Schieffelin and Co., Inc. v. Department of Liquor Control

• Decision Date: 03 March 1987
• Citation: 202 Conn. 405,521 A.2d 566
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SCHIEFFELIN AND COMPANY, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF LIQUOR CONTROL et al.

Page 566

521 A.2d 566

202 Conn. 405

SCHIEFFELIN AND COMPANY, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF LIQUOR CONTROL et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 9, 1987.

Decided March 3, 1987.

Robert F. Vacchelli, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Richard M. Sheridan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the appellant (named defendant).

Walter B. Schatz, with whom, on the brief, were Leonard Bieringer and Alfred E. Wechsler, Hartford, for the appellants (defendant Brescome Distributors Corp. et al.).

Barry J. Waters, with whom was John C. Yavis, Jr., Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO, CALLAHAN and MENT, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in these cases is whether this administrative appeal was finally adjudicated, for purposes of appeal to this court, when the trial court remanded the case for administrative resolution of an issue which the administrative tribunal had failed to adjudicate. We hold that there was no final judgment, and therefore dismiss this appeal.

The underlying litigation arose out of efforts by the plaintiff, Schieffelin & Co., to terminate the distributorships of several liquor wholesale licensees, including the defendants Brescome Distributing Corporation and Eder Brothers, Inc. Its history is described in full in our earlier opinion in Schieffelin & Co. v. Department of Liquor Control, 194 Conn. 165, 479 A.2d 1191 (1984). As it was required to do by the terms of General Statutes § 30-17(a)(2), ¹ the plaintiff sought permission from the defendant Department of Liquor Control (hereinafter department) to terminate the individual defendants' distributorships. In ruling against the plaintiff, the department did not determine whether the plaintiff had met the statutory requirement of establishing just and sufficient cause for the terminations it sought to implement. Instead, the department merely concluded that the terminations were unwarranted because the plaintiff had failed to comply with the procedural requirement of § 30-17(a)(2) that "cause shall be set forth" in notices of termination.

Upon the plaintiff's administrative appeal to the Superior Court, that court concluded that the notices of termination to the defendants Brescome and Eder sufficiently complied with the requirements of § 30-17(a)(2). That conclusion did not, however, terminate the litigation between the parties, because the trial court held that it could not make an initial ruling about whether the plaintiff had substantively established cause for its termination of the individual defendants' distributorships. Accordingly, the trial court remanded the case to the department for resolution of that issue. General Statutes § 4-183(g).

The defendants then appealed to this court. The parties disagree not only about the validity of the trial court's ruling on the notice issue but also about the consequences that flow from the trial court's judgment. If we agree with the trial court that the notices complied with § 30-17(a)(2), the plaintiff, fearing prejudgment by the department, urges us to remand the case to the trial court for final judicial resolution of the issue of just cause. The defendants, on the other hand, maintain that our affirmance of the trial court's judgment would require us also to concur in the trial court's order of administrative remand.

Upon examination of the briefs and records before oral argument of these appeals, this court sua sponte issued an order of notice to the parties that the appeals might be dismissed for lack of a final judgment. Under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., further appellate review of superior court rulings on administrative appeals is limited to cases in which the Superior Court has rendered a final judgment. General Statutes § 4-184. That statutory provision accords with the general proposition that, except in special cases, such as appeals upon reservations; State v. Sanabria, 192 Conn. 671, 681-85, 474 A.2d 760 (1984); or upon certification pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a; Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac, 194 Conn. 677, 678-79 n. 1, 485 A.2d 1272 (1984); the jurisdiction of this court is restricted to appeals from judgments that are final. General Statutes § 52-263; Practice Book § 3000 (now § 4000); Melia v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 202 Conn. 252, 255, 520 A.2d 605 (1987); Doublewal Corporation v. Toffolon, 195 Conn. 384, 388-89, 488 A.2d 444 (1985).

The expeditious resolution of disputes counsels against appellate review of trial court rulings that do not finally dispose of all the issues between the litigating parties. See Practice Book § 4002 (formerly § 3001). When a trial court lacks authority to render a definitive judgment on pending claims, its rulings are, in effect, interlocutory orders, no matter how they may have been denominated as a matter of form. Doublewal Corporation v. Toffolon, supra, 391-93, 488 A.2d 444. Interlocutory orders, in turn, are immediately appealable only "(1) where the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) where the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them." State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983); Melia v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., supra.

We have not recently articulated how these principles apply to appellate proceedings that arise out of administrative appeals under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. There may well be cases in which we have addressed the merits of an administrative appeal without fully considering its jurisdictional implications. The press of the appellate docket in the Appellate Court and in this court, and the fact that motions to dismiss may be granted without an accompanying written opinion, make it important now to clarify the ground rules for appellate review of administrative appeals.

There is no reason why administrative appeals should not be governed by the principles of Curcio set forth above. A judgment by a trial court ordering further administrative proceedings cannot meet the first prong of the Curcio test, because, whatever its merits, the trial court's order has not "terminate[d] a separate and distinct proceeding." The more difficult question is whether the trial court's order "so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them."

Under our existing case law, we have distinguished, with reference to that question, between two kinds of administrative remands. A trial court may conclude that an administrative ruling was in error and order further administrative proceedings on that very issue. In such circumstances, we have held the judicial order to be a final judgment, in order to avoid the possibility that further administrative proceedings would simply reinstate the administrative ruling, and thus would require a wasteful second administrative appeal to the superior court on that very issue. See, e.g., Watson v. Howard, 138 Conn. 464, 468, 86 A.2d 67 (1952); Santos v. Publix Theatres Corporation, 108 Conn. 159, 161, 142 A. 745 (1928). A trial court may alternatively conclude that an administrative ruling is in some fashion incomplete and therefore not ripe for final judicial adjudication. Without dictating the outcome of the further administrative proceedings, the court may insist on further administrative evidentiary findings as a precondition to final judicial resolution of all the issues between the parties. See General Statutes § 4-183(e). Such an order is not a final judgment. See, e.g., Burdick v. United States Finishing Co., 128 Conn. 284, 288-89, 22 A.2d 629 (1941); Luliewicz v. Eastern Malleable Iron Co., 126 Conn. 522, 524, ...