Schmechel v. Dille

• Decision Date: 26 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 35050.,35050.
• Citation: 219 P.3d 1192
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Vaughn SCHMECHEL, individually and as surviving spouse and personal representative of The Estate of Rosalie Schmechel, deceased and Robert P. Lewis, Kim Howard and Tamara Hall, natural children of Rosalie Schmechel, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clinton DILLÉ, M.D., Southern Idaho Pain Institute, an Idaho corporation, Thomas Byrne, P.A., and John Doe and Jane Doe, I through X, Defendants-Respondents.

219 P.3d 1192

Vaughn SCHMECHEL, individually and as surviving spouse and personal representative of The Estate of Rosalie Schmechel, deceased and Robert P. Lewis, Kim Howard and Tamara Hall, natural children of Rosalie Schmechel, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clinton DILLÉ, M.D., Southern Idaho Pain Institute, an Idaho corporation, Thomas Byrne, P.A., and John Doe and Jane Doe, I through X, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 35050.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, August 2009 Term.

October 26, 2009.

Comstock & Bush, Boise, and Byron V. Foster, Boise, for appellants. Taylor Mossman and David Comstock argued.

Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., Boise, for respondent Thomas Byrne, P.A. Keely Duke argued. Chris Comstock appeared.

Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for respondent Clinton Dillé, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute. Steven Hippler argued. Will Varin appeared.

HORTON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a district court's decision denying a new trial after it entered judgments on a jury verdict finding that Dr. Clinton Dillé, M.D., and Mr. Thomas Byrne, P.A., were not negligent in their medical treatment of Rosalie Schmechel, who died shortly after coming under their care at the Southern Idaho Pain Institute (SIPI) in 2003. Mrs. Schmechel's surviving spouse and children (collectively referred to as the Schmechels) contend that the district court abused its discretion in not granting their motion for a new trial based on their claims that the court erred in excluding testimony from one of their experts, in declining to instruct the jury on negligence per se, in excluding the Idaho Administrative Code (IDAPA) rules governing physician assistants in 2003, in declining to instruct the jury on recklessness and in allowing testimony from a defense expert.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mrs. Schmechel had been receiving pain management treatment from a medical provider in Sun Valley, Idaho, for ongoing chronic back pain and right leg pain, which she had experienced for approximately 30 years. Owing to the expense and difficulty of travelling to Sun Valley from her home in Twin Falls, Idaho, in order to receive treatment for her pain, in September 2003 Mrs. Schmechel decided to begin seeing a pain management provider in Twin Falls, and thus she sought treatment at SIPI. SIPI is a clinic and surgery center dedicated to pain management treatment. In 2001, Dr. Dillé hired Mr. Byrne to work as a physician assistant at SIPI. In April, 2003, Dr. Dillé and Mr. Byrne entered into a Delegation of Services (DOS) Agreement outlining the working relationship and delegation of duties between them as required by law.

On September 26, 2003, Mr. Byrne saw Mrs. Schmechel. Up to that point, Mrs. Schmechel had been taking OxyContin to manage her pain, and Mr. Byrne suggested that she should discontinue using OxyContin and prescribed her methadone instead. Over the next few days, Mrs. Schmechel and Mr. Byrne spoke on the phone twice, and both times Mr. Byrne advised Mrs. Schmechel to increase her dosage of methadone. After the second call, Mr. Byrne discussed Mrs. Schmechel's case with Dr. Dillé, and Dr. Dillé approved Mr. Byrne's treatment plan although he did not learn the exact dosage of methadone that Mr. Byrne prescribed. On October 2, 2003, Mrs. Schmechel passed away.

On October 3, 2005, the Schmechels brought suit against Dr. Dillé and Mr. Byrne, alleging medical malpractice. In early October 2007 the Schmechels learned of the 2003 IDAPA regulation that required doctors and physician assistants to have DOS Agreements in place. The Schmechels then renewed an earlier request to Dr. Dillé and Mr. Byrne to produce the DOS agreement that existed between them in 2003. Dr. Dillé and Mr. Byrne promptly did so, six days before trial. At the conclusion of the trial, on October 30, 2007, the jury returned a verdict finding that Dr. Dillé and Mr. Byrne were not negligent in their treatment of Mrs. Schmechel. On November 19, 2007, the Schmechels filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. The Schmechels timely appealed. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the Schmechels a new trial, we affirm.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Schmechels alleged that four errors occurred at trial and moved the district court for a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1), I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3), and I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7). The district court denied the motion.

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. A trial court has wide discretion to grant or refuse to grant a new trial, and on appeal this Court will not disturb that exercise of discretion absent a showing of manifest abuse. ... [T]he test for evaluating whether a trial court has abused its discretion [is]: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 529-30, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239-40 (2003) (citations omitted).

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) governs a motion for a new trial and states in relevant part that:

A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action for any of the following reasons:

1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial . . . .

3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.

. . . .

7. Error in law, occurring at the trial.

"In evaluating whether an irregularity in the proceedings merits a new trial, a district court takes into consideration whether the irregularity had any effect on the jury's decision." Gillingham Const., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 23, 121 P.3d 946, 954 (2005). A motion for a new trial based upon alleged accident or surprise must show prejudice in order to be successful. Hughes v. State, Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement, 129 Idaho 558, 562, 929 P.2d 120, 124 (1996). Where prejudicial errors of law have occurred, the district court has a duty to grant a new trial, even though the verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Craig Johnson Const., L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 801, 134 P.3d 648, 652 (2006).

However,

[n]o error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

I.R.C.P. 61; see also Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 575, 903 P.2d 730, 740 (1995) ("No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence is grounds for granting a new trial ... unless refusal to take such action appears to the court to be inconsistent with substantial justice.").

III. ANALYSIS

The district court recognized that the decision whether to grant a new trial was within its discretion.¹ Whether the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it and whether it reached its decision not to grant a new trial by an exercise of reason requires scrutiny of the court's consideration of each of the Schmechels' alleged errors. We first address the Schmechels' arguments regarding the jury's findings that Dr. Dillé and Mr. Byrne did not breach the applicable standard of care. Because we conclude that these alleged errors do not warrant a new trial, we decline to reach the Schmechels' arguments regarding the introduction of expert testimony relating to the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death.

A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting a new trial based on the exclusion of Dr. Lordon's testimony regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement.

The Schmechels urge that the district court should have granted a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1), I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3), and I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7) because it abused its discretion in precluding their medical expert, Dr. Lordon, from testifying regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement on the grounds that his opinion had not been disclosed to Dr. Dillé and Mr. Byrne as required by I.R.C.P. 26(e). Specifically, the Schmechels contend that Dr. Lordon was prevented from testifying that non-compliance with the 2003 DOS Agreement resulted in Dr. Dillé and Mr. Byrne breaching the standard of care and that because this testimony was crucial to their case, the Schmechels were prejudiced by the court's decision not to allow it.

Whether to exclude undisclosed expert testimony pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4) is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 271, 647 P.2d 311, 317 (Ct.App.1982) (citing Matter of Webber's Estate, 97 Idaho 703, 707-08, 551 P.2d 1339, 1343-44 (1976)). The test for determining whether a district court abused its discretion is: (1) whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)...