Morceau v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 April 1962
• Docket Number: GOULD-NATIONAL
• Citation: 344 Mass. 120,181 N.E.2d 664
• Parties: Edward J. MORCEAU et al. v.BATTERIES, INC.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 664

181 N.E.2d 664

344 Mass. 120

Edward J. MORCEAU et al. v. GOULD-NATIONAL BATTERIES, INC.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampshire.

Argued Sept. 29, 1961.

Decided April 9, 1962.

Warren H. Pyle, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Henry V. Atherton, Boston, for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, and KIRK, Jj.

WHITTEMORE, Justice.

The plaintiffs Morceau and Riley, as officers and members of Local 210, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (the Union), in a representative capacity, and the plaintiff Stanley Krzynowek (Stanley) in his individual right, appeal from the dismissal in the Superior Court of their bill of complaint to enforce an arbitration award which directed the defendant (Gould) to offer employment to Stanley and to pay him lost wages. The evidence is reported. There is a report of material facts.

Stanley was employed by Gould's predecessor, Nickel Cadmium Battery Corporation (Nicad), from August 19, 1957, to September 1, 1957. On that date Gould purchased Nicad and the employees of Nicad struck. Shortly thereafter Gould remployed supervisory and office personnel of Nicad.

On December 27, 1957, Gould and the Union negotiated a bargaining agreement and a separate stipulation for the remployment of former employees of Nicad. The strike ended on December 30 and on that date Gould hired a number of former employees of Nicad, but not including Stanley and Joseph Tessier, who had been employees with probationary status only.

The arbitration hearing was held in April, 1958, under the following statement of issues.

'I. [a ¹ Does the Union have the authority under Article V, Section 1, 'Seniority Established' and Section 2 'Continuous Service Broken' and Article III, Section 1, 'Recognition' and Section 2 'Conditions of Employment' to represent S. Krzynowek and J. Tessier under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement dated December 27, 1957. ²

'[b] If so, did the Company violate the terms of the stipulation dated December 27, 1957, regarding rehiring of employees which was attached and made part of the collective bargaining agreement dated December 27, 1957, and which reads in part as follows:

'1. All former employees of Nickel Cadmium Battery Corp. (hereinafter referred to as 'Nicad') on the active payroll of Nicad and with permanent seniority as of August 31, 1957, will be offered employment within one week subsequent to the effective date, i. e. December 30, 1957, of the attached collective bargaining agreement.

'5. The seniority of the above employees shall be equal to the seniority that they held on August 31, 1957, with Nicad and will begin accumulating further seniority as of December 30, 1957.

'7. There shall be no discrimination against any former Nicad employee for any activity which may have occurred between August 31, 1957, and December 30, 1957.

'8. The provisions of the agreement are subject to the grievance and arbitration provision of the attached collective bargaining agreement.

'II. If so, what shall be the remedy?'

The arbitrator, after hearing, awarded:

'I. [Issue I(a)]

'The Union does have the authority under * * * [the articles specified] to represent Stanley Krzynowek and Joseph Tessier under the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated December 27, 1957.

'II. [Issue I(b)]

'The Company did violate the terms of the Stipulation dated December 27, 1957, regarding rehiring of employees. * * *

'III.

'The remedy shall be for the Company to offer employment to Stanley Krzynowek as an active material processor, Class 1, or in a substantially equivalent classification and to pay him back pay from January 19, 1958, to the date of employment less his earnings elsewhere during said period.

'IV.

'The grievance of Joseph Tessier is dismissed.'

The judge noted that art. IV, § 7, of the collective bargaining agreement provided:

'The arbitrator may consider and decide only the particular grievance presented to him in a written stipulation by the Company and the Union and his decision shall be based solely upon an interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement. The Arbitrator shall not have the right to amend, take away, modify, add to, or change any of the provisions of this Agreement.'

