Schmidt v. Univ. of Cincinnati Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 16 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96API05-647,96API05-647
• Parties: SCHMIDT, Exr., Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee. Tenth District, Franklin County
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 427

117 Ohio App.3d 427

690 N.E.2d 946

SCHMIDT, Exr., Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee.

No. 96API05-647.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided Jan. 16, 1997.

Karen Foeller Marler, Cincinnati, for appellant.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Marilena R. Walters, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

PETREE, Judge.

Plaintiff, Alfred Schmidt, executor of the estate of Barbara Schmidt, deceased, appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio in favor of defendant, University of Cincinnati Medical Center. Plaintiff sets forth the following assignments of error:

1. "The court erred to plaintiffs' detriment in granting defendant's Civil Rule 41(B)(1) motion to dismiss against the manifest weight of the evidence.

2. "The court erred to plaintiffs' detriment in granting defendant's Civil Rule 41(B)(1) motion to dismiss contrary to law."

In 1992, decedent Barbara Schmidt was admitted to Bethesda North Hospital complaining of chest pains. While at the hospital, Mrs. Schmidt experienced a heart attack. Although Mrs. Schmidt survived the heart attack, it was determined that she was in need of an automatic implantable cardioverter defibrillator ("AICD").

Thereafter, Mrs. Schmidt was admitted to the University of Cincinnati Medical Center, defendant herein. Dr. Thomas Ivey, an employee of the hospital, was scheduled to perform the surgical procedure necessary to implant the AICD. In order to implant the AICD, a small incision is made in the patient's abdominal wall, and a clamp is then used to open the abdominal cavity. This allows the surgeon to grasp a chest tube that contains wire leads. The wire leads are then tunneled through the abdominal wall to the pericardium. Tunneling is a blind procedure, meaning that the surgeon cannot actually see where the clamp is placed. In this case, the clamp had penetrated the peritoneum and perforated the stomach, allowing the leads to pass through the stomach. As a consequence of the perforation of the stomach, Mrs. Schmidt developed a postoperative infection. A second surgical procedure was performed by another physician to determine the source of the infection and course of treatment. It was during the second procedure that the perforation of the stomach was discovered. Mrs. Schmidt was subsequently treated for the infection and recovered.

In November 1994, Mrs. Schmidt brought the instant action against defendant, alleging medical malpractice. However, on December 8, 1995, Mrs. Schmidt passed away and her husband, Alfred Schmidt was substituted as party-plaintiff in this action. The case proceeded to a nonjury trial. Following the presentation of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for dismissal of plaintiff's cause pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2). On April 16, 1996, the Court of Claims issued a decision dismissing plaintiff's case. A judgment entry of dismissal was issued by the court on that same day.

In each of plaintiff's assignments of error, plaintiff contends, for slightly different reasons, that the trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff's medical malpractice claim pursuant to Civ.R. 41. Accordingly, we will address the assignments of error jointly.

Civ.R. 41(B)(2) provides:

"Dismissal; Non-jury Action. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence."

In Johnson v. Tansky Sawmill Toyota, Inc. (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 164, 167, 642 N.E.2d 9, 10-11, we discussed the standard of review of a dismissal, pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2):

"In a trial to a court without a jury, a motion for judgment by a defendant at the close of plaintiff's case is one for dismissal, pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2) * * *. Pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2), the trial court is the trier of fact and is to weigh the evidence. A dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2) will not be set aside unless it is incorrect as a matter of law or is against the manifest weight of the evidence."

In order to establish medical malpractice, plaintiff must demonstrate by the preponderance of the evidence that the injury complained of was caused by a practice that a physician of ordinary skill, care or diligence, would not have employed, and that plaintiff's injury was the direct and proximate result of that practice. Bruni v. Tatsumi (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 127, 75 O.O.2d 184, 346 N.E.2d 673, at paragraph one of the syllabus. Accordingly, proof of medical malpractice requires evidence of the pertinent recognized standard of the medical community and evidence that the physician negligently departed from that standard. Id. at 131, 75 O.O.2d at 186-187, 346 N.E.2d at 677.

In Turner v. Children's Hosp., Inc. (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 541, 548, 602 N.E.2d 423, 427, this court discussed the type of evidence necessary to sustain plaintiff's burden of proof in a medical malpractice case:

"Ordinarily, the issue of whether the physician has employed the requisite care must be determined from the testimony of experts, unless the standard of care is sufficiently obvious that laymen could reasonably evaluate the physician's conduct. Such expert testimony serves to aid the trier of fact in determining if there was malpractice. For, although customary practice is evidence of what a reasonably prudent physician would do under like or similar circumstances, it is not conclusive in determining the applicable standard required. Ault [v. Hall (1928), 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518]." (Citation omitted.)

In this case, the trial court, as the trier of fact, determined that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence that Dr. Ivey had negligently departed from the applicable standard of care. The court expressly found that the testimony of plaintiff's own expert witness defeated plaintiff's medical malpractice claim. We agree.

Plaintiff presented the testimony of Dr. Loren Hiratzka, a board-certified thoracic surgeon. Hiratzka testified that he had performed between two hundred and...