Schleman v. Guaranty Title Co.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1943
• Citation: 153 Fla. 379,15 So.2d 754
• Parties: SCHLEMAN, Tax Collector of Hillsborough County, et al. v. GUARANTY TITLE CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

15 So.2d 754

153 Fla. 379

SCHLEMAN, Tax Collector of Hillsborough County, et al. v. GUARANTY TITLE CO.

Florida Supreme Court

July 6, 1943

On Rehearing Nov 26, 1943.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; L. L. Parks judge.

James S. Moody, of Plant City, Fred T. Saussy, Jr., of Tampa, Lewis H. Tribble of Tallahassee, and John M. Allison, of Tampa, for petitioners.

William H. Rogers, of Jacksonville, and Whitaker, Whitaker & Terrell, of Tampa, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

On November 13 1942, the Guaranty Title Company, a corporation, filed in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, its bill of complaint against Anthony Schleman, as Tax Collector of Hillsborough County, and J. M. Lee as Comptroller of the State of Florida, and alleged that it was engaged in the conduct of a general abstract and title insurance business in the City of Tampa, Florida, and owned personal property consisting of furniture and equipment used in connection with the operation of the abstract and title business; a certain amount of cash on deposit in banks; designated stocks; abstract records, and accounts receivable.

The tax return as by it made to the County Tax Assessor, disclosed that it owned intangible personal property of a value of $35,000, and the Tax Assessor assessed the abstract records as tangible property and placed a valuation of $32,000 thereon and assessed its abstract records as intangible property for a valuation of $35,000. The plaintiff, being dissatisfied therewith, protested, the assessment of the abstract records so made as tangible personal property before the Board of County Commissioners of Hillsborough County acting as a Board of Equalizers, and contended that they should be assessed as intangible personal property, but the protest was rejected and the County Tax Assessor was by the Board directed to strike from the intangible property roll the abstract records assessed as intangible personal property.

The assessor complied with the order so made, with the result that the abstract records of the plaintiff remained assessed on the tangible personal property rolls of Hillsborough County at a valuation of $32,000, while plaintiff contended that the abstract records so owned by the plaintiff, as a matter of law, should be assessed as intangible personal property and not as tangible personal property, as it appears now on the tax rolls of Hillsborough County. The plaintiff tendered into court a sufficient amount of money to pay the assessment upon its abstract records as intangible personal property and otherwise offered to do equity.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint on the grounds viz: (1) the bill of complaint was without equity; (2) it affirmatively appeared that the described property was lawfully assessed; and (3) that the bill of complaint failed to allege discrimination against the plaintiff or that its property had been assessed in a manner different from other property of like nature and similarly situated. Likewise, a motion was filed to strike from the bill of complaint all allegations and references therein to the effect that the abstract information or abstract records were intangible personal property.

On January 21, 1943, an order was entered by the Circuit Court overruling the motion to dismiss and the motion to strike, and subsequently a reconsideration of the aforesaid order was had, when an order of affirmance was entered under date of March 10, 1943. The order of reconsideration was entered largely because the case of Brooksville Abstract Co. v. Kirk, 101 Fla.

175, 133 So. 629, had not been considered. The cause comes before this Court on petition for interlocutory writ of certiorari authorized by Supreme Court Rule No. 34, praying for an order quashing the order of the lower court dated January 21, 1943.

Evolved from the questions propounded, it is safe to conclude that an answer to the following question will be determinative of the controversy presented: Are abstract rocords, consisting of certain loose-leaf records or memoranda showing certain information taken off from the public records, and so compiled and arranged and filed as to tracts and names as to enable abstractors, by reference thereto, to make abstracts of tiele, which abstract records also contain certain work sheets, abstractors' notes and indices, and all of which records are either in loose-leaf form or bound in loose-leaf books, and were not produced for the purpose of sale or being dealt with as a commodity of commerce, and no part of which records proper is incorporated into the abstracts as produced and sold, but which are at all times kept and maintained for the sole and exclusive use of the compiler and which abstract records or memoranda consist of thousands of sheets of paper having certain matter written in typewriting, ink or pencil thereon, together with fasteners, binders and covers, pursuant to law, properly assessed for taxation as tangible personal property rather than intangible personal property?

