Schoenwandt v. Karan
Decision Date | 15 October 2014 |
Docket Number | CIV. NO. 14-00398 HG-KSC |
Parties | LORI A. SCHOENWANDT, Plaintiff, v. LORI KARAN, DEBBORAH STAMPFLE, GARY SALDANA, TINA ARAGON, WINONA KEAWE, ABBY MEDRANO, DR. FRAUENZ, MARK PATTERSON, THOMAS EVANS, SONYA MAAE, HAKU KAMELAMELA, GRACE JOHNSON, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Lori A. Schoenwandt's prisoner civil rights complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When she filed this action, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Women's Community Correctional Center ("WCCC"); she has since been released.1 Plaintiff names Department of Public Safety ("DPS") employees Lori Karan, M.D., Debborah Stampfle, Gary Saldana, M.D., Tina Aragon, R.N., former Health Care Unit ("HCU") Director Winona Keawe, R.N., Abby Medrano, R.N., Orthopedic Consult Dr. Frauenz, former WCCC Warden Mark Patterson, Chief of Security Thomas Evans, Sergeant Sonya Maae, Sergeant Haku Kamelamela, and Lieutenant Grace Johnson as defendants in their individual and official capacities.2 She broadly alleges Defendants denied or delayed her medical care, failed to supervise others who denied or delayed her medical care, interfered with appropriate medical care, discriminated against her, or failed to protect her from harm. For the following reasons, the Court FINDS that Plaintiff fails to state a claim and RECOMMENDS the Complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2), with leave granted to amend.
Federal courts must screen all civil actions brought by prisoners seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, and dismiss a claim or complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).
A court must construe pro se complaints liberally, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept all allegations of material fact as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Hebbe v. Pliler, 611 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010). Leave to amend should be grantedunless amendment is futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The court should not advise a litigant how to cure the defects in the pleading, however, as this "would undermine district judges' role as impartial decisionmakers." Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231(2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 ( ).
Compl., Doc. No. 1, PageID #3.
Plaintiff claims:
(5) Nurse Abby Medrano refused to discuss Plaintiff's ear infection with her on August 4, 2014, and, on August 14, 2014, "Katherine" examined Plaintiff's ears and told her there was no infection.
(6) Dr. Frauenz, an orthopedic surgeon consultant, refused to give Plaintiff a cortisone shot, immobilize her hand, or recommend disability housing.
(7) Former WCCC Warden Mark Patterson and Security Captain Thomas Evans knew of the "gravity of the Plaintiff's condition" but refused to authorize her "exceptional" housing, despite the HCU's request. Id., PageID #9
(8) Sergeant Maae refused Plaintiff's requests to go to the HCU and verbally abused her. Sergeant Kamelamela forced Plaintiff to lead the medication line despite her difficulty walking, causing other inmates to taunt her. Plaintiff further claims Kamelamela falsely charged her with two infractions regarding inmate Angela Maiawa, although she admits grievances are still pending on these charges. Plaintiff also says Lieutenant Johnson failed to protect Plaintiff by separating inmate Maiawa from the general population.
Plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and state law negligence and defamation claims.
"To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show '(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by aperson acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.'" Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against state officials sued in their official capacity. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007). This is because state officials sued in their official capacity for damages are not "persons" for purposes of § 1983. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n.24 (1997). State officials sued in their official capacity for injunctive relief, however, are considered persons for purposes of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). Stated differently, the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) does not bar suits for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacity. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997).
Moreover, under Title II of the ADA, claims for damages against defendants named in their individual capacity must be dismissed. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (). Claims against individuals under the ADA are treated as official capacity claims because no individual capacity claims exist under the statute. See, e.g., Abbott v. Rosenthal, 2 F. Supp.3d 1139, *6 (D. Idaho 2014); Becker v. Oregon, 170 F. Supp.2d 1061, 1066 (D. Or. 2001); see also Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ( ).
The Court FINDS that Plaintiff's claims for damages under § 1983 against Defendants in their official capacities, and under the ADA against Defendants in their individual capacities, fail to state a claim. The Court RECOMMENDS that these claims be DISMISSED without leave to amend. Plaintiff's damages claims against individual Defendants under § 1983 remain; Plaintiff's injunctive relief claims under the ADA and § 1983 against official capacity Defendants remain.
A complaint fails to state a claim if it (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory; or (2) contains insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim, a pleadingmust contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This does not require detailed factual allegations, but "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. A sufficient complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not 'show[n]' — 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Plaintiff alleges insufficient facts for the court to reasonably infer that any Defendant violated her constitutional rights. She does not explain what "specific care" was required for her "documented" back, neck, hand, and arm "neuromuscular [] condition," or identify a physician or medical expert who recommended this unspecified treatment. Compl., Doc. No. 1,PageID #3. She fails to allege who at WCCC denied her this treatment, when this occurred, or explain why this treatment was allegedly denied. What can be discerned from Plaintiff's statements is that she received medication and medical care from Dr. Saldana and others while she was incarcerated at...
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