Schindler v. Department of Motor Vehicles
| Citation | 593 N.W.2d 295,256 Neb. 782 |
| Decision Date | 23 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. S-98-121,S-98-121 |
| Parties | Jason D. SCHINDLER, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, State of Nebraska, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Nebraska |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Administrative Law: Motor Vehicles: Judgments: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,208 (Reissue 1993), decisions of the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, pursuant to Nebraska's administrative revocation statutes, are appealed under the Administrative Procedure Act. A final order rendered by a district court in a judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for errors appearing on the record.
2. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Presumptions: Appeal and Error. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law; accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the court below. A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and all reasonable doubts will be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.
3. Equal Protection: Statutes. If a statute involves economic or social legislation not implicating a fundamental right or suspect class, courts will ask only whether a rational relationship exists between a legitimate state interest and the statutory means selected by the Legislature to accomplish that end. Upon a showing that such a rational relationship exists, courts will uphold the legislation.
4. Constitutional Law: Drunk Driving. Driving is not a fundamental right, and drunk drivers are not a suspect class.
5. Administrative Law: Licenses and Permits: Revocation: Equal Protection. Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 60-6,205 (Cum.Supp.1996) and 60-6,206 to 60-6,208 (Reissue 1993) bear a rational relationship to legitimate state interests and do not violate equal protection.
6. Constitutional Law. A sanction must be construed as punishment for the Eighth Amendment to be implicated.
7. Constitutional Law: Administrative Law: Licenses and Permits: Revocation: Blood, Breath, and Urine Tests. Administrative license revocation imposed for refusing to submit to a chemical test does not constitute punishment and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Rodney W. Smith, of The Law Offices of Rodney W. Smith, P.C., Neligh, for appellant.
Don Stenberg, Attorney General, and Carla Heathershaw Risko, Omaha, for appellee.
Appellant, Jason D. Schindler, asks this court to determine that Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 60-6,205 (Cum.Supp.1996) and 60-6,206 to 60-6,208 (Reissue 1993), the administrative license revocation statutes, are unconstitutional because they violate equal protection and constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Schindler was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a Class W misdemeanor. After his arrest, Schindler was read the postarrest chemical test advisement and asked to submit to a blood test for alcohol and a urine test for drugs. Schindler refused.
The Department of Motor Vehicles held an administrative proceeding and revoked Schindler's driving privileges. Schindler appealed the order of the department to the district court under the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the administrative license revocation statutes are unconstitutional in that they violate equal protection
and constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The district court affirmed the department's order, specifically finding that the arrest was made with probable cause, that Schindler improperly refused to submit to a chemical test, and that the administrative license revocation statutes are not unconstitutional. We affirm.
Schindler asserts that the district court erred in (1) finding that the administrative license revocation statutes did not deny Schindler equal protection of the laws by (a) creating an under-inclusive class by excluding persons who drive under the influence of alcohol but are not required to submit to a chemical test, persons who drive under the influence of drugs, and persons who refuse to submit to a chemical test to determine the pres ence of drugs and (b) by creating an overinclusive class which includes persons who refuse to submit to a chemical test; (2) finding that the administrative license revocation statutes, which provide a 1-year suspension for refusal to submit to a chemical test, first offense, when a person who submits to a chemical test that reveals an alcohol level in excess of the statutory limit, first offense, is only subject to a 90-day suspension, did not deny Schindler equal protection of the laws; (3) finding that the denial of an employment driving permit authorized in § 60-6,206(2) to persons who refuse to submit to a chemical test was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause; (4) finding that denial of the reinstatement procedures prescribed in § 60-6,206(4) to persons who refuse to submit to a chemical test was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and (5) finding that the penalties provided by the administrative license revocation statutes which are applicable to a person who refuses to submit to a chemical test, first offense, are not so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Decisions of the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, pursuant to Nebraska's administrative revocation statutes, are appealed under the Administrative Procedure Act. Kimball v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 255 Neb. 430, 586 N.W.2d 439 (1998); § 60-6,208. A final order rendered by a district court in a judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for errors appearing on the record. Id.
Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law; accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the court below. Bauers v. City of Lincoln, 255 Neb. 572, 586 N.W.2d 452 (1998). A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and all reasonable doubts will be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Andrews v. Schram, 252 Neb. 298, 562 N.W.2d 50 (1997).
Schindler argues that the administrative license revocation statutes violated his right to equal protection. In discussing equal protection, we have stated:
In any equal protection challenge to a statute, the degree of judicial scrutiny to which the statute is to be subjected may be dispositive.... If a legislative classification involves either a suspect class or a fundamental right, courts will analyze the statute with strict scrutiny. Under this test, strict congruence must exist between the classification and the statute's purpose. The end the legislature seeks to effectuate must be a compelling state interest, and the means employed in the statute must be such that no less restrictive alternative exists. On the other hand, if a statute involves economic or social legislation not implicating a fundamental right or suspect class, courts will ask only whether a rational relationship exists between a legitimate state interest and the statutory means selected by the legislature to accomplish that end.... Upon a showing that such a rational relationship exists, courts will uphold the legislation.
(Citations omitted.) State v. Garber, 249 Neb. 648, 652-53, 545 N.W.2d 75, 78-79 (1996).
This court has held that driving is not a fundamental right and that drunk drivers are not a suspect class. State v. Michalski, 221 Neb. 380, 377 N.W.2d 510 (1985). Accordingly, we examine the administrative license revocation statutes at issue herein, §§ 60-6,205 and 60-6,206 to 60-6,208, using the rational relationship standard of review. See State v. Michalski, supra.
Administrative license revocation serves legitimate state interests. See State v. Howell, 254 Neb. 247, 575 N.W.2d 861 (1998). Thus, the question is whether a rational relationship exists between these legitimate state interests...
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