State v. Howell
| Decision Date | 20 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. S-96-1295,S-96-1295 |
| Parties | STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Steven G. HOWELL, Appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On questions of law, a reviewing court has an
obligation to reach its own conclusions independent of those reached by the lower courts.
2. Constitutional Law: Double Jeopardy. The double jeopardy clause of the Nebraska Constitution provides no greater protection than that of the U.S. Constitution.
3. Double Jeopardy. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.
4. Administrative Law: Motor Vehicles: Licenses and Permits: Revocation: Double Jeopardy: Legislature: Intent. In analyzing whether administrative license revocation for refusal to submit to a chemical test constitutes punishment for purposes of double jeopardy, we must inquire (1) whether the Legislature intended the statutory sanction to be criminal or civil and (2) whether the statutory sanction is so punitive in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil sanction into a criminal one.
5. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Whether the Legislature intended a civil or criminal sanction is simply a matter of statutory construction.
6. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. In analyzing whether the purpose or effect of a civil sanction statute is so punitive as to negate the Legislature's intent, we consider (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment--retribution and deterrence, (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to an alternative purpose assigned. These factors are helpful, but certainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive, and must be considered in relation to the statute on its face. Furthermore, only the clearest proof is sufficient to negate the Legislature's intent, rendering a civil sanction criminal.
7. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. The views of a later Legislature cannot control the intent of an earlier one when enacting a particular statute absent some substantial change in the statute's operation or effect.
8. Criminal Law. Although deterrence is an objective of criminal punishment, deterrence may serve civil as well as criminal goals.
9. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. In determining whether the Legislature intended a statute to establish civil or criminal proceedings, the language used by the legislators, on the floor and in the statute, is not dispositive. An appellate court must also look at the structure and design of the statute to determine the Legislature's intent. The primary consideration in this regard is the procedural mechanisms established by the Legislature to enforce the statute.
10. Administrative Law: Motor Vehicles: Licenses and Permits: Revocation: Legislature: Intent. The Legislature intended administrative license revocation to be a civil sanction.
11. Administrative Law: Motor Vehicles: Licenses and Permits: Revocation: Intent. Although there is an element of deterrence in administrative license revocation, its primary purpose is to protect the public, a rational alternative purpose, and an important nonpunitive goal.
12. Administrative Law: Motor Vehicles: Licenses and Permits: Revocation: Double Jeopardy. To the extent that the behavior to which administrative license revocation applies is already a crime, this fact is insufficient to render the sanction criminally punitive, particularly in a double jeopardy context.
13. Administrative Law: Motor Vehicles: Licenses and Permits: Revocation. Even though administrative license revocation serves as a deterrent, which is a traditional aim of punishment, the mere presence of this purpose is insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence may serve legitimate nonpunitive goals as well.
14. Motor Vehicles: Licenses and Permits. A driver's license is a privilege, not a right.
15. Revocation. Revocation of a privilege is usually not considered punishment.
Rodney W. Smith, of Smith & Doerr, P.C., Neligh, for appellant.
Don Stenberg, Attorney General, and David T. Bydalek, Lincoln, for appellee.
This case presents the question, Does the administrative revocation of a driver's license for refusal to submit to a chemical test constitute punishment, such that any subsequent criminal prosecution puts the offender twice in jeopardy? Although we addressed a similar question in State v. Hansen, 249 Neb. 177, 542 N.W.2d 424 (1996), we now readdress Nebraska's administrative license revocation statute, applying the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis from Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997). We conclude that administrative license revocation for failure to submit to a chemical test does not violate double jeopardy, and thus, we affirm.
Appellant, Steven G. Howell, was arrested and charged with refusal to submit to a chemical test and driving under the influence. Howell's driver's license was later administratively revoked by the Department of Motor Vehicles. After Howell's driver's license was revoked, he filed a plea in bar alleging that his criminal prosecution for refusal to submit to a chemical test and for driving under the influence placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The county court denied Howell's plea in bar, and Howell appealed to the district court, which affirmed.
Howell asserts that the district court erred in affirming the decision of the county court overruling Howell's plea in bar.
On questions of law, a reviewing court has an obligation to reach its own conclusions independent of those reached by the lower courts. Sacco v. Carothers, 253 Neb. 9, 567 N.W.2d 299 (1997).
The double jeopardy clause of the Nebraska Constitution provides no greater protection than that of the U.S. Constitution. State v. Hansen, supra. Thus, our analysis will proceed under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V.
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. McBride, 252 Neb. 866, 567 N.W.2d 136 (1997). Howell argues that the administrative revocation of his driver's license for refusal to submit to a chemical test constituted "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, and thus, that any further prosecution therefor constitutes multiple punishment for the same offense. The State disagrees, relying on Neil v. Peterson, 210 Neb. 378, 314 N.W.2d 275 (1982).
In Neil, the defendant had been criminally charged with refusal to submit to a chemical test, which charge was later dismissed. After the defendant's criminal charge was dismissed, his driver's license was administratively revoked for refusal to submit to a chemical test, which revocation arose from the same incident as the criminal charge. This court held that the subsequent administrative license revocation did not constitute double jeopardy because "[a]cquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by the government." Id. at 379, 314 N.W.2d at 276. Implicit in the holding in Neil is that the administrative license revocation does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. We note, however, that Neil lacked any substantive analysis concerning punishment. We also note that Neil was decided before several significant double jeopardy decisions concerning punishment, including our decision in State v. Hansen supra. Therefore, we reconsider the issue of whether administrative license revocation for refusal to submit to a chemical test is punishment, taking into account recent double jeopardy decisions.
We have previously analyzed whether the administrative revocation of a driver's license pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,206 (Reissue 1993) constitutes punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. State v. Hansen, 249 Neb. 177, 542 N.W.2d 424 (1996). In Hansen, the defendant's license was revoked after he submitted to a chemical test, the results of which were over the legal limit of .10 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. The defendant was already facing criminal prosecution for the same incident of driving under the influence at the time his license was revoked. The defendant filed a plea in bar, asserting that the administrative license revocation constituted punishment and, thus, that the criminal prosecution was barred by double jeopardy. Relying on United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), we held that " 'under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.' " (Emphasis in original.) State v. Hansen, 249 Neb. at 188-89, 542 N.W.2d at 432.
After Hansen was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court disavowed Halper and reaffirmed its previously established analysis of multiple punishment under the Double Jeopardy...
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