Schmidt v. Johnstone

• Decision Date: 13 May 1915
• Citation: 153 N.W. 293,31 N.D. 53
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

153 N.W. 293

31 N.D. 53

ANDREW SCHMIDT et al. v. JOHN JOHNSTONE

Supreme Court of North Dakota

May 13, 1915

Rehearing denied June 7, 1915.

From a judgment of the District Court of Golden Valley County Pollock, Special J., defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

F. C Heffron and J. A. Miller, for appellant.

A change of venue is not complete until the files are received by the court to which they are sent, and therefore this case could not be legally put on the calendar for the term commencing before their receipt by the clerk. Stringer v Jacobs, 9 Ark. 497, 50 Am. Dec. 221; 50 Cyc. 174.

Constitutional provisions as to right to trial by jury are universally held to refer to such rights as they existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Smith v. Kunert, 17 N.D. 120, 115 N.W. 76; Copp v. Henniker, 55 N.H. 179, 20 Am. Rep. 194; Stillwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 462; Whallon v. Bancroft, 4 Minn. 109, Gil. 70; 24 Cyc. 101, 102, notes 76-78.

The Code action to determine adverse claims to real property is a composite action, either legal or equitable, depending upon the matters at issue between the parties. Davis v. Judson, 159 Cal. 121, 113 P. 148; Burleigh v. Hecht, 22 S.D. 301, 117 N.W. 367; Kenny v. McKenzie, 25 S.D. 485, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 775, 127 N.W. 597.

An action for possession of real property, by one out of possession against the person in possession, in the Code action to determine adverse claims, is an action in ejectment. Ottow v. Friese, 20 N.D. 86, 126 N.W. 503; Burke v. Scharf, 19 N.D. 227, 124 N.W. 79; Burleigh v. Hecht and Kenny v. McKenzie, supra; Code Civ. Proc. 1913, § 8147.

And same triable by jury. Donahue v. Meister, 88 Cal. 121, 22 Am. St. Rep. 283, 25 P. 1096; Gillespie v. Gouly, 120 Cal. 515, 52 P. 816; Haggin v. Kelly, 136 Cal. 481, 69 P. 140; Davis v. Judson, 159 Cal. 121, 113 P. 148; Angus v. Craven, 132 Cal. 691, 64 P. 1091; Atkinson v. J. R. Crowe Coal & Min. Co. 80 Kan. 161, 39 L.R.A.(N.S.) 31, 102 P. 50, 106 P. 1052, 18 Ann. Cas. 242; Burleigh v. Hecht, 22 S.D. 301, 117 N.W. 367; Kenny v. McKenzie, 25 S.D. 485, 49 L.R.A.(N.S.) 775, 127 N.W. 597; Haines's Appeal, 73 Pa. 169; North Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Snowden, 42 Pa. 488, 82 Am. Dec. 530, 14 Mor. Min. Rep. 294; Chandler v. Graham, 123 Mich. 327, 82 N.W. 814; Stonecifer v. Yellow Jacket Silver Min. Co. 3 Nev. 38, 3 Mor. Min. Rep. 4; Meigs v. Willis, 66 How. Pr. 466; Newman v. Duane, 89 Cal. 597, 27 P. 66; Hughes v. Dunlap, 91 Cal. 385, 27 P. 642; Taylor v. Ford, 92 Cal. 419, 28 P. 441; Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322.

The rule is against splitting an indivisible cause of action, no matter under what pretext or what form of action, nor who are the parties or alleged parties to the various proceedings. Baird v. United States, 96 U.S. 430, 24 L. ed. 703; Pierro v. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. 39 Minn. 451, 1 Am. St. Rep. 673, 40 N.W. 520; 1 Van Fleet, Former Adjudication, §§ 59, 70, 144, and 156; Dutton v. Shaw, 35 Mich. 431; 23 Cyc. 1174, note 85; Continental Ins. Co. v. H. M. Loud & Sons Lumber Co. 93 Mich. 139, 32 Am. St. Rep. 494, 53 N.W. 394; Dils v. Justice, 137 Ky. 822, 127 S.W. 472; Craig v. Broocks, Tex. Civ. App. , 127 S.W. 572; 1 Sutherland, Code Pl. & Pr. § 218; Reynolds v. Jones, 63 Ark. 259, 38 S.W. 151; Guernsey v. Carver, 8 Wend. 494, 24 Am. Dec. 60; Hughes v. Dundee Mortg. & Trust Invest. Co. 26 F. 831; Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N.Y. 554; Kennedy v. New York, 127 A.D. 89, 111 N.Y.S. 61.

