School Committee of Boston v. Board of Ed.
| Decision Date | 15 February 1973 |
| Citation | 292 N.E.2d 870,363 Mass. 125 |
| Parties | SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF BOSTON et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Walter H. Mayo, III, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Andrew M. Wolfe, Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for Board of Education.
James D. St. Clair, Boston (Stephen H. Oleskey, Boston, with him), for School Committee of Boston and another.
Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.
We return to another facet of this perplexing case in the hope that this opinion will serve as a vehicle for action by the parties so that the school children of the city of Boston, the principal sufferers from the controversy, may find prompt and effective relief from the tensions and dislocations to which they have been subjected.
Reference may be had to our opinion released on February 2, 1973, for the statement of the factual background of the case. We supplement that statement with the following.
The school committee of the city of Boston (committee) and the board of education of the Commonwealth (board) took certain actions pursuant to the 'interlocutory decree' entered by the trial judge on September 27, 1972. On October 6, 1972, the board made recommendations for a short-term plan to satisfy the racial imbalance law by redistricting Boston schools at all levels. In turn the committee filed with the board on November 6, 1972, a 'Short Range Plan Toward Elimination of Pacial Imbalance in the Boston Public Schools 1972--1973.' The board rejected this plan on November 9, 1972, and on November 16, 1972, formally adopted its own plan which was submitted to the committee on the same day. On that day both the board and the committee were ordered by the trial judge on his own motion to appear before him on November 17, 1972, for a judicial hearing to review the board's plan. This hearing consumed eight days and was completed on November 30, 1972.
The board presented two witnesses, Dr. Gregory Anrig, chairman of the board's task force on racial imbalance, and Dr. John A. Finger, Jr., who served as special consultant to the board's task force for the formulation of the board's plan. Both witnesses outlined the nature of the plan and the considerations on which it was based.
John Coakley, associate director of the educational planning center of the Boston school department, testified for the committee, and criticised several of the plan's proposed school districts from the standpoint of size and safety.
On November 30, 1972, the committee, meeting at the request of the judge, voted to oppose the board's plan.
On December 18, 1972, the judge entered an order holding the board's plan in violation of the provisions of the racial imbalance law. The judge found that the board had proposed some districts which were 'too large,' and were 'gerrymandered,' and that there had been a failure to consider the concept of 'neighborhood' in the construction of its plan, and that as a result excessive busing would be required. The judge also concluded that the plan did not take safety into account on an equal basis with the aim of achieving racial balance, included material not proper for a racial balance plan, and did not provide for the public hearings required by c. 71, § 37D, as amended through St.1971, c. 958. He directed that measures be taken designed to produce a new time schedule for the development of a new plan. The board appealed from the order and, following other proceedings, the full court on December 28, 1972, on motion of the board, stayed all proceedings below and ordered the trial judge to file a report of material facts 'including a detailed analysis as to precisely how the plan submitted by the board is violative of the racial imbalance law.' All papers in the case were transmitted to this court by its order, which also provided for the filing of briefs and the argument which we have heard.
The judge filed an elaborate and detailed 'Report of Material Facts,' which consists of a district-by-district analysis of the plan, including estimation of maximum distances within each district, enumeration of the neighborhoods in each, and identification of the safety hazards.
The racial imbalance statute requires each school committee of the Commonwealth to take a racial census of its student population each year. Upon receiving this data, the board must notify each committee whose schools are racially imbalanced, and each committee is then required to file a plan to eliminate such imbalance. G.L. c. 71, § 37D. The board is to furnish technical assistance in the formulation and execution of such plans. If, after a committee submits its plan, the board determines that it does not meet the statutory standards, the board is required to make specific recommendations to the committee for a plan to eliminate imbalance. The committee would then submit a revised plan to the board. G.L. c. 15, § 1I.
The statute also provides for 'judicial review,' on a bill of a committee, in either the Superior Court for the county in which it is located or in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk county in two situations: (1) after the committee declines to accept the recommendations submitted to it by the board, or (2) after the board disapproves a revised plan submitted to it by a school committee. As a result of a judicial review the court is either to affirm the board's determination of the recommendations or its disapproval of the committee's revised plan and order the board's recommendations enforced, or, if it finds the board's determination to be in excess of its statutory authority, based upon an error of law, arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, it may set aside the determination and remand the matter to the board. G.L. c. 15, § 1J.
Traditionally, this sort of judicial review of an administrative determination takes place on the basis of an administrative record. The proper function of the court is not to engage in complex fact determinations more appropriately committed to an agency, with staff and skilled experience to make them. Rather, the court must accept the factual determinations made by the agency if it finds they are supported by substantial evidence, and decide only questions of law. See DUATO V. COMMISSIONER OF PUB. WELFARE, MASS., 270 N.E.2D 782A.
General Laws c. 15, § 1J, does not explicitly require a hearing before the board, nor does it elaborate on the...
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