Schneider v. Schneider
Decision Date | 25 January 1904 |
Citation | 98 N.W. 159,125 Iowa 1 |
Parties | MARY CATHERINE SCHNEIDER, Appellant, v. GERTRUDE SCHNEIDER, B. WESSLING, and B. WESSLING, Guardian of GERTRUDE SCHNEIDER, an insane person, Appellees |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Carroll District Court.--HON. Z. A. CHURCH, Judge.
Reversed.
Heinz & Fisher and George W. Paine, for appellant.
Salinger & Korte, for appellees.
THE opinion states the case.--Reversed.
On November 30, 1898, Caspar Schneider, a resident of Carroll county, Iowa, died intestate, leaving Gertrude Schneider, his widow, and Mary Catherine Schneider, his sister, his only heirs at law and next of kin. Gertrude Schneider is, and for some years has been, insane, and confined in the State Hospital at Clarinda, and is under the guardianship of B Wessling. The intestate died seised of an eighty-acre tract of land in Carroll county, and a lot in the town of Breda. So far as appears, the property was un-incumbered, and there were little or no liabilities against the estate, except a few small claims arising from the expenses of the last sickness and burial of the decedent. On December 16, 1898 Wessling was appointed administrator of the estate. Mary Catherine Schneider is, and during all her life-time has been, a resident of Germany. About two years after the appointment of the administrator, when the estate had been substantially settled, and the administrator was about to be discharged, said Mary Catherine Schneider, acting through the German consul at Chicago, and attorneys employed by him brought this action in equity for the partition of the eighty-acre tract, naming as the only defendants the widow, Gertrude Schneider, and B. Wessling, as her guardian. The petition alleged the death of Caspar Schneider intestate, while seised of said real estate, and that the title to the said property thereby became vested in plaintiff and the defendant Gertrude in equal shares, and demanded partition accordingly. The defendant guardian answered this petition, admitting all the material allegations of the petition, except the present ownership by plaintiff of any interest in the land, and alleged that before the commencement of the suit, plaintiff had "sold and disposed of her interest in and to said land," but did not allege to whom the sale had been made. At the next term of the district court, the cause being still pending, B. Wessling appeared, and upon his application, was made a defendant in his own right, and alleged he was himself the owner of the undivided half interest in the land claimed by plaintiff, having obtained the same by purchase from her. By a subsequent amendment to his pleading, he sets out certain letters between himself and plaintiff, upon which he relies as a contract of sale to himself, and, after alleging that he has performed the agreement on his part, asks that the title be confirmed in him. Plaintiff, replying, admits the writing of the letters, and says she was induced thereto by the fraud and deceit of Wessling, and further says that at a subsequent date the proposed or attempted sale was abandoned by mutual consent.
I. Before proceeding to a consideration of the merits of the case, it is necessary to examine a question raised by appellee as to the record. The evidence consists largely in letters which are written in the German language, and are said to have passed between plaintiff and Wessling. The appellee objects that the alleged translations set out in appellant's abstract are not proved to be correct, and he denies that they are correct, but does not seek to enlighten this court by any statement of what he believes to be the true interpretation. The letters themselves, in their original form were offered in evidence, and the appellant sets out in her abstract what she claims to be their contents. This she had the right to do, and appellees cannot, by a bare denial, put the correctness of such statement in issue. Supreme Court rules, section 31 (old rule 22). We shall therefore treat the letters as being correctly set forth in the abstract.
II. The record shows that Wessling, a man about seventy years of age, was the plaintiff's cousin, although for some reason he addresses her as "niece." He is evidently a man of intelligence, a native of Germany, and, at the time of the transaction under inquiry, had been a resident of Carroll county for many years. Plaintiff, about sixty-four years old, has never lived elsewhere than in Germany, has never visited this country, and is ignorant of its laws and customs. On the day after the burial of Caspar Schneider, Wessling wrote to plaintiff, addressing her as "Dear Niece," and gave her a detailed account of the illness and death of her brother. He then adds: On January 6, 1899, he wrote plaintiff again, acknowledging receipt of a letter from her, and saying, among other things: Referring apparently to a statement in plaintiff's letter to the effect that she had received a letter from a lawyer at Carroll, he warns her to beware of such assistance saying, He then asks her for a power of attorney, and adds: Responding to information thus imparted, plaintiff on January 28, 1899, wrote Wessling as follows:
If defendant replied directly to this inquiry, it does not appear in the record. It is quite probable, however, that the entire correspondence is not in evidence. Under date of May 7, 1899, he writes: On September 3, 1899, he again writes explaining that he has been waiting because he wished to obtain information about the whole matter, and says: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Rauen v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of America
...of law. The rule by which a party is presumed to know the law has no reference to the law of another state or country. Schneider v. Schneider, 125 Iowa 1, 98 N.W. 159; King v. Doolittle, 38 Tenn. 77, 1 Head. (Tenn.) Patterson v. Bloomer, 35 Conn. 57 (95 Am. Dec. 218); Morgan v. Bell, 3 Wash......
-
Rauen v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
...of law. The rule by which a party is presumed to know the law has no reference to the law of another state or country. Schneider v. Schneider, 125 Iowa, 15, 98 N. W. 159;King v. Doolittle, 1 Head. (Tenn.) 77;Patterson v. Bloomer, 35 Conn. 57, 95 Am. Dec. 218;Morgan v. Bell, 3 Wash. St. 554,......
-
Bettendorf v. Bettendorf
... ... canceled. The decree should so provide." ... The ... point is touched upon in Schneider v. Schneider , 125 ... Iowa 1, 98 N.W. 159, where the contention was that a tender ... in open court alone was not sufficient. The court held ... ...
-
State v. Edwards, 27651.
...198 N. W. 905;Jekshewitz v. Groswald (Mass.) 164 N. E. 609. Much depends upon whether the parties deal on equal terms. Schneider v. Schneider, 125 Iowa, 1, 98 N. W. 159. Here they did. This rule of policy or procedural convenience which exists out of necessity will not permit one to rely up......