A judgment for a part of an entire indivisible demand, all of which is due when action is commenced, is an election to take the part in satisfaction of the whole, and estops the plaintiff from recovering the residue. Headnote 4 to Deweese v. Smith, 66 L.R.A. 971, 45 C. C. A. 408, 106 F. 438; South & North Ala. R. Co. v. Henlein, 56 Ala. 368; Grain v. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514, 99 Am. Dec. 423; Cunningham v. Morris, 19 Ga. 583, 65 Am. Dec. 611; McDole v. McDole, 106 Ill. 452; Brannenburg v. Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. 13 Ind. 103, 74 Am. Dec. 250; Day v. Brenton, 102 Iowa 482, 63 Am. St. Rep. 460, 71 N.W. 538; Madden v. Smith, 28 Kan. 798; Powell v. Weiler, 11 B. Mon. 186; Bennett v. Hood, 1 Allen, 47, 79 Am. Dec. 705; Milroy v. Spurr Mountain Iron Min. Co. 43 Mich. 231, 5 N.W. 287, 12 Mor. Min. Rep. 53; O'Brien v. Manwaring, 79 Minn. 86, 79 Am. St. Rep. 426, 81 N.W. 746; Taylor v. Heitz, 87 Mo. 660; Johnson v. Payne, 11 Neb. 269, 9 N.W. 81; Bendernagle v. Cocks, 19 Wend. 207, 32 Am. Dec. 448; Kline v. Stein, 46 Wash. 546, 123 Am. St. Rep. 940, 90 P. 1041; Collins v. Gleason, 47 Wash. 69, 125 Am. St. Rep. 891, 91 P. 566; Guernsey v. Carver, 8 Wend. 492, 24 Am. Dec. 60; Ewing v. McNairy, 20 Ohio St. 315; Simes v. Zane, 24 Pa. 242; Morey v. King, 51 Vt. 383; Stone v. Pratt, 25 Ill. 25; Wichita & W. R. Co. v. Beebe, 39 Kan. 470, 18 P. 502; Pinney v. Barnes, 17 Conn. 420; Welles v. Rhodes, 59 Conn. 498, 22 A. 286; Pomeroy v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401, 138 Am. St. Rep. 347, 76 A. 898, 21 Ann. Cas. 574; Mallory v. Dawson Cotton Oil Co. 32 Tex. Civ. App. 294, 74 S.W. 953; Phillips v. Portsmouth, 112 Va. 164, 70 S.E. 502; Cornett v. Moore, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 280, 97 S.W. 380; Loomis v. Robinson, 76 Mo. 488; Coster v. New York & E. R. Co. 6 Duer, 46; German F. Ins. Co. v. Bullene, 51 Kan. 764, 33 P. 467; Lock v. Miller, 3 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 14; Franklin School Twp. v. Wiggins, 142 Iowa 377, 120 N.W. 1032.

The prosecution to judgment of a portion of an indivisible cause of action is a bar to any action for any portion thereof, including all matters that could and should have been included in the first action. Smith v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 83 Wis. 271, 50 N.W. 497, 53 N.W. 550; Craig v. Broocks, Tex. Civ. App. , 127 S.W. 572; O'Brien v. Manwaring, 79 Minn. 86, 79 Am. St. Rep. 426, 81 N.W. 746; L. Bucki & Son Co. v. Atlantic Lumber Co. 48 C. C. A. 455, 109 F. 411; Kennedy v. New York, 127 A.D. 89, 111 N.Y.S. 61; Franklin School Twp. v. Wiggins, 142 Iowa 377, 120 N.W. 1032.

