway extending to a landing on the second floor. The defendant exercised exclusive control over the stairway. It had thirteen steps. The treads were thirty-six inches wide and about nine and one-half inches deep; the risers were eight inches high. Two wooden railings, each made of two-by-fours, one above the other, extended along each side of the stairway, paralleling its rise. On the outer side, the lower railing was twelve and one-half inches above the nosing of the tread and eighteen and one-half inches from the junction of the tread with the base of the riser, when measured perpendicularly. The structural condition of the stairway and railings had been the same for at least three months. Access to the apartments on the second and third floors could be gained only by this stairway. Two young children lived in the apartment on the second floor, and a four-year-old boy lived with the family on the third floor. The defendant visited the premises at least once each week. She had used the stairway and knew that young children lived on the premises.

On September 14, 1956, about 4:30 p. m., the plaintiff, then two years, seven and one-half months old, sustained injuries when he fell to the ground from the stairway. His father was working in the rear yard at the time. Shortly before the fall, the plaintiff had tried to climb the stairway but was taken down by his father, who thereafter resumed his work, keeping an eye on the plaintiff from time to time. The father heard a scraping sound on the stairway and then a thud on the concrete walk He found the plaintiff on the concrete, about one foot from the edge of the staircase and directly below the eighth step. The stairway and the railings were not in disrepair.

On these facts, the court concluded that the structural condition of the stairway was inherently dangerous, in that it did not have railings which were adequate, safe, proper and sufficient for children of the age of the plaintiff when using it unaccompanied by an adult; that the defendant knew or should have known that children, including the plaintiff, were likely to use the stairway and that such use would involve unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to them; that the children, because of their youth, would not realize the risk involved; and that the utility of maintaining the rails structurally in their existing condition, in the light of the probability of the use of the stairway by young children, was slight, if any at all, compared to the risk of injury to the children. The court also concluded that the stairway, as maintained by the defendant, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries and awarded damages to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff claimed the right to recover on the ground of private nuisance as well as negligence. Since no interest in land was involved, there could be no recovery on the ground of nuisance. Higgins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 129 Conn. 606, 611, 30 A.2d 388; Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 515, 525, 7 A.2d 215, 123 A.L.R. 863. Recovery, if there be any, must therefore rest on negligence alone. To establish a basis for recovery, the plaintiff had the burden of proving a breach of some duty owed by the defendant. In an attempt to follow the reasoning of the trial court, we have referred to the memorandum of decision. See Goldblatt v. Ferrigno, 138 Conn. 39, 40, 82 A.2d 152. From this, it is evident that the court applied to this case the law established in Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110, 113, 193 A. 608. In that case, we adopted the principle, enunciated in the Restatement, 2 Torts § 339, regarding the liability of a possessor of land where unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon is caused by artificial conditions of a highly dangerous nature maintained on...

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19 cases
  • Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 25, 1998
    ...Furstein v. Hill, supra, at 619, 590 A.2d 939; see Bears v. Hovey, 159 Conn. 358, 361, 269 A.2d 77 (1970); Schiavone v. Falango, 149 Conn. 293, 298, 179 A.2d 622 (1962). The plaintiffs assert that the imposition of liability on the defendants is necessary to achieve a stated purpose of tort......
  • Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • June 5, 2014
    ...while limiting tort liability from risks that are so “novel or extraordinary” that they could not be anticipated. Schiavone v. Falango, 149 Conn. 293, 298, 179 A.2d 622 (1962) ; Palsgraf v. Long Isl. R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 345–47, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) ; see also Prosser & Keeton, On Torts § ......
  • Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 11, 2017
    ...engine is beyond the scope of the reasonably foreseeable risks created by the transmission of a false alarm"); Schiavone v. Falango , 149 Conn. 293, 298, 179 A.2d 622 (1962) (not reasonably foreseeable that unattended child would climb and fall from exterior stairway railing); Noebel v. Hou......
  • Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Const. Co.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • April 22, 2008
    ...require that one must guard against eventualities which, at best, are too remote to be reasonably foreseeable." Schiavone v. Falango, 149 Conn. 293, 298, 179 A.2d 622 (1962). There was no reason for Sordoni to foresee that Berlin Steel would not fulfill its contractual obligations to inspec......
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