Duato v. Commissioner of Public Welfare
| Citation | 270 N.E.2d 782,359 Mass. 635 |
| Parties | Arlene DUATO v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC WELFARE. |
| Decision Date | 14 June 1971 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Paula W. Gold, Boston, for Arlene Duato.
Gregor I. McGregor, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commissioner of Public Welfare.
Before TAURO, C.J., and SPALDING, REARDON and QUIRCO, JJ.
This is a bill in equity under G.L. c. 30A, § 14, for review of a decision by the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare (department) reducing the amount of aid being paid to Arlene Duato (applicant) under G.L. c. 118 relating to aid to families with dependent children (aid). The case is before us on the appeal of the applicant from the final decree of the Superior Court affirming the decision of the department.
At a time when she was receiving such aid, the applicant became gainfully employed. However, her earnings were less than the amount of aid to which she would otherwise be entitled, and she was therefore entitled to continue to receive aid in a reduced amount. To afford an incentive to recipients of aid to seek and hold gainful employment, and for other reasons not material to this decision, the governing regulations did not require that the aid being received be reduced by the full amount of the earnings from the employment. They permitted certain exclusions or deductions from the earned income in computing the reduction in the amount of the aid. One of the items thus deductible is the amount of expenses variously referred to as 'expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of income,' or 'expenses entailed in producing that income,' or 'expenses incident to employment,' or 'expenses of employment,' all hereinafter called 'work-related expenses.' At issue between the parties in this case is the amount of the work-related expenses which should be deducted from the applicant's earnings in determining the amount of reduction in her aid.
The applicant contends that her work-related expenses amount to $45.31 a month and that they include $2 a week for transportation, $5 a week for lunches, and approximately $15 a month for clothing other than what the applicant would wear at home and for the cleaning of the clothing. The department allowed her a deduction of only $11 a month for work-related expenses. This is the only item of exclusion or deduction at issue in this case.
In her bill for review the applicant alleges that the department's decision to allow her a deduction of $11 a month for work-related expenses was based on a department regulation which she contends as void for the reasons that (a) it was not promulgated in the manner required by G.L. c. 30A, §§ 3 and 5, and (b) it is arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to Federal law in that it purports to set a maximum of $11 monthly for deductible work-related expenses whereas the Federal law imposes no such maximum. The Federal government grants money to the Commonwealth for use in payment of the type of aid which the applicant was receiving. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601--644 (Supp. IV, 1965--1968). In the prayers in her bill the applicant asks that the court declare (a) that the department regulation in question is void as not properly promulgated, (b) that she is entitled to aid computed on the basis of work-related expenses of $45.31 a month instead of $11 a month, and (c) that she is entitled to the increased aid retroactive to the date it was improperly reduced. Beyond questioning whether some of the prayers are more appropriate to a bill for declaratory relief under G.L. c. 231A, it is not necessary for us to determine to what extent they are appropriate to a bill for judicial review of an administrative decision.
If we assume, but without so deciding, that the department has adopted a rule fixing a maximum of $11 monthly for deductible work-related expenses, or that it has so construed one of its rules, the applicant is not entitled to a judicial determination of the validity of the department's action under G.L. c. 30A unless she is aggrieved thereby in the legal sense. Section 14(2) requires that her bill 'shall * * * include a concise statement of the facts * * * showing that * * * (she) is aggrieved.' Section 14(8) provides that 'the court may set aside or modify the decision, or compel any action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced' because the agency decision is unlawful for a number of reasons listed. Therefore, before considering the validity of the department's action, we consider whether the applicant is an aggrieved person whose 'substantial rights * * * may have been prejudiced' by the alleged illegality. Newton v. Department of Pub. Util., 339 Mass. 535, 542--544, 160 N.E.2d 108. Shaker Community, Inc. v. State Racing Commn., 346 Mass. 213, 190 N.E.2d 897. In so doing, we have in mind that the applicant brings this bill in her individual right, and that it is not brought by or in behalf of a group under claim of a class proceeding.
At the adjudicatory hearing before the department on July 23, 1969, the applicant, who was represented by her present counsel, presented evidence that her work-related expenses were $45.31 a month. The proceedings at that hearing were not recorded stenographically or by any mechanical recording device. On August 13, 1969, the referee who presided over the adjudicatory hearing rendered a written decision which stated the issues involved in the hearing, the applicant's earnings from employment, and the exclusions and deductions therefrom in arriving at the net available income to be considered in determining the amount of aid to which she was entitled. In that computation the sum of $11 a month was used as the deduction for work-related expenses. The applicant seeks judicial review of this decision as to that item. The decision does not recite or otherwise refer to the applicant's evidence that her work-related expenses were $45.31 a month.
After the department had failed in the Superior Court a certified record of the proceeding under review, the applicant filed a motion alleging that the record was not adequate for the reason that no stenorgrapher was present at the hearing of July 23, 1969, and no transcript of the evidence presented at the hearing was available, and requesting leave to present evidence at the hearing of her bill for review. 1 The motion was allowed. At the hearing in the Superior Court the applicant's present counsel testified in part as follows. When she and the applicant arrived for the hearing of July 23, 1969, there was no stenographer or recording device available, she protested the fact, and she and her client walked out of the hearing room. The applicant insisted that they proceed with the hearing, so they returned and proceeded under protest.
Thereafter, without objection from the department, the applicant offered, and the court received evidence on the marits of the applicant's claim that her work-related expenses were $45.31 a month and not $11 as found by the department referee. This evidence came principally from testimony of the applicant. This was beyond the scope of § 14(6) and beyond the scope of the motion which the court had allowed. It was contrary to the basic rule stated in § 14(6) that judicial review of...
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