Neither can such a cause of action be split by assignment, so as to permit more than one action to be brought thereon without full concurrence by the debtor. German F. Ins. Co. v. Bullene, 51 Kan. 764, 73 P. 467; Smith v. Jones, 15 Johns. 229; Willard v. Sperry, 16 Johns. 121; Marziou v. Pioche, 8 Cal. 536; Herriter v. Porter, 23 Cal. 385; Pueblo v. Dye, 44 Colo. 35, 96 P. 969; Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. Nichols, 57 Ill. 464; Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277, 5 L. ed. 87; Thatch v. Metropole Ins. Co. 3 McCrary, 387, 11 F. 29; Day v. Brenton, 102 Iowa 482, 63 Am. St. Rep. 460, 71 N.W. 538; Grain v. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514, 99 Am. Dec. 423; Roby v. Eggers, 130 Ind. 415, 29 N.E. 365; Ingraham v. Hall, 11 Serg. & R. 78; Continental Ins. Co. v. H. M. Loud & Sons Lumber Co. 93 Mich. 139, 32 Am. St. Rep. 494, 53 N.W. 394; Thomas v. Rock Island Gold & S. Min. Co. 54 Cal. 578; St. Lawrence Boom & Mfg. Co. v. Price, 49 W.Va. 432, 38 S.E. 526; Phillips v. Portsmouth, 112 Va. 164, 70 S.E. 502; 2 Stone, Judgm. p. 1102, 23 Cyc. 443; 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 158.

A judgment in a prior action between the same parties, which involves the same subject-matter, renders res judicata every question which was directly or impliedly involved in the decision. Brown v. First Nat. Bank, 66 C. C. A. 293, 132 F. 450; Kline v. Stein, 46 Wash. 546, 123 Am. St. Rep. 940, 90 P. 1041.

It is the right of this defendant to but one single trial upon a single cause of action. Durango Land & Coal Co. v. Evans, 25 C. C. A. 523, 49 U.S. App. 305, 80 F. 425; Livingston v. Proseus, 2 Hill, 526; Chamberlain v. Taylor, 92 N.Y. 348; Galbraith v. Payne, 12 N.D. 164, 96 N.W. 258; Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 9405, 9406.

All necessary parties shown by pleadings or proof must be brought in before the court can lawfully enter a decree or judgment. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 15 L. ed. 158.

A defendant in possession cannot be ejected from land, the title quieted, and damages recovered from him, without ascertaining who the real owner is. Comp. Laws 1913, § 7639; Birney v. Warren, 28 Mont. 64, 72 P. 293; Gray v. Pike, 38 Mich. 650.

Possession of real property is notice to the world of the right and claims of the party in possession thereto. O'Toole v. Omlie, 8 N.D. 444, 79 N.W. 849; Dickson v. Dows, 11 N.D. 407, 92 N.W. 798; Niles v. Cooper, 98 Minn. 39, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 49, 107 N.W. 744; Garbutt v. Mayo, 128 Ga. 269, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 58, 57 S.E. 495; Notes in the two latter cases in 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 49 to 140.

Harold Harris and T. F. Murtha, for respondents.

If appellant at any time was entitled to a jury trial, he waived such right by trial and submitting all his rights and defenses to the court without a jury, and by failing to demand a jury trial, and by demanding a new trial in the supreme court. Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 7608, 7637; 24 Cyc. 149, et seq. 154, 155, 158; Webster v. White, 8 S.D. 479, 66 N.W. 1145; Citizens' Gaslight Co. v. Wakefield, 161 Mass. 432, 31 L.R.A. 457, 37 N.E. 444.

But the claims and issues here involved were properly triable in a court of equity. Gescheidt v. Quirk, 66 How. Pr. 272; Gilroy v. Badger, 27 Misc. 640, 58 N.Y.S. 392; Comp. Laws 1913, § 9406; Burke v. Scharf, 19 N.D. 227, 124 N.W. 79; Galbraith v. Payne, 12 N.D. 164, 96 N.W. 258; 39 Cyc. 1400, notes 35 and 37; Arnett v. Smith, 11 N.D. 55, 88 N.W. 1037; Cotton v. Butterfield, 14 N.D. 469, 105 N.W. 236; Suessenbach v. First Nat. Bank, 5 Dak. 477, 41 N.W. 662 (subdiv. 6 of syllabus).

It is a proper suit in equity and triable as such, and defendant cannot, by raising a legal issue in his answer, transform the suit into a legal action. Gresens v. Martin, 27 N.D 231, 145 N.W. 823; Preteca v. Maxwell Land Grant Co. 1 C. C. A. 607, 4 U.S. App. 326, 50 F. 674; Angus v. Craven, 132 Cal. 691, 64 P. 1091; Beamer v. Werner, 86 C. C. A. 289, 159 F. 99; O'Neil v. Tyler, 3...