The judge found that 'although the parties in prior correspondence had referred to the stipulation of December 27, 1957 [in drafting issue I(a)], such reference was entirely omitted in the final draft as submitted to the arbitrator'; that the arbitrator in his findings attached to the award says plainly that whatever right the Union had to represent the employee must originate in the stipulation and that its 'rights do not arise out of Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement since, as this company contends, the employee has never been an employee of Gould * * *.' The judge concluded that 'the arbitrator having determined that the Union's authority to represent the employee stemmed, if at all, from the agreement of December 27, 1957, and since the Stipulation Agreement was not incorporated in * * * [paragraph 1(a) of the statement of issues] for arbitration, * * * [the arbitrator] was foreclosed from going into the merits of the alleged dispute.' The judge ruled that the arbitrator thus did not conform to his authority under the submission and the award was invalid.

1. For the concurrent jurisdiction of the State court to enforce the award see Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483, affirming 341 Mass. 337, 169 N.E.2d 885. The Dowd decision (pp. 506-514) authorizes State courts to participate in the fashioning of a body of Federal law for the enforcement of agreements within the ambit of § 301(a) of the Labor Maagement Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952) [29 U.S.C.A. § 185]. ³ See Textile Wkrs. Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-457, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972; Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour Co., 82 S.Ct. 571; Karcz v. Luther Mfg. Co., 338 Mass. 313, 317, 155 N.E.2d 441; McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Conncil of Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d 45, 57-60, 315 P.2d 322, cert. den. sub nom. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters v. McCarroll, 355 U.S. 932, 78 S.Ct. 413, 2 L.Ed.2d 415.

2. The function of the court in reviewing decisions of arbitrators in this field is limited to determining whether the arbitrator has acted within the scope of the reference. Did 'the reluctant party * * * agree to arbitrate the grievance or did [it] agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award he made'? United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403. The question of interpretation of the agreement is for the arbitrator and mere ambiguity in the opinion is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award, even when it permits the inference of a want of authority. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-599, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424. See 2 B.C.Ind. & Commercial L.Rev. 359.

The Massachusetts decisions exemplify these principles. '[I]n the absence of fraud the decision of the arbitrators is binding even though they may have committed an error of law or fact.' Kesslen Bros. Inc. v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 339 Mass. 301, 302, 158 N.E.2d 871, 873. Hannan v. Enterprise Publishing Co., 341 Mass. 363, 365, 169 N.E.2d 894. 'The parties received what they agreed to take, the honest judgment of the arbitrator as to a matter referred to him.' Phaneuf v. Corey, 190 Mass. 237, 247, 76 N.E. 718, 719. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Beth Israel Hosp. Ass'n, 331 Mass. 177, 186, 118 N.E.2d 79. Compare Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg. Co., 340 Mass. 136, 138-139, 163 N.E.2d 9.

3. The conclusion of the judge that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in proceeding to issues I[b] and II was error. The reference and the award drew their 'essence from the collective bargaining agreement' (Enterprise case, supra, 363 U.S. p. 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424). That agreement was in two writings; it included the stipulation which gave certain rights to former employees of Nicad. The reference itself, in issue I[b], asserted that the stipulation was a part of 'the collective bargaining agreement dated December 27, 1957.' The arbitrator precisely answered the three questions submitted to him in respect of the two part agreement. 'The Union does have the authority. * * * The Company did violate the * * * Stipulation. * * * The remedy shall be * * *.' The arbitrator's authority to proceed beyond issue I[a] depended upon his answer to that issue, not upon whether his reasoning was sound.

We do not agree with Gould that the arbitrator's formal answer to issue I[a] is necessarily belied by an express finding in his opinion. ⁴ It was inescapable that whatever rights Stanley had to employment must have originated in the stipulation 'since, as the company contends, * * * [he had] never been an employee of Gould.' It was also true that the Union's right to assert a grievance on behalf of any former employee of Nicad was founded in the stipulation, for none such, regular or probationary, had ever been an employee of Gould. No such former employee could get rights under the main collective bargaining agreement until remployed pursuant to the stipulation. The language of the opinion which Gould refers to is subject to the construction that the arbitrator was doing no more than to recognize this fundamental circumstance of the dispute which was being arbitrated. The stated premise '[Stanley had] never been an employee of Gould' supports this construction.

We disagree also with Gould's contention that the only question which issue I[a] can conceivably be construed to ask is that to...