Schmanski v. Church of St. Casimir of Wells

• Decision Date: 10 December 1954
• Docket Number: Nos. 36351,36352,s. 36351
• Citation: 67 N.W.2d 644,243 Minn. 289
• Parties: Irene M. SCHMANSKI et al., Appellant, v. The CHURCH OF ST. CASIMIR OF WELLS, Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 644

67 N.W.2d 644

243 Minn. 289

Irene M. SCHMANSKI et al., Appellant, v. The CHURCH OF ST. CASIMIR OF WELLS, Minnesota, Respondent.

Nos. 36351, 36352.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 10, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

The duty owed by an owner or occupant of premises toward an invitee is that the owner or occupant, although not an insurer of their safe condition, is bound to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to keep them in a safe condition for those who come upon them by his express or implied invitation. Such duty of reasonable care includes the duty of making the premises safe as to dangerous conditions or activities upon the premises of which the owner knows or of which he ought to have knowledge in the exercise of reasonable care. Such an owner is bound to exercise reasonable care to construct and to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition for their use. The duty is continuing in nature. It does not end with an original safe construction or installation but continues as long as the premises are devoted to such use. Reasonable inspection during such use is a duty incident to the maintenance of the premises. Legal responsibility for an accidental injury cannot be fastened upon anyone unless his act or failure to act was the proximate cause of the injury. The proximate consequence is that consequence which follows in an unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act. If the act is one which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was liable to result in injury to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not have anticipated the particular injury which did happen.

Held, under the facts and circumstances here, that the court did not err in granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict.

Horan & Irvine, Wells, Plunkett & Plunkett, Austin, for appellants.

Meighen, Sturtz & Peterson, Albert Lea, for respondent.

FRANK T. GALLAGHER, Justice.

Appeal from an order denying plaintiffs' motions for a new trial.

Actions were brought by Irene M. Schmanski and her husband, Andrew A. Schmanski, against The Church of St. Casimir of Wells, Minnesota. In her complaint Irene M. Schmanski alleges that on November 5, 1951, she was an invitee on the premises of St. Casimir's School, which was owned and operated by defendant, and that due to defendant's negligence in the operation and maintenance of the premises she was caused to fall and injure herself.

An examination of the record discloses that prior to November 5, 1951, Andrew A. Schmanski, as a member of the Knights of Columbus, arranged with defendant's parish priest to use the auditorium of the school for an organizational meeting. According to the arrangement, five dollars was to be paid and the hall was to be left in the same condition as when they took over.

Mrs. Schmanski testified that she was asked to prepare the lunch for the Knights of Columbus and was also asked to clean the kitchen after the lunch was served and to leave it in the same condition as when she took over. She further testified that after the luncheon was over she decided to sweep the floors and was told by some men present that she could get a broom in the boiler room.

A floor plan of the building introduced by plaintiffs shows that the kitchen is separated from the boiler or furnace room by a corridor which runs north and south. The boiler room is on the west side of the corridor and is entered by passing through a small hallway about 11 1/2 feet long running east and west.

Mrs. Schmanski said that there was a light in the corridor between the kitchen and the boiler room but that there was no light in either the small hall leading to the boiler room or the boiler room. She stated that as she entered the small hallway she found a light switch and 'clicked' or tried to turn it on several times in order to light the hallway but did not get any light. She then proceeded into the boiler room, which was not lighted except for a reflection or light coming in the boiler room or basement windows by which she saw the handle of a broom on the wall. She next stated that after she had the broom and was about to return to the kitchen 'at a glance I saw a man,' but she did not recognize who he was, although it developed that he was the janitor whom she had known for some time. Upon seeing the man she turned to run back into the kitchen and, while trying to get out of the boiler room into the small hallway, 'tripped over the broom in attempting to make the turn.' She further stated that there are some steam pipes along the north wall of the small hallway which extend along the north wall of the boiler room about two feet above the floor.

At the close of plaintiffs' testimony, defendant moved for a directed verdict. In granting this motion, the trial judge told the jury that from the evidence in the case it appeared to the court that plaintiffs had failed to show that defendant was negligent in any manner proximately causing the injury in question to Mrs. Schmanski.

Plaintiffs claim on appeal that the trial court erred in directing a verdict at the close of their testimony. They call our attention to the legal principles that, in deciding on a motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs' case the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, citing Handrahan v. Safway Steel Scaffold Co., 233 Minn. 171, 46 N.W.2d 243, and Woehrle v. Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co., 82 Minn. 165, 84 N.W. 791, 52 L.R.A. 348; also, that it is only in the clearest of cases, where the facts are undisputed and it is plain that all reasonable men can draw but one conclusion from them, that the question for determination becomes one of law for the court, citing Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 169 Minn. 342, 211 N.W. 580, and Nygren v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 241 Minn. ---, 63 N.W.2d 560.

Mrs. Schmanski contends that she was a business visitor or invitee. She argues in effect that the question whether or not defendant was negligent was a fact question on three different grounds: (1) That the electric construction of the building was grossly negligent; (2) that defendant failed to provide a light in the small hallway leading to the boiler room; and (3) that there was active negligence on the part of defendant's agent, the janitor. Defendant does not agree that the legal status of Mrs. Schmanski was that of invitee or business visitor but contends that in any event there was no negligence shown on...