Schmidt v. Multimedia Holdings Corp., 6:04-CV-186-ORL-31KRS.

• Citation: 361 F.Supp.2d 1346
• Decision Date: 10 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 6:04-CV-186-ORL-31KRS.,6:04-CV-186-ORL-31KRS.
• Parties: Judith SCHMIDT, Plaintiffs, v. MULTIMEDIA HOLDINGS CORP. d/b/a News-Press, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

361 F.Supp.2d 1346

Judith SCHMIDT, Plaintiffs, v. MULTIMEDIA HOLDINGS CORP. d/b/a News-Press, Defendant.

No. 6:04-CV-186-ORL-31KRS.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division.

November 10, 2004.

Jeremy D. Friedman, Downs Brill Whitehead, Coral Gables, FL, Mark A. Goldstein, Wolfe and Goldstein, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Luca R. Bronzi, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., Miami, FL, David Stockton Hendrix, Gray Robinson, P.A., Tampa, FL, Jack A. Kirschenbaum, GrayRobinson P.A., Melbourne, FL, Carol A. Licko, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., Miami, FL, William K. Thames, II, Lozier, Thames & Frazier, P.A., Pensacola, FL, Parker D. Thomson, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., Miami, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

PRESNELL, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Defendant Multimedia Holding Corp d/b/a News-Press' ("News-Press") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 89) and Plaintiff Judith Schmidt's Response (Doc. 94).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has brought the instant case against News-Press for alleged violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq. On behalf of herself and perhaps as many as 479,500 proposed class members, Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint (Doc. 85) that News-Press engaged in the following conduct as an actionable wrong:

a. From the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("State"), News-Press obtained and continues to possess for marketing purposes certain information pertaining to the Plaintiff and proposed class members,

b. News-Press obtained the information without Plaintiff's or the proposed class members' express consent or waiver,

c. "upon information and belief" the State also failed to obtain such consent or waiver, and

d. "upon information and belief" News-Press knew or should have known that the State failed to obtain such consent or waiver.

(Doc. 85 ¶¶ 28, 30-34). Based on News-Press' obtainment of information, Plaintiff claims to "have suffered actual damages in the form of mental distress, monetary loss concerning the lost value of their personal information, nuisance, and annoyance;" and, accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to recover a minimum $2,500 statutory award for herself and for each proposed class member. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49). Based on News-Press' continued possession of information, Plaintiff seeks equitable relief in the form of a court-ordered destruction of the information News-Press obtained. (Id. ¶¶ 53-54). Based on a further allegation that News-Press knew of and intentionally flouted the DPPA, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages. (Id. ¶ 47). Plaintiff also seeks attorneys' fees and costs for bringing this case.

An unenforced amendment to the DPPA is the genesis of this case. In 1994, Congress enacted the DPPA to limit the release of information that drivers' license recipients are required to submit to states for the legal privilege of driving motor vehicles. Originally, the DPPA provided an "opt-out" procedure for information disclosures for marketing purposes — a state could release information for marketing purposes so long as the person to whom it pertained could, by request, prevent the release of their information. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(12)(1994). In 1999, however, Congress amended the DPPA to provide an "opt-in" procedure — a state cannot release information for marketing purposes without the express consent of the person to whom the information pertains. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(12)(1999). Plaintiff alleges that the State failed to follow the DPPA's amendment upon its effective date, and News-Press thereafter obtained Plaintiff's and proposed class members' information in violation of the DPPA's current opt-in requirement. (Doc. 85 ¶ 13).

Plaintiff relies on the following DPPA provisions as her basis for the instant case:

(a) Cause of Action. — A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under [the DPPA] shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring a civil action in a United States district court.

(b) Remedies. — the court may award —

(1) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500;

(2) punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law;

(3) reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred; and

(4) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be appropriate.

18 U.S.C. § 2724(a)-(b).

In response to Plaintiff's claims, News-Press has filed a Motion to Dismiss, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, under Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As to jurisdiction, News-Press asserts that Plaintiff has no standing — specifically, Plaintiff has not sustained an "injury in fact," which is a necessary element for a justiciable case or controversy under Article III § 2 of the United States Constitution. News-Press also asserts that Plaintiff's claims are not ripe for jurisdictional purposes because Plaintiff has not been injured in any way and Plaintiff may never suffer an injury. As to whether Plaintiff states cognizable claims for relief, News-Press asserts that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for actual (and thus liquidated) damages, and Plaintiff has failed to make a proper showing for equitable relief.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) come in two forms that may involve substantially different standards of review. First, there are "facial attacks," which "require the court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction...." Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990). As is generally the standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, a court assessing a "facial attack" on jurisdiction is to assume the allegations in the complaint are true and not look outside the pleadings and attached exhibits. See id. Second, there are "factual attacks," which challenge the factual basis asserted for jurisdiction. Id. If a factual attack on jurisdiction regards an issue reasonably distinct from the merits, the court may weigh conflicting written and oral evidence and decide for itself whether jurisdiction exists. See, e.g. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 512-13 (5th Cir.1980) (affirming Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal where evidence outside the pleadings revealed a lack of state action and thus no jurisdictional basis for a civil rights claim). Nevertheless, in regard to motions to dismiss, judicial economy and fairness require a defendant to proceed under Rule 12(b)(6) when challenging the merits of a plaintiff's claim. Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415-16 (5th Cir.1981)).

In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), and must limit its consideration to the pleadings and any exhibits attached thereto. FED.R.CIV.P. 10(c). See also GSW, Inc. v. Long County, Ga., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir.1993). A court is to assume that the allegations are true and liberally construe them in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is inappropriate unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that support a claim for relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). If, however, no construction of the factual allegations will support a cause of action in light of a dispositive issue of law, a court may dismiss a legally insupportable claim for relief. See Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir.1993).

III. ANALYSIS

At issue, initially, is whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. News-Press argues that (1) the Court need not accept Plaintiff's allegations that she has sustained actual damages or has been injured; (2) Plaintiff has not been harmed in any way; and (3), unless and until there is some further action on News-Press' part, this case is not ripe for adjudication and Plaintiff has no standing to sue.

A. Jurisdiction and the Requirements of Standing and Ripeness in Regard to the DPPA

Article III of the U.S. Constitution, in relevant part, provides that the "judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution ... [and] to Controversies...." U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). Derived from this case-or-controversy language is the concept of standing, which limits the types of matters appropriate for judicial determination. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). First among the irreducable constitutional requirements for standing is that the plaintiff who brings a claim in federal court "must have suffered an `injury in fact' — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical.'" Id. (citations omitted). In this regard, standing addresses whether an alleged injury is sufficient to raise an Article III case-or-controversy and whether the plaintiff is the appropriate person to complain about that alleged injury. See id; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKI, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.4 (4th ed.2003).

Also derived from Article III's case-or-controversy language and from prudential considerations is the concept of ripeness, which is "designed to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Levy v. Miami-Dade County, 358 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)....