Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. City of Bridgeton, 66183

• Decision Date: 07 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 66183,66183
• Parties: SCHNUCK MARKETS, INC., Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CITY OF BRIDGETON, Defendant/Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 163

895 S.W.2d 163

SCHNUCK MARKETS, INC., Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CITY OF BRIDGETON, Defendant/Respondent.

No. 66183.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Four.

Feb. 7, 1995.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied March 7, 1995.

Application to Transfer Denied

April 25, 1995.

Gerald R. Ortbals, Lawrence S. Denk, Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, St. Louis, for appellant.

William A. Richter, Earl Robert Schultz, Peper, Martin, Jensen, Maichel & Hetlage, St. Louis, for respondent.

AHRENS, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff Schnuck Markets, Inc., (Schnucks) challenges the validity of a municipal ordinance of Bridgeton which forbids the operation of engines or compressors on stationary trucks within one thousand feet of an occupied residential structure at night. The trial court granted Bridgeton's motion for summary judgment against Schnucks. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

When considering appeals from summary judgments, we review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Facts set forth by affidavit or otherwise in support of a party's motion are taken as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party's response to the summary judgment motion. Id. We accord the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. Id.

Schnucks owns and operates an office and warehouse complex located in Bridgeton. For a number of years, Schnucks has used its privately owned parking lot at the complex for overnight parking of refrigerated trucks carrying perishables.

In 1985, Bridgeton Ordinance No. 85-17 was enacted to prohibit nighttime operation of truck engines and compressors near inhabited residential homes. In 1987, Schnucks sought to expand its complex in Bridgeton with plans to expand the parking lot. After applying to Bridgeton for the proper building permits, several meetings were held between both parties, and the permits were issued in September, 1987. Schnucks expended over four million dollars in the expansion of the complex and over $25,000.00 to complete the parking lot addition.

On July 6, 1988, Bridgeton enacted ordinance § 325.050, which repealed ordinance 85-17, but which reenacted the prohibition against nighttime operation of truck engines and compressors near inhabited residential areas. Bridgeton Ordinance § 325.050(A)(3) for "On-Street Parking or Storage" provides It shall be unlawful for any vehicle operator, or the owner of any property upon which said vehicle is parked, or the property owner's agent, to cause, allow, or permit any refrigeration compressor, motor, or other refrigeration equipment or any vehicular engine on any truck, trailer, tractor, tractor-trailer or other commercial vehicle, except in emergencies, to run or operate while any such vehicle is parked or placed within one thousand (1,000) feet of an occupied residential structure between the hours of 8:00 P.M. in the evening to 8:00 A.M. the following day.

Bridgeton Ordinance § 325.050(B)(4) for "Off-Street Parking or Storage" provides:

No semi-truck tractor or semi-trailer shall be permitted to be stored in any off-street parking area unless in a loading or an unloading area, or in a motel-hotel lot when its owner or driver is registered as a guest; provided however, it shall be unlawful for any vehicle operator, or the owner of any property upon which said vehicle is parked, or the property owner's agent, to cause, allow, or permit any refrigeration compressor, motor, or other refrigeration equipment or any vehicular engine, or any truck, trailer, tractor, tractor-trailer other commercial vehicle, to run or operate while any such vehicle is parked or placed within one thousand (1,000) feet of an occupied residential structure between the hours of 8:00 P.M. in the evening to 8:00 A.M. the following day.

On April 16, 1992, Bridgeton police served Schnucks with a complaint and summons. Schnucks was cited with a violation of Bridgeton Ordinance § 325.050 Section 3, ¹ for operating refrigerated trucks during the nighttime at their complex parking lot within 1,000 feet of occupied residential structures. The trial for the alleged violation has been stayed by mutual agreement of the parties pending a resolution of the claims here.

On November 13, 1992, Schnucks filed this action contesting the validity of the ordinance, for declaratory and injunctive relief and for damages. In Count I, Schnucks asserted a claim of equitable estoppel against Bridgeton. ² In Count II, Schnucks claims that the enforcement of the ordinance as applied to Schnucks is unreasonable, arbitrary, and confiscatory, and thus constitutes a deprivation of due process under the United States Constitution. Count III is a claim of inverse condemnation. On a motion by Bridgeton, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Bridgeton and against Schnucks on all counts of Schnucks's amended petition.

Our review is essentially de novo. The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially. ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 376. Since the propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law, we need not defer to the trial court's order granting summary judgment. Id.

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Rule 74.04. In order to make a prima facie showing that summary judgment is proper, a defending party may "establish a right to judgment by showing (1) facts that negate any one of the claimant's elements facts, (2) that the non-movant, after an adequate period of discovery, has not been able to produce, and will not be able to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of any one of the claimant's elements, or (3) that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of each of the facts necessary to support the movant's properly-pleaded affirmative defense." ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 381. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or otherwise ... shall set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.; Rule 74.04(e). The non-movant need only show that there is a genuine dispute as to the facts underlying the movant's right to judgment. ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 382. A "genuine issue" exists where the record contains competent materials that evidence two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of at least one of the essential facts. Id.

In its first point on appeal, Schnucks contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Count II. Schnucks claims that genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute as to whether the enforcement of the ordinance against Schnucks is unreasonable, arbitrary and confiscatory, and thus a violation of Schnucks's due process rights under the Fourteen Amendment of the United States Constitution. ³

Schnucks does not challenge the constitutional validity of the ordinance generally. Schnucks recognizes that a presumption of reasonableness attaches to ordinances enacted pursuant to a municipality's police powers. Real Estate Bd. of Metropolitan St. Louis v. City of Jennings, 808 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Mo.App.1991). The test of whether an ordinance is fairly referable to a legitimate exercise of police power is whether the expressed requirements of the ordinance have a substantial and rational relationship to the health, safety, peace, comfort and general welfare of the inhabitants of a municipality. Id. As an ordinance enacted pursuant to the valid police power of a city is presumed valid, the party challenging the ordinance bears the burden of proving its invalidity. Home Builders Ass'n of Greater St. Louis v. City of St. Peters, 868 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Mo.App.1994). In the present case, Schnucks stated in its Amended Petition that "[t]he ordinance is a police power regulation enacted for the manifest purpose of abating noise pollution." Therefore, we need not discuss the general constitutional validity of the ordinance as it is presumed to be valid and Schnucks does not challenge the ordinance on those grounds.

However, Schnucks does challenge the enforcement of the ordinance as applied to Schnucks on the grounds that to do so would be unreasonable, arbitrary and confiscatory, and thus a violation of Schnucks's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Schnucks relies primarily on City of St. Louis v. Brune, 515 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. banc 1974) to support its claim. In Brune, our Supreme Court held as unconstitutional as applied a city ordinance requiring, inter alia, that each dwelling unit have a tub or shower bath properly connected to approved hot/cold water and sewage systems. The court stated that the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied because it was "unreasonable, arbitrary and confiscatory as so applied, and consequently a deprivation of due process; and that as so applied, it would have no substantial or reasonable relationship to the public health, welfare or safety." Id. at 476-77.

In examining the petition by Schnucks and the motion for summary judgment by Bridgeton, the following facts are not in issue: Schnucks was issued permits to expand its complex and Bridgeton knew of Schnucks's historical use of the parking lot for parking refrigerated trucks overnight preceding the enactment of both ordinances. The cost of expanding the warehouse was four million dollars, and an additional $25,000.00 for the parking lot. Finally, both parties agree...