In Section 1 of Article IX of the Florida Constitution, adopted at the General Election of 1924, intangible personal property was not assessable at a higher rate than five mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation. The amendment as adopted conferred on the Legislature authority to provide for special rates of taxation on intangible personal property. See Porter v. First National Bank, 96 Fla. 740, 119 So. 130, 519.

Pursuant to Section 1 of Article IX, the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 20724, Acts of 1941, Laws of Florida, F.S.A. § 199.01 et seq., which, among other things, defined and classified for taxation purposes intangible personal property. Section 2 of the Act defines 'Intangible Personal Property' as 'all personal property which is not in itself intrinsically valuable but which derives its chief value from that which it represents.' Section 3 of the Act classifies for taxation purposes intangible personal property into four classes and identifies them as Classes A, B, C and D.

Class A intangible personal property is defined by the terms of the Act as 'all moneys, United States Legal tender notes, bank deposits of all kinds, certificates of deposits, cashier's and certified checks, bills of exchange, drafts, and money placed with savings, building and loan associations.' Class B is defined by the terms of the Act as being 'all stocks, or shares of incorporated or unincorporated companies; all bonds except bonds of the several municipalities and counties of the State of Florida, and also such bonds or governmental bonds as may be exempt from taxation under the Constitution or laws of the United States or the State of Florida; and all notes, bonds and other obligations bearing date prior to January 1, 1942, for payment of money which are secured by mortgage, deed of trust or other liens upon real or personal estates situated in Florida * * *; and the beneficial interest of residents of Florida in trust estates of all kinds * * *.' Class C is defined by the terms of the Act as being 'all notes, bonds and other obligations bearing date subsequent to December 31, 1941, for payment of money which are secured by mortgage, deed of trust or other liens upon real property situated in Florida, provided that only that part of the value of the mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien, the real property of which is located within the State shall bear to the whole value of the real property described in said obligation shall be included.' Class D of the Act is to define and include 'all other Intangible Personal Property not embraced in Classes A. B, or C.'

Section 5 of the Act, F.S.A. § 199.03, confers on the State Comptroller the power and duty to make or provide such reasonable rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to effectuate and carry out the several terms, conditions and provisions of the Act.

Section 13 of the Act, F.S.A. § 199.11, provides for the annual levy and assessment, and fixes the amount or amounts thereon to be assessed and collected, on all intangible personal property defined and classified as Classes A, B, C and D supra viz: (a) a tax of 1/20 of one mill on the dollar of the taxable value is assessed on intangible personal property classified and defined as Class A in Subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Act; (b) a tax of one mill on the dollar of the taxable value is assessed on tangible personal property classed and defined as Class B in Subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Act; (c) a tax of three mills on the dollar of the taxable value is assessed on intangible personal property classified and defined as Class C in Subsection (3) of the Act; (d) a tax of one mill on the dollar of the taxable value is assessed on intangible personal property classified and defined as Class D in Subsection (4) of the Act.

Abstract records are not named, classified or defined as intangible personal property in Subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 3 of Chapter 20724, supra. If classified as such for taxation purposes, they must necessarily fall within Class D, which is defined to include 'all other Intangible Personal Property not embraced in Classes A, B, or C' of Section 3, supra. Approximately ten years prior to the enactment of Chapter 20724, supra, this Court had before it the case of Brooksville Abstract Co. v. Kirk, 101 Fla. 175, 133 So. 629, in which it was held that an abstract plant was tangible property.

In the last above cited case, suit was brought by the Brooksville Abstract Company to enjoin the collection of a tax assessed against an abstract plant. The bill of complaint alleged that: 'its said abstract plant is without value except in the hands of complainant, and to the extent that complainant chooses to use...