Schoenhorn v. Moss

• Docket Number: SC 20710
• Decision Date: 08 August 2023
• Parties: JON L. SCHOENHORN v. MELODIE MOSS ET AL.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

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JON L. SCHOENHORN
v.
MELODIE MOSS ET AL.

No. SC 20710

Supreme Court of Connecticut

August 8, 2023

Argued March 22, 2023

Procedural History

Action for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendants to produce transcripts of certain court proceedings, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Sheridan, J., granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

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Jon L. Schoenhorn, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Emily Adams Gait, assistant attorney general, with whom were Robert J. Deichert, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, and Alma Rose Nunley, assistant attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

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OPINION

ALEXANDER, J.

The plaintiff, Attorney Jon L. Schoenhorn, appeals^[1] from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his action for a writ of mandamus^[2] ordering the defendant, Melodie Moss, the chief court reporter for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, to produce certain transcripts that were sealed by another trial court in a separate proceeding involving different parties. The plaintiff claims that the trial court incorrectly determined that his action was nonjusticiable and, therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over it. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. In 2017, Jennifer R. Dulos commenced a marital dissolution action against her husband, Fotis Dulos, in the family division of the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk (family court). Dulos v. Dulos, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FST-FA-17-5016797-S. As a part of that proceeding, the family court conducted a hearing on May 14 and 17, 2019, relating to the custody of the Dulos children. At the commencement of the hearing, the family court issued an oral order closing the courtroom to the public and sealing the hearing transcripts. On February 4, 2020, following the death of Fotis Dulos, the family court rendered a judgment of dismissal in the Dulos marital dissolution action. The transcripts of the hearing are the subject of this appeal.

In April, 2021, the plaintiff commenced the present mandamus action in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, against the defendant, individually and in her official capacity as the chief court reporter for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, after she declined to produce the transcripts to the plaintiff. In his complaint, the plaintiff sought an injunction compelling the defendant, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-61 (c),^[3]to produce the transcripts. The defendant thereafter filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus because to grant the requested relief would require the trial court to overturn the family court's order sealing the transcripts. In support of her motion, the defendant attached certified transcript pages from the hearing that contained the family court's oral ruling sealing the transcripts and closing the courtroom to the public.^[4]

The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and rendered judgment dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Relying on Volvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, 294 Conn. 534, 985 A.2d 1052 (2010), the trial court concluded that "[t]he plaintiffs . . . mandamus [action was] nothing more than an impermissible collateral attack on the

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sealing order imposed by the [family] court," and, therefore, the action was "nonjusticiable because no practical relief [was] available to the plaintiff . . . ."

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court incorrectly determined that Volvo required dismissal of his mandamus action. The plaintiff argues that, in Lechner v. Holmberg, 165 Conn. 152, 157-58, 328 A.2d 701 (1973), this court recognized that an action for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for compelling the production of judicial transcripts. The plaintiff further argues that Volvo is inapposite because, unlike the sealing order in that case, which was properly issued, the order in Dulos violated Practice Book § 25-59 and the constitutional principles underlying that section, rendering the order void ab initio.^[5] The plaintiff argues that, because the sealing order in Dulos was void from its inception, the trial court in the present case had subject matter jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus. We conclude that the plaintiffs action is nonjusticiable.^[6]

"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court. ... In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP, 329 Conn. 515, 522, 187 A.3d 1154 (2018). "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however [that issue is] raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).

"Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. . . . Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant. ... As we have recognized, justiciability . . . implicate[s] a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter. . . . [B]ecause . . . justiciability raises a question of law, our appellate review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 254-55, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).

"In deciding whether the plaintiffs complaint presents a justiciable claim, we make no determination regarding [the complaint's] merits. Rather, we consider

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only whether the matter in controversy [is] capable of being adjudicated by judicial power according to the aforestated well established principles." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP, supra, 329 Conn. 525.

In Volvo, this court concluded that a trial court presiding over an administrative appeal did not have subject matter jurisdiction to overturn sealing orders issued by another trial court in an unrelated case involving different parties. Volvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 294 Conn. 543. We stated that to conclude otherwise would be "completely unworkable"; id.; because "[o]ur jurisprudence concerning the trial court's authority to overturn or to modify a ruling in a particular case assumes, as a proposition so basic that it requires no citation of authority, that any such action will be taken only by the trial court with continuing jurisdiction over the case, and that the only court with continuing jurisdiction is the court that originally rendered the ruling. . . . This assumption is well justified in light of the public policies favoring consistency and stability of judgments and the orderly administration of justice. . . . It would wreak havoc on the judicial system to allow a trial court in an administrative appeal to second-guess the judgment of another trial court in a separate proceeding involving different parties, and possibly to render an inconsistent ruling. This is especially true when a direct challenge to the original ruling can be made by any person at any time in the trial court with continuing jurisdiction, as is the case with sealing orders." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 543-45. Of particular concern to this court was the fact that the interests of all of the affected parties may not be adequately protected in a collateral proceeding. See id., 545 ("it is by no means clear that procedures adequate to protect the interests of all affected parties could even be devised in such a proceeding"); id., 545 n.13 ("[t]he trial court . . . would have no jurisdiction to order the trial courts that issued the sealing orders to do anything unless those courts and the parties in the underlying cases were named as parties in this administrative appeal, which they were not"). In light of the foregoing, we held that, because the trial court in Volvo did not have continuing jurisdiction over the cases in which the sealing orders were imposed or custody or control over the sealed documents, and because the interests of all parties affected by the sealing orders were not adequately represented in the appeal, the trial court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs' claim. Id., 545.

In the present case, we agree with the defendant that the plaintiffs action is nonjusticiable because no relief can be granted to him by the trial court. The plaintiff sought an injunction by way of a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to produce transcripts that were sealed by another trial court in a separate proceeding

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involving different parties. The plaintiffs action is, therefore, a collateral attack on a sealing order imposed by a different court in a different action, which is not permissible. See, e.g., U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Crawford, 333...