Scholl v. New England Power Service Co.

Decision Date12 January 1960
Citation340 Mass. 267,163 N.E.2d 279
PartiesDelia SCHOLL and another, v. NEW ENGLAND POWER SERVICE COMPANY (and two companion cases). Delia SCHOLL and another, v. WORCESTER COUNTY ELECTRIC COMPANY. Delia SCHOLL and another, v. CITY OF WORCESTER.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Alphonse P. San Clemente, Worcester, for plaintiffs.

Francis H. George, Worcester, for defendants New England Power Service Co. and another.

Harry J. Meleski, City Sol., and Andrew F. McCarthy, Asst. City Sol., Worcester, for defendant City of Worcester, submitted a brief.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, COUNIHAN, and CUTTER, JJ.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

These are three actions of tort by one Delia Scholl, hereinafter called the plaintiff, against the city of Worcester, Worcester County Electric Company, and New England Power Service Company to recover for personal injuries received by falling on Franklin Street, a public way in Worcester, on the afternoon of July 2, 1956. In the actions against the electric and power companies her husband, William Scholl, joins as plaintiff to recover for consequential damage. The cases were tried together.

Franklin Street runs from Main Street to Salem Street in a general easterly direction. It is bounded on the north by grounds of the City Hall and the Worcester Common. The plaintiff, sixty-five years of age, testified that she walked from a bus stop at Main and Franklin streets through the Common to a point on Franklin Street opposite Portland Street which intersects Franklin Street from the south. Traffic on both streets was stopped and the traffic light at Portland Street was green. She started to cross Franklin Street toward a drug store at the corner of Portland Street and had walked six or eight feet into the street, watching the traffic light, when she stepped into a hole in the street, fell and was injured. The hole consisted of a circular excavation six inches wide and deep around a manhole. She saw no signs, lights or sawhorses.

There was evidence that at the time the plaintiff was injured the city was resurfacing Franklin Street. The work began about June 19 and was completed on July 8. Having laid a base course of stones mixed with asphalt the city requested the defendant electric company to raise the manholes in the street to conform in height to the proposed new level. The electric company 'engaged' the defendant power company, a 'contracting organization,' to do the work. The power company dug around the manholes to a depth of a foot in order to raise the 'castings' and after raising them put on cold patches sloping up to the manhole frames. One of the manholes was in Franklin Street on a line with the easterly or southeasterly boundary of Portland Street. There was evidence that the manholes were raised on June 25 and 26 and other evidence that the raising took place between July 1 and July 8. Although in her declarations the plaintiff alleged that her accident occurred on July 2, she testified that it was in July without specifying any day. Whatever were the exact dates when the excavations around the manholes were made and the plaintiff fell, it could be found that she stepped into the excavation which had been dug by the power company around the manhole opposite Portland Street.

It appeared that during the resurfacing Franklin Street was not closed to travel but that signs were maintained on horses at the intersections of Main, Portland and Salem streets reading, 'Street under construction--Pass at your own risk--Bureau of Streets.' In respect to guards around the manhole excavations the only testimony was that 'they customarily put horses on both sides of the dug out area, most of the time, four horses.'

Motions of the electric and power companies for directed verdicts in their favor were denied subject to their respective exceptions and the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiff in like amounts. A motion by the city for a directed verdict was allowed and the plaintiff excepted. The cases are here on a consolidated bill of exceptions setting forth these exceptions and, in the cases against the electric and power companies, exceptions by them to the admission of certain evidence and to the judge's charge.

The case against the power company was rightly submitted to the jury. From the testimony of the plaintiff that she saw no lights, signs or sawhorses at the place where she fell it could be found that none was there and that the power company was negligent in failing to warn travellers of the excavation or to provide adequate barriers around it. See Cipollone v. D'Alessandro-Crognale, Inc., 333 Mass. 469, 473, 131 N.E.2d 754. It could not have been ruled that the plaintiff was not in the exercise of due care. See O'Neil v. City of Chelsea, 208 Mass. 307, 308-309, 94 N.E. 279, and cases cited.

There was no error in refusing to direct a verdict for the electric company. If the power company were its agent it would be liable for its agent's negligent acts in performing work which it had authorized. If the power company was an independent contractor as the evidence tended to show, the work contracted for was of such a nature that the electric company was responsible for its negligent performance. '[W]here the work to be performed necessarily will cause injury to others unless precautions are taken to protect them from the consequences of such work, the employer is liable for the negligence of an independent contractor.' McGinley v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston, 248 Mass. 583, 586, 143 N.E. 537, 538. The defendant companies excepted to a ruling that the plaintiff might use a blackboard to draw a crosswalk across Franklin Street to the corner of Portland Street which she had previously observed but did not see on the day of the accident. Her testimony as to the usual presence of a crosswalk and...

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12 cases
  • Meyer v. Veolia Energy North America
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 8 Mayo 2019
    ...to assign or delegate their public responsibilities under the road defect statute. As we explained in Scholl v. New England Power Serv. Co., 340 Mass. 267, 270-271, 163 N.E.2d 279 (1960), the "liability of a municipality under G. L. c. 84, § 15, for an injury to a traveller sustained by rea......
  • Trioli v. Town of Sudbury
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • 3 Marzo 1983
    ...or the intervening wrongful act of a third person combines with the defect to cause the injuries." Scholl v. New England Power Serv. Co., 340 Mass. 267, 271, 163 N.E.2d 279 (1960). Here the plaintiff alleges simply that while he was riding his motorcycle on a public way he was struck by an ......
  • Fortin v. City of Gardner
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 4 Mayo 1964
    ...find sidewalk defect not apparent); Delgado v. Town of Billerica, 323 Mass. 483, 485-486, 82 N.E.2d 591; Scholl v. New England Power Serv. Co., 340 Mass. 267, 270-271, 163 N.E.2d 279 (unguarded defect in a street crossing); Tosches v. Town of Sherborn, 341 Mass. 360, 361-362, 169 N.E.2d 901......
  • Sanker v. Town of Orleans
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • 1 Junio 1989
    ...rule a municipality is held responsible only if its negligence is the sole cause of the injuries. See Scholl v. New England Power Service Co., 340 Mass. 267, 271, 163 N.E.2d 279 (1960); Tomasello v. Commonwealth, 398 Mass. 284, 286, 496 N.E.2d 638 (1986). We think, however, that such an ide......
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