Schmitz v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
| Decision Date | 08 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 103525.,103525. |
| Citation | 2016 Ohio 8041,67 N.E.3d 852 |
| Parties | Steven SCHMITZ, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Robert E. Derose, Neal J. Barkan, Barkan Meizlish Handelman Goodin Derose Wentz, L.L.P., Columbus, OH, Melanie J. Garner, David D. Langfitt, Locks Law Firm, Philadelphia, PA, Richard S. Lewis, Hausfeld, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for appellants.
Frederick R. Nance, Sean L. McGrane, Squire Patton Boggs (US), L.L.P., Cleveland, OH, for National Collegiate Athletic Association.
Steven A. Friedman, Squire Patton Boggs (US) L.L.P., Cleveland, OH, Aaron Michael Healey, Matthew A. Kairis, Jones Day, Columbus, OH, for University of Notre Dame du Lac.
Before: JONES, A.J., BOYLE, J., and CELEBREZZE, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, the estate of Steven T. Schmitz and Yvette Schmitz, individually and as fiduciary of the estate of Steven T. Schmitz, deceased (collectively "plaintiffs"), appeal the trial court's decision granting the motions to dismiss filed by defendants-appellees, the University of Notre Dame du Lac ("Notre Dame") and the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("the NCAA") (collectively "defendants"). Plaintiffs raise the following single assignment of error:
The trial court erred by granting the motions to dismiss, because the complaint's allegations are sufficient to state each claim, and the complaint does not conclusively show on its face that plaintiffs-appellants' claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
{¶ 2} Finding some merit to the appeal, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
{¶ 3} From 1974 to 1978, Steven Schmitz, a former running back and receiver, played football for Notre Dame, a member institution of the NCAA.1 In December 2012, Schmitz was diagnosed by the Cleveland Clinic Neurology Department with chronic traumatic encephalopathy ("CTE")—a latent brain disease caused by repetitive head impacts. At that time, Schmitz was 57 years old and unemployable, suffering from severe memory loss, cognitive decline, early onset Alzheimer's disease, traumatic encephalopathy, and dementia.
{¶ 5} The complaint alleges that Notre Dame and the NCAA knew (or should have known) "college football players are at greater risk for chronic brain injury, illness, and disability both during their football careers and later in life." And that, despite this knowledge, Notre Dame and the NCAA "orchestrated an approach to football practices and games" that (1) "ignored the medical risks to Steve Schmitz"; (2) "aggravated and enhanced the medical risks to Steve Schmitz"; (3) "failed to educate Steve Schmitz of the link between concussive and sub-concussive impacts in amateur football and chronic neurological damage, illnesses, and decline"; and (4) "failed to implement or enforce any system that would reasonably have mitigated, prevented, or addressed concussive and sub-concussive impacts suffered by Steve Schmitz." The complaint sets forth counts for negligence, fraud by concealment, constructive fraud, breach of express and implied contract, and loss of consortium.
{¶ 6} In March 2015, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint. Specifically, Notre Dame moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that plaintiffs' claims are time-barred. The NCAA moved to dismiss the claims on both statute of limitations grounds and failure to state a claim under Ohio or Indiana law.
{¶ 7} Schmitz died on February 13, 2015. Thereafter, the estate of Steven Schmitz was substituted as a plaintiff as well as Yvette Schmitz as fiduciary of her husband's estate and in her personal capacity.
{¶ 8} On September 1, 2015, the trial court granted both Notre Dame's and the NCAA's motion to dismiss without opinion and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. This appeal follows.
{¶ 9} We review an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim for relief under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5. When reviewing a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, we must accept the material allegations of the complaint as true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 106 Ohio St.3d 278, 2005-Ohio-4985, 834 N.E.2d 791, ¶ 6. However, while the factual allegations of the complaint must be taken as true, "[u]nsupported conclusions of a complaint are not considered admitted * * * and are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." State ex rel. Hickman v. Capots, 45 Ohio St.3d 324, 544 N.E.2d 639 (1989). For a defendant to prevail on the motion, it must appear from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would justify a court in granting relief. O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975). York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144–145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991).
{¶ 10} Additionally, under Ohio's liberal pleading rules, all that is required of a plaintiff bringing suit is "(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled." Civ.R. 8(A). Unlike other claims, however, fraud claims must be plead with particularity as required under Civ.R. 9(B).
{¶ 11} While the parties dispute the governing state substantive law that applies to plaintiffs' claims—Indiana or Ohio—there is no dispute that Ohio, the forum state, provides the applicable statute of limitations. See Howard v. Allen, 30 Ohio St.2d 130, 133, 283 N.E.2d 167 (1972) (). Both Notre Dame and the NCAA moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that Ohio's statute of limitations had run on all of plaintiffs' claims. We first examine this issue applying Ohio law.
{¶ 12} Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint as being time-barred. Plaintiffs maintain that the complaint pleads a latent undiscoverable injury that became manifest decades after Schmitz played football and that the complaint does not on its face show beyond doubt that plaintiffs cannot recover based on a statute of limitations defense. According to plaintiffs, the trial court erred in failing to apply the discovery rule, which would have tolled their claims until December 2012—the date when they became aware of the injury and the cause of the injury. Because they filed their original complaint approximately 18 months after learning of the diagnosis, they argue that their claims were timely and well within (1) the two-year limitation period for their negligence personal injury claim under R.C. 2305.10, (2) the four-year limitation period for their fraud claim as contained in R.C. 2305.09, and (3) the 15–and six-year period for their express written and implied contract claims as contained in R.C. 2305.06 and 2305.07.
{¶ 13} "Statutes of limitations serve a gate-keeping function for courts by ‘(1) ensuring fairness to the defendant, (2) encouraging prompt prosecution of causes of action, (3) suppressing stale and fraudulent claims, and (4) avoiding the inconveniences engendered by delay—specifically, the difficulties of proof present in older cases.’ " (Citations omitted.) Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. Airline Union's Mtge. Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 529, 2011-Ohio-1961, 947 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 7. Nevertheless, "statutes of limitations are remedial in nature and are to be given a liberal construction to permit cases to be decided upon their merits, after a court indulges every reasonable presumption and resolves all doubts in favor of giving, rather than denying, the plaintiff an opportunity to litigate." Id. at ¶ 7; Harris v. Reedus, 2015-Ohio-4962, 50 N.E.3d 1036, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 14} Generally, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run at the time the wrongful act was committed. Collins v. Sotka, 81 Ohio St.3d 506, 507, 692 N.E.2d 581 (1998). The discovery rule, however, is an exception to this general rule and provides that "a cause of action does not arise until the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that he or she has been injured by the conduct of the defendant." Flagstar Bank at ¶ 14, citing Collins at id. "The rule entails a two-pronged test—i.e., actual knowledge not just that one has been injured but also that the injury was caused by the conduct of the defendant." Id., citing O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 447 N.E.2d 727 (1983). A statute of limitations does not begin to run until both prongs have been satisfied. Id.
{¶ 15} The first issue that we must decide is whether the discovery rule applies to plaintiffs' claims.
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