Schneider v. Bress

• Citation: 604 N.Y.S.2d 314,194 A.D.2d 36
• Parties: In the Matter of Martin B. SCHNEIDER et al., Respondents, v. Joseph M. BRESS, as Executive Director of the New York State Ethics Commission, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 02 December 1993
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

Page 314

604 N.Y.S.2d 314

194 A.D.2d 36

In the Matter of Martin B. SCHNEIDER et al., Respondents, v. Joseph M. BRESS, as Executive Director of the New York State Ethics Commission, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Dec. 2, 1993.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Siobhan S. Crary, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

Martin B. Schneider, New York City, respondent pro se.

Before WEISS, P.J., and MERCURE, CREW and WHITE, JJ.

CREW, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Travers, J.), entered June 16, 1992 in Albany County, which, inter alia, granted petitioners' application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul two determinations of respondent denying petitioners' requests for an exemption from filing financial disclosure statements.

Petitioners Martin B. Schneider and George G. Janis are attorneys employed by the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal; Schneider is employed as a senior attorney while Janis is employed as a Hearing Officer. As State employees earning in excess of $30,000 in 1989, petitioners were required to file an annual financial disclosure statement for calendar year 1988 in accordance with Public Officers Law § 73-a. ¹ On or before April 1, 1989, petitioners applied to the State Ethics Commission for exemptions from the filing requirement in accordance with Executive Law § 94(9)(k). Those requests were denied, and petitioners thereafter commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging respondent's determinations. Supreme Court annulled the determinations based upon respondent's failure to articulate a sufficient basis for the denials and remitted the matters for further consideration. Upon reconsideration, respondent again denied the requested exemptions, finding that petitioners' respective duties could encompass those activities set forth in Executive Law § 94(9)(k)(i)-(iv), thereby precluding an exemption and, further, that the public interest required disclosure.

Petitioners thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul respondent's determinations. Ultimately, Supreme Court granted the petition, ordering that petitioners be granted the requested exemptions, that Schneider's previously filed disclosure statement be returned and that any information derived therefrom be expunged from the Commission's records. This appeal by respondent followed.

At issue on appeal is the construction given Executive Law § 94(9)(k) which provides, in pertinent part, that the Commission may grant an exemption from the financial disclosure requirements to employees who are not employed in a policy-making position in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations governing such exemptions. The statute further provides that "[s]uch rules and regulations may permit the granting of an exemption where, in the discretion of the commission, the public interest does not require disclosure and the applicant's duties do not involve [certain enumerated activities]" (Executive Law § 94[9][k] [emphasis supplied]. It is petitioners' position that the phrase "applicant's duties" compels the Commission, in reviewing an application for an exemption, to render a determination based upon the applicant's actual job duties, as opposed to his or her job title or classification. Thus petitioners argue, and Supreme Court found, that it was arbitrary and capricious for respondent to deny the requested exemptions based upon petitioners' respective job classifications when the documentation submitted in support of their applications indicated that petitioners did not actually engage in any of the disqualifying activities set forth in Executive Law § 94(9)(k)(i)-(iv). We cannot agree and, accordingly, reverse.

It is well settled that as the agency charged with the administration of Executive Law § 94, the Commission's construction of that statute and the corresponding implementing regulations (see, 19 NYCRR part 935) will be upheld if not irrational (see Matter of John v. New York State Ethics Commn., 178 A.D.2d 51, 55, 581 N.Y.S.2d 882, lv. denied 80 N.Y.2d...