Schoenbach v. De Buono

• Decision Date: 17 June 1999
• Citation: 692 N.Y.S.2d 208
• Parties: In the Matter of Stanley SCHOENBACH, Petitioner, v. Barbara A. DE BUONO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 208

692 N.Y.S.2d 208

In the Matter of Stanley SCHOENBACH, Petitioner, v. Barbara A. DE BUONO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

June 17, 1999.

Pollack & Greene, L.L.P. (Mitchell G. Mandell of counsel), New York City, for petitioner.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney-General (Mona Jha of counsel), New York City, for respondents.

Before: CARDONA, P.J., MIKOLL, CREW III, YESAWICH JR. and GRAFFEO, JJ.

GRAFFEO, J.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this court pursuant to Public Health Law § 230-c ) to review a determination of the Administrative Review Board for Professional Medical Conduct which revoked petitioner's license to practice medicine in New York.

In April 1997 petitioner, a licensed physician, was charged by the Bureau of Professional Medical Conduct (hereinafter BPMC) with committing professional misconduct stemming from petitioner's treatment of five patients (hereinafter patients A, B, C, D and E) from 1985 to 1988 and with submitting fraudulent applications for privileges at certain hospitals. After extensive hearings, a Hearing Committee of respondent State Board for Professional Medical Conduct concluded that petitioner negligently and incompetently practiced medicine with respect to all five patients, and with regard to patients C and D petitioner was found to have fraudulently practiced medicine by purposely mislabeling separate operations as "staged procedures". The findings of the Hearing Committee further cited petitioner's failure to maintain adequate records pertaining to patients B, C, D and E. Lastly, the Hearing Committee determined that petitioner fraudulently failed to disclose all of his hospital affiliations on staff applications with two hospitals between 1986 and 1988. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the Hearing Committee suspended petitioner's license to practice medicine for two years. On appeal, the Administrative Review Board for Professional Medical Conduct (hereinafter ARB) sustained the Hearing Committee's findings but overturned the penalty imposed, instead revoking his medical license. Petitioner now seeks to vacate the license revocation, contending that the penalty imposed by the ARB was arbitrary and capricious.

Initially, petitioner argues that he suffered prejudice as the result of the delay in the commencement of this disciplinary matter. It is undisputed that the investigation was commenced in 1989 and eight years transpired before charges were brought. Although the length of time between the initiation of the investigation and the commencement of the disciplinary proceeding is troubling, this disciplinary proceeding is not governed by a Statute of Limitations (see, Matter of Monti v. Chassin, 237 A.D.2d 738, 740, 655 N.Y.S.2d 145) and, absent a manifestation of actual prejudice to petitioner, such delay, without more, fails to satisfy petitioner's burden of proof (see, Matter of Lawrence v. De Buono, 251 A.D.2d 700, 673 N.Y.S.2d 773; Matter of Monti v. Chassin, supra, at 740, 655 N.Y.S.2d 145; Matter of Hubsher v. De Buono, 232 A.D.2d 764, 648 N.Y.S.2d 735, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 810, 656 N.Y.S.2d 738, 678 N.E.2d 1354). Petitioner's unsubstantiated allegations, including vague intimations that his memory of the events had eroded with the passage of time, are insufficient to sustain a claim of prejudice (see, Matter of Galin v. De Buono, --- A.D.2d ----, 686 N.Y.S.2d 190, 193). Because petitioner has failed to submit actual proof that he suffered prejudice as a result of the delay, this claim must be rejected (see, Matter of Lawrence v. De Buono, supra; Matter of Hubsher v. De Buono, supra, at 765, 648 N.Y.S.2d 735).

Petitioner next contends that the evidence presented at the hearing was not sufficient to support the ARB's findings. We disagree. The applicable standard of review is whether the administrative determination "was arbitrary and capricious, affected by an error or law or an abuse of discretion" (Matter of Brown v. New York State Dept. of Health, 235 A.D.2d 957, 957-958, 652 N.Y.S.2d 860, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 814, 659 N.Y.S.2d 854, 681 N.E.2d 1301). The relevant inquiry, therefore, focuses on whether the ARB's determination had a "rational basis supported by fact" (Matter of Chua v. Chassin, 215 A.D.2d 953, 954-955, 627 N.Y.S.2d 152, lv. denied 86 N.Y.2d 708, 634 N.Y.S.2d 441, 658 N.E.2d 219). Credibility issues and the weight accorded to expert testimony are "solely within the province of the administrative fact finder" (id., at 955, 627 N.Y.S.2d 152) and shall be disturbed only where they are irrational (see, Matter of Gonzalez v. New York State Dept. of Health, 232 A.D.2d 886, 889-890, 648 N.Y.S.2d 827, lv. denied 90 N.Y.2d 801, 660 N.Y.S.2d 554, 683 N.E.2d 19).

Here, the expert testimony on behalf of BPMC indicating that petitioner failed to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent physician would exercise under the circumstances was sufficient to sustain the ARB's findings of negligence and incompetence (see, Matter of Bogdan v. New York State Bd. for Professional Med. Conduct, 195 A.D.2d 86, 88, 606 N.Y.S.2d 381, appeal dismissed, lv. denied 83 N.Y.2d 901, 614 N.Y.S.2d 381, 637 N.E.2d 272), notwithstanding contradictory evidence submitted by petitioner's experts, the weight of which was to be determined by the fact finder (see, Matter of Gupta v. De Buono, 229 A.D.2d 58, 60, 654 N.Y.S.2d 426; Matter of Brigham v. De Buono, 228 A.D.2d 870, 644 N.Y.S.2d 413, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 801, 653 N.Y.S.2d 278, 675 N.E.2d 1231; Matter of Moss v. Chassin, 209 A.D.2d 889, 891, 618 N.Y.S.2d 931, lv. denied 85 N.Y.2d 805, 627 N.Y.S.2d 322, 650 N.E.2d 1324, cert. denied 516 U.S. 861, 116 S.Ct. 170, 133 L.Ed.2d 111). Additionally, evidence was presented by BPMC demonstrating that petitioner failed to properly record and maintain adequate medical records. We conclude that petitioner's failure to maintain objectively meaningful medical information in his patient records (see, Matter of Mucciolo v. Fernandez, 195 A.D.2d 623, 625, 599 N.Y.S.2d 757, lv. denied 82 N.Y.2d 661, 606 N.Y.S.2d 596, 627 N.E.2d 518) constituted negligence, especially in light of the fact that there was a relationship between the inadequate record-keeping and patient treatment (see, Matter of...