School Committee of Wellesley v. Labor Relations Commission

• Decision Date: 28 July 1978
• Parties: , 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3408 SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF WELLESLEY v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1077

379 N.E.2d 1077

376 Mass. 112, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3408

SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF WELLESLEY v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 8, 1978.

Decided July 28, 1978.

James M. Paulson, Boston, for School Committee of Wellesley.

David F. Grunebaum, Boston, for Labor Relations Commission.

Mark G. Kaplan, Boston, for Wellesley Teachers Ass'n, intervener.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and KAPLAN, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

By its appeal the school committee of Wellesley (school committee) challenges the correctness of a judgment which affirmed an order and decision of the Labor Relations Commission (commission). The school committee argues that the commission and therefore the court erred as matter of law in determining that the term "managerial employees" as used in G.L. c. 150E did not exclude from statutory coverage a bargaining unit, unit B, consisting of "(a)ll Principals, Assistant Principals, Directors, Coordinators and Department Heads, and no other professional or non-professional employees of the Wellesley Public Schools. ¹ We affirm the judgment and order entered by the Superior Court.

We summarize the proceedings. For a number of years, the school committee had recognized the Wellesley Teachers Association (association) as the exclusive representative of the unit B employees for the purposes of collective bargaining. After the effective date of G.L. c. 150E, the school committee sought a determination by the commission that all unit B employees were now precluded from collective bargaining on the ground that unit B employees were "managerial" or "confidential" ² employees and therefore not entitled to the collective bargaining rights afforded other public employees by G.L. c. 150E. The association filed a complaint of prohibited practice with the commission alleging that the school committee had refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the association as exclusive representative of the unit B employees. ³ After investigation, pursuant to G.L. c. 150E, § 11, the commission issued an interim order on July 16, 1974, consolidating the school committee's petition with the association's complaint, ordering an expedited hearing on the consolidated cases, and directing the parties to bargain in good faith pending resolution of the dispute. ⁴

After extensive hearings, the commission filed a lengthy and detailed decision in which it determined that none of the unit B employees were managerial or confidential employees within the meaning of the statute and concluded that the school committee's refusal to bargain had been unjustified and in violation of G.L. c. 150E, § 10(A )(1), and § 10(A )(5). However, the commission found that the school committee had not acted in bad faith. ⁵ The school committee's complaint was dismissed.

In the Superior Court the commission sought enforcement of its order against the school committee. The school committee filed a complaint seeking judicial review of the commission's decision. See G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7). The cases were consolidated, and the association, through its officers, was permitted to intervene. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed, and a judge of the Superior Court allowed the commission's motion, denied the school committee's motion, and entered a judgment affirming the commission's decision and order in its entirety, including an order that the school committee bargain collectively in good faith with the association. The school committee timely filed its claim of appeal, and we granted direct appellate review.

The issues before the court concern the interpretation of the phrase "managerial" employee in G.L. c. 150E, § 1. ⁶ The school committee alleges that the commission erred in its determination that the unit B employees were not managerial employees as matter of law and statutory interpretation.

We agree with the school committee that "(t)he duty of statutory interpretation is for the courts." Cleary v. Cardullo's, Inc., 347 Mass. 337, 344, 198 N.E.2d 281, 286 (1964). We have, however, also recognized that an administrative interpretation of a statute is accorded deference particularly "where, as here, an agency must interpret a legislative policy which is only broadly set out in the governing statute." Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Department of Pub. Health, --- Mass. ---, --- ^A, 364 N.E.2d 1202, 1207 (1977), quoting from School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ., 362 Mass. 417, 442, 287 N.E.2d 438 (1972). We turn to the statute, its interpretation, and its application by the commission in its decision.

1. Substantial Participation in Formulating Policy.

General Laws c. 150E, § 1, in pertinent part reads: "(E)mployees shall be designated as managerial employees only if they (A ) participate to a substantial degree in formulating or determining policy . . . ." In its decision the commission defined policy decisions as "those of major importance when examined in the light of the objective of the public enterprise"; further, policy decisions "must impact a significant part of the public enterprise." In defining substantial participation, the commission excluded participation which is little more than advisory: "Limited participation in the process by which true managerial decisions are made is likewise insufficient to make an employee 'managerial.' . . . (P)articipation . . . (w)hich is only advisory in nature (is insufficient)."

These guidelines for denoting the sphere of substantial participation in formulating policy are in accord with the legislative purpose reflected in c. 150E. This purpose, which is most clearly evidenced by the amendment of the definition of "managerial" to add the phrase "to a substantial degree," is to include as managerial employees only those with significant responsibility in the decision-making process.

The school committee does not quarrel with the commission's definitions of these terms. Rather, it argues that the commission's application of the statutory standard indicates an erroneous interpretation of the provision and that some of the commission's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the school committee contends (1) that the commission's decision read the word "participate" out of the statute, (2) that it improperly required a managerial employee to possess system-wide authority, (3) that it failed properly to consider the functions of two employee committees the executive council and the elementary principals group in the formulation of policy, and (4) that it improperly based its definition of the word "policy" on decisions of New York's Public Employment Relations Board.

(a) Substantial participation. Quoting a number of excerpts from the commission's decision, the school committee first maintains that the commission's application of the statutory standard required that employees have the authority to make decisions in order for them to be considered managerial. It contends that this test is more stringent than requiring participation in the decision-making process and effectively reads "participate" out of the statute. We conclude, however, that the commission did not overlook the obvious meaning of "participate" and did not contort its meaning to achieve an unusually restrictive interpretation of the statutory passage. Rather, our reading of the commission's decision convinces us that it concluded that any participation by the unit B employees in formulating or determining policy was not "substantial" and thus did not fall within the subsection (A ) definition of managerial employees.

The commission found that for participation to be substantial it must be more than advisory in nature. The factual findings which supported the commission's determination that any participation in policy formulation by the unit B members was merely advisory included the following: some unit B members attended and participated in periodic discussions with higher administrators; these meetings were generally characterized as merely "source(s) of 'input' "; and some unit. B members were consulted, in the capacity of potential implementers of policy, before a policy was determined. The commission's reliance on these findings in reaching its conclusion indicates that it was, in fact, principally concerned with whether the unit B employees functioned in an advisory, or consulting, role and not with whether they in fact had the authority to make final decisions. We cannot conclude on this record that the commission applied a standard requiring actual decision-making authority by the unit B employees. ⁷

(b) The issue of system-wide authority. The school committee contends that the commission arbitrarily applied a standard requiring an employee to possess system-wide authority in order for the employee to be found to participate to a substantial degree in formulating policy. The commission specifically rejected a system-wide authority test: "Although we do not necessarily believe that the authority of a managerial employee must be system-wide (such an interpretation in state government would lead to untenable results) the scope of discretion should be significant when considered in relation to the mission of the public enterprise." Nowhere in its decision did the commission conclude that the failure to possess system-wide authority prevented a unit B employee from being classified as managerial. We thus cannot conclude that the commission did not mean what it said or that it was inconsistent in its application of the standard which it had chosen.

(c) The functions of the executive council and the elementary principals group. On the issue whether unit B members substantially participated in the formulation of policy, evidence was introduced concerning the functioning of two employee committees the executive council and the elementary principals group. The executive council consisted of...