Schlagel v. Schlagel, 669
Decision Date | 20 January 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 669,669 |
Citation | 117 S.E.2d 790,253 N.C. 787 |
Parties | Mary Katherine SCHLAGEL v. Arthur Port SCHLAGEL, Jr. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
J. W. Lasley, Chapel Hill, for plaintiff-appellant.
No counsel contra.
The sole question presented on this appeal is whether or not a suit for alimony without divorce under G.S. § 50-16 is one in which a clerk of the Superior Court can enter a judgment by default and inquiry as provided by G.S. § 1-209 et seq. The answer is 'No'.
A brief history of the alimony without divorce law in this State shows that prior to 1872 there were no statutes allowing alimony without divorce, but in proper cases equity would allow alimony. Anonymous, 2 N.C. 347; Spiller v. Spiller, 2 N.C. 482. In 1872 the first statute was passed authorizing alimony without divorce, but none was allowed pendente lite in such suits. Laws 1872, c. 193. In 1919 alimony pendente lite was authorized in suits for alimony without divorce. Laws 1919, c. 24. In 1953 the statute was amended to allow the custody of children to be determined in a proceeding instituted under G.S § 50-16. Sess.Laws 1953, c. 925. In 1955 the statute was again amended to require the complaint to set out the same information regarding minor children as is required in divorce actions, and to allow the court to enter orders respecting the support and maintenance of such children in the same manner as such orders are entered in divorce actions, and to allow actions for alimony without divorce to be brought as a counterclaim or cross-action in a suit for divorce, and to allow a suit for divorce to be brought as a counter-claim or cross-action to a suit for alimony without divorce. Sess.Laws 1955, cc. 814, 1189.
G.S. § 50-16 provides for alimony without divorce if the husband separates himself from the wife and fails to provide her and the children of the union with the necessary subsistence. Brooks v. Brooks, 226 N.C. 280, 37 S.E.2d 909; Caddell v. Caddell, 236 N.C. 686, 73 S.E.2d 923; Ollis v. Ollis, 241 N.C. 709, 86 S.E.2d 420; Batts v. Batts, 248 N.C. 243, 102 S.E.2d 862. And in this connection, the material facts at issue in this action for alimony without divorce are the questions of the existence of the marriage relationship and whether the husband abandoned the wife and failed to provide her with the necessary subsistence according to his means and condition in life. Skittletharpe v. Skittletharpe, 130 N.C. 72, 40 S.E. 851; Hooper v. Hooper, 164 N.C. 1, 80 S.E. 64; Trull v. Trull, 229 N.C. 196, 49 S.E.2d 225.
In addition the plaintiff in a suit under G.S. § 50-16 must meet the requirements of the statute for divorce from bed and board as provided by G.S. § 50-7. Pollard v. Pollard, 221 N.C. 46, 19 S.E.2d 1; Brooks v. Brooks, supra; Best v. Best, 228 N.C. 9, 44 S.E.2d 214; Ollis v. Ollis, supra.
Hodges v. Hodges, 226 N.C. 570, 39 S.E.2d 596, 597. G.S. § 50-10 provides: 'The material facts in every complaint asking for divorce shall be deemed to be denied by the defendant, whether the same shall be actually denied by pleading or not, and no judgment shall be given in favor of the plaintiff in any such complaint until such facts have been found by a jury * * *.' The legal effect of this statute is that the allegations required to be set forth in the plaintiff's complaint are indispensible elements of her cause of action and the facts so alleged must be established by the verdict of a jury. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296. As is said in Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617, 624, 'The statute, G.S. § 50-10, denies, and requires findings of fact by a jury * * * as to 'the material facts in every complaint.' ' In this connection, this Court in McQueen v. McQueen, 82 N.C. 471, a suit for divorce a mensa et thoro, said: See also Saunderson v. Saunderson, 195 N.C. 169, 141 S.E. 572.
As is shown in the cases cited above, G.S. § 50-10 applies to a divorce from bed and board under G.S. § 50-7. A divorce from bed and board is nothing more than a judicial separation;...
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