School Committee of Boston v. Finance Commission of Boston

• Decision Date: 17 October 1973
• Citation: 364 Mass. 187,302 N.E.2d 571
• Parties: SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF BOSTON et al. 1 v. FINANCE COMMISSION OF BOSTON et al. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 571

302 N.E.2d 571

364 Mass. 187

SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF BOSTON et al. ¹ v. FINANCE COMMISSION OF BOSTON et al. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 1, 1973.

Decided Oct. 17, 1973.

Robert M. Murphy, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Allan van Gestel, Boston, for defendants.

Before TAURO, C.J., and BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

BRAUCHER, Justice.

These cases bring to us the question whether the Finance Commission of Boston (commission) has power to conduct an investigation into testimonials and other fund-raising activities for members of the School Committee of Boston (committee). A decree was entered in the Superior Court under G.L. c. 231A, declaring that the commission 'has the right and authority to publicly investigate, by all appropriate means, the effect' of such activities 'on the administrative, operational, and financial practices and methods' of the committee and the School Department of Boston (department). We affirm.

On May 24, 1973, the commission adopted resolutions and votes whereby it determined to conduct an investigation into the practices of the committee and the department, including testimonials and other fund-raising activities. Public hearings commenced on June 11, 1973, and continued on June 12, 13, and 19. On June 22 the individual plaintiffs, acting for themselves and as members of the committee, brought a suit in the Superior Court under G.L. c. 231A for declaratory and injunctive relief, and obtained temporary orders restraining the defendants from issuing press releases or other comments based on testimony at the hearings and from conducting hearings 'or other action on the issue of testimonials or fund-raising activities' of the plaintiffs. Both restraining orders were continued in force by an interlocutory decree of June 27. Also on June 27 the four plaintiffs stipulated in writing that they would not make press releases or comments on testimony at the hearings. At a hearing on the merits on July 23, the court allowed a motion to add the committee as a party plaintiff and to add a prayer for a declaration that the commission lacked authority to investigate the committee.

On August 10, 1973, the judge, adopting as his findings the parties' statement of agreed facts, entered a final decree upholding the authority of the commission. The decree vacated as of August 22, 1973, the interlocutory decree continuing the restraining orders in effect, relieved the plaintiffs of similar restraints imposed by stipulation, and retained the court's jurisdiction of the case.

The plaintiffs appealed from the final decree. On August 28 the judge denied their motion to suspend the final decree pending appeal. The plaintiffs filed a separate claim of appeal from the denial of the motion to suspend, and they filed a petition, again seeking injunctive relief pending appeal, before a single justice of this court pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, and c. 214, § 22. An order denying relief was entered on September 4, 1973, and a bill of exceptions was allowed.

Public hearings into the issue of testimonials resumed. On September 20 special counsel for the commission voluntarily agreed that no further public hearings would be held pending expedited decision by this court on the plaintiffs' appeal from the final decree entered on August 10. The case was submitted to us on September 28 on the original papers and briefs of the parties.

1. The commission, as presently constituted, was established by St.1909, c. 486, §§ 17--21. ³ Section 18 of that chapter provides: 'It shall be the duty of the finance commission from time to time to investigate any and all matters relating to appropriations, loans, expenditures, accounts and methods of administration affecting the city of Boston or the county of Suffolk, or any department thereof, that may appear to the commission to require investigation, and to report thereon from time to time to the mayor, the city council, the governor, or the general court. The commission shall make an annual report in January of each year to the general court.'

Three of our decisions provide guidance on the scope of the commission's power. The Legislature intended the commission's range of inquiry to be broad but not unlimited. Its investigations must have a reasonable relation to the finances and methods of management of the city. The commission may 'investigate fairly, by comprehensive but reasonable methods, matters which it is justified in regarding as affecting the finances and management of Boston.' Subject to judicial determination whether subpoenas may properly be enforced, the statutes leave to the commission the determination in the first instance 'whether the inquiry is relevant to the statutory functions, and whether particular methods of inquiry are necessary.' Finance Commn. of Boston v. McGrath, 343 Mass. 754, 760--762, 180 N.E.2d 808, 813--814 (1962). Finance Commn. of Boston v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 349 Mass. 503, 504, 209 N.E.2d 342 (1965). Finance Commn. of Boston v. Basile, 354 Mass. 188, 192, 236 N.E.2d 520 (1968).

Apart from the special status of the committee, considered hereafter, there seems to be little doubt that its activities may have effects on the finances and management of the city. We need not decide whether it is a 'department' of the city for the purposes of the governing statute. Compare Eastern Mass. St. Ry. v. Mayor of Fall River, 308 Mass. 232, 233--234, 31 N.E.2d 543 (1941), with Sweeney v. Boston, 309 Mass. 106, 108--110, 34 N.E.2d 658 (1941). The commission may investigate matters affecting the finances and management of the city, whether or not a 'department' is involved. No extended discussion is needed to demonstrate that school problems may have such effects.

The commission concluded that testimonials and other fund-raising activities 'may' have a significant effect upon the administrative, operational and financial practices and methods of the committee. The judge thought it 'not an unreasonable assumption' that fund-raising conducted by an official among the employees of his department might have such an effect. See Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 375, 1 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed. 232 (1882). Hence, he ruled, the commission may investigate such activities unless the committee as such is beyond the reach of the investigatory powers of the commission. We agree.

2. The plaintiffs contend that the committee is 'an autonomous political entity,' and hence that the commission has no power or jurisdiction over its management. The argument rests in part on the 'substantially final authority' over the school budget established by our decisions under G.L. c. 71, § 34. See Bell v. North Reading Mass. (1973), ^a 295 N.E.2d 894, and cases cited. The city of Boston his contended in the past that that statute is not 'operative' in the city. See KERRIGAN V. BOSTON, MASS. (1972), 278 N.E.2D 387.^B We did not resolve the question raised by that contention, and we do not decide it now. Even if G.L. c. 71, § 34, is not operative in Boston, the committee has apart from that statute a large measure of independence in the management of the public schools. Lynch v. Fall River, 336 Mass. 558, 560-- 561, 147 N.E.2d 152 (1958). Collins v. Boston, 338 Mass. 704, 707--709 (1959), 157 N.E.2d 399. See School Comm. of Salem v. Gavin, 333 Mass. 632, 634--635, 132 N.E.2d 396 (1956). On the other hand, even where the statute is operative, the power of a school committee is not unlimited. BELL V. NORTH READING, MASS. (1973), 295 N.E.2D 894.^C For example, it is not inconsistent with the traditional pattern to subject certain votes of school committees to review by referendum. G.L. c. 43, § 42. Gorman v. Peabody, 312 Mass. 560, 566--569, 45 N.E.2d 939 (1942). Compare Fantini v. School Comm. of Cambridge, Mass. (1972), d 285 N.E.2d 433.

The traditional supremacy of the committee in the field of education does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that it is immune from investigation by the commission. Whatever the...