Ela v. Destefano, Case No: 6:13-cv-491-Orl-28KRS
| Decision Date | 02 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 6:13-cv-491-Orl-28KRS |
| Parties | THERESA ANN ELA, Plaintiff, v. KATHLEEN DESTEFANO, JERRY L. DEMINGS, JOHN DOES 1-30, JANE DOES 1-30 and ORANGE COUNTY, SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
The facts of this case once again prove that "among human beings jealousy ranks distinctly as a weakness."1 Defendant Kathleen Destefano is an Orange County deputy sheriff and is married to Dennis Ela, also an Orange County deputy sheriff. But, before marrying Destefano, Dennis Ela was married to Theresa Ann Ela, Plaintiff in this case. Apart from jealousy, Destefano's conduct is inexplicable. Knowing it to be illegal and in violation of the Sheriff's policy, Destefano used her authority as a deputy sheriff to access Plaintiff's personal information contained in law enforcement databases. Upon discovery of this conduct, Plaintiff sued Destefano in her individual capacity under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act2 ("the DPPA") and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sued Sheriff Jerry Demings ("the Sheriff") in his official capacity under § 1983. (Am. Compl., Doc. 82). Before trial and during trial, Destefano admitted to illegally accessing Plaintiff's personal information. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury determined that Destefano did so 101 times. (JuryVerdict, Doc. 180 at 1). But, the jury also found that Plaintiff suffered no damages from Destefano's conduct. Id. This Order explains the Rule 50(a) rulings3 made during the trial and addresses remaining post-trial issues, including how much, if any, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and costs should be awarded.
Central to this litigation is the DPPA. Congress enacted the DPPA in reaction to the ability of wrongdoers to easily use and distribute drivers' personal information in furtherance of criminal conduct and marketing schemes. Schmidt v. Multimedia Holdings Corp., 361 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1354 (M.D. Fla. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank & Tr., 421 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005). In determining remedies available to drivers whose personal information is compromised, "Congress clearly contemplated that in most cases, a defendant who obtained motor vehicle information would put it to some use." Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 393 (3d Cir. 2008).
In her capacity as an officer with the Orange County Sheriff's Office, Destefano had access to databases used by law enforcement agencies, including the Driver and Vehicle Information Database ("DAVID"), the Florida Crime Information Center database ("FCIC"), and the National Crime Information Center database ("NCIC"). These databases contain information about individuals, including photographs, addresses, vehicle information, and emergency contacts. Destefano admitted that she viewed Plaintiff's personal information on the databases without a legitimate law enforcement purpose many times from January 2010 through November 2011, almost always using DAVID to do so.
Plaintiff first learned of Destefano's actions when she made a public records request with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement in late 2011. At trial, Destefano was contrite. She admitted she had "no good explanation" for accessing Plaintiff's personal information, that "it was a mistake," and that she was "sorry." She further admitted that she did not have a legitimate law enforcement purpose for accessing the information. As a result of her conduct, the Sheriff suspended Destefano for sixty hours without pay and placed her on disciplinary probation for six months. As additional punishment, the Sheriff prohibited Destefano from driving a patrol car to and from her home and from participating in off-duty private employment ordinarily available to Sheriff's deputies.
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sued Destefano under the DPPA (Count I) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II); the Sheriff under § 1983 for failure to supervise and train its employees on the proper use of DAVID (Count III); and Orange County, Sheriff Department under § 1983 (Count IV) and the DPPA (Count V). (Am. Compl., Doc. 82).4 The case proceeded to trial on Counts I, II, and III.
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case-in-chief, each party moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The Sheriff moved for judgment as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against him, and Plaintiff and Destefano both moved for judgment as to the DPPA and § 1983 claims against Destefano. Ultimately, I grantedPlaintiff's motion as to the DPPA and §1983 claims against Destefano and granted the Sheriff's motion as to the § 1983 claim against him, ending his participation in the case.
Before the case was submitted to the jury on the remaining claims against Destefano, Plaintiff agreed to seek damages only under the DPPA and not under §1983. After the trial, Plaintiff and Destefano filed memoranda addressing how much liquidated damages, if any, should be awarded under the DPPA. (Docs. 184 & 185). Plaintiff then filed a motion for an award of costs and attorney's fees under the DPPA and § 1983 (Doc. 190), to which Defendant filed a response, (Doc. 197). The Sheriff also filed a motion to recover his costs (Doc. 196), to which Plaintiff responded, (Doc. 198).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) governs motions for judgment as a matter of law. Such a motion may be granted against a party "[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). But, entry of judgment as a matter of law is appropriate "only if the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont'l Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1309 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering Rule 50(a) motions, a court must review all evidence in the record and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party; however, a court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as those are solely functions of the jury. Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004). Even under this generous standard, the nonmoving party isobligated to come forward with some evidence indicating that reasonable jurors could reach different verdicts. Campbell v. Rainbow City, Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 1312 (11th Cir. 2006).
The DPPA is enforceable under its own terms, but it also creates a statutory right to privacy that is enforceable under § 1983. See Collier v. Dickinson, 477 F.3d 1306, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2007). It generally provides that except when carrying out an official governmental or law enforcement function "[a] person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record . . . shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains." 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721(b), 2724(a). To "obtain" personal information under the DPPA, a defendant need only access and observe the data. McDonough v. Anoka Cty., 799 F.3d 931, 944 (8th Cir. 2015). Also, each "access" of a person's personal information is a separate "obtainment" and thus an additional violation of the DPPA. See Rollins v. City of Albert Lea, 79 F. Supp. 3d 946, 974 (D. Minn. 2014). Accordingly, Destefano violated the DPPA each time she accessed Plaintiff's personal information, even when the accesses occurred in close succession to one another. Id.
In this case, the unrefuted testimony elicited during trial establishes that Destefano violated the DPPA and Plaintiff's statutory right to privacy. Destefano admitted that while she was on duty as a law enforcement officer she accessed driver's license databases to view Plaintiff's personal information. Except for one instance where Destefano claimed to view Plaintiff's information for a law enforcement purpose—an instance about which she could recall no details—Destefano testified that she viewed the data for an improperpurpose. Based on this testimony, Destefano violated the DPPA and Plaintiff's statutory right to privacy as a matter of law.
In Count III, Plaintiff attempted to hold the Sheriff accountable in his official capacity for Destefano's conduct under § 1983 based on inadequate training or supervision. In doing so, Plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). Instead, a municipality may only be liable under § 1983 if its policy directly causes a violation. Am. Fed'n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1187 (11th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff did not claim or prove the Sheriff's policy on its face violated federal law or that it directed its employees to do so; thus, the only question is whether Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that would allow the jury to conclude that there was a direct causal connection between the Sheriff's policy and the alleged violation. Id.
To prove that the Sheriffs' office caused a violation, Plaintiff must show that the Sheriff had in place a policy or custom that amounted to a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's rights. Id. at 1189. This requires evidence that the Sheriff had notice of a need to train or supervise his employees. Id. The notice requirement can be satisfied by a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees or through a single prior incident. Id. In some cases, even without a prior incident it may be so obvious that without training, drivers' rights under the DPPA would be violated. Id. Plaintiff must also establish that, once the Sheriff had notice of a violation, he "made a deliberate choice not to train his employees." Id. (internal...
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