School Committee v. United Educators

• Decision Date: 28 February 2003
• Citation: 784 N.E.2d 11,438 Mass. 753
• Parties: "SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF PITTSFIELD v. UNITED EDUCATORS OF PITTSFIELD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

784 N.E.2d 11

438 Mass. 753

"SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF PITTSFIELD v. UNITED EDUCATORS OF PITTSFIELD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Berkshire.

Argued November 7, 2002.

Decided February 28, 2003.

Daniel R. Wojcik, Lowell, for the plaintiff.

Ira Fader, Newton, for the defendant.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Michael J. Long, Quincy, for Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents.

Ann Clarke, Boston, Judith Neumann, Auburndale, Jeffrey W. Jacobsen, Mary T. Sullivan, & Donald J. Siegel, Boston, for Massachusetts AFL-CIO & others.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

MARSHALL, C.J.

We are asked to determine whether, in the wake of the Education Reform Act of 1993, St.1993, c. 71 (Reform Act), the involuntary transfer of a special education teacher from one school to another is a matter that is properly arbitrable under a collective bargaining agreement between a school committee and a union representing the teacher.¹ The plaintiff, the school committee of Pittsfield (school committee), appeals from a Superior Court judge's order dismissing its application under G.L. c. 150C, § 11, to vacate an arbitration award. The arbitrator concluded that the school committee had violated its collective bargaining agreement with the defendant, United Educators of Pittsfield (union), when it ordered the involuntary transfer of a teacher, Karen Woolis, to a position in a different school. He ruled that the teacher must be reinstated to her former position, or a comparable one, at her former school and be paid the supplemental stipend that she would have received but for the transfer. The judge entered judgment on the pleadings for the union and affirmed the award. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion, and now affirm the judgment.

1. Background. The case was submitted to the Superior Court judge on the pleadings. The parties do not dispute the arbitrator's factual findings, which we summarize. This controversy arose at the end of the 1998-1999 school year. At that time, Woolis had worked in the Pittsfield school system for eleven years as a resource room teacher at the Egremont Elementary School (Egremont). Woolis was a teacher entitled to "professional teacher status"² certified to teach mild-to-moderate special-needs students from preschool to grade nine. At Egremont, she worked with special-needs students on an as-needed basis. Although she was a member of the "building assessment team" that determined individual education plans for students, she was not involved in developing students' educational curricula. Woolis was also Egremont's "building technology integrator" (BTI), working with teachers to integrate technology into the classroom. Woolis earned an annual stipend of $2,500 for the BTI position.

The terms of Woolis's employment as a teacher in the Pittsfield school district were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (agreement) between the school committee and the union, effective August 28, 1996, through August 25, 1999. The agreement identifies the union as "the exclusive bargaining agent for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to ... conditions of employment for: All full and part-time classroom teachers ... teachers of students with special needs .. and all other employees of the [Pittsfield] school system." Among other things, it sets forth a procedure for the involuntary transfer of teachers,³ and provides for final and binding arbitration of grievances that cannot be resolved administratively.⁴

In May, 1999, shortly after expressing frustration with her job to Stephanie Case, who is described in the record only as "supervisor of special education," Woolis was approached by Michael Meyer, the acting director of special education, who asked her to consider a teaching position in the special education program at Herberg Middle School (Herberg).⁵ Woolis agreed to explore the option. She visited the Herberg program and discussed it with several of the paraprofessionals who worked there. Woolis learned that the Herberg position was significantly different from her position at Egremont: the children were older and had more severe disabilities⁶; her class would be composed solely of special-needs children for whom she would be the sole responsible teacher; her classroom would be less spacious and the technological resources less up to date than at Egremont; and her working hours would change significantly. Woolis concluded that she was not properly certified for the position, and decided that a move to Herberg would not be in her best professional interest. She declined Meyer's offer.

Nevertheless, Meyer believed that Woolis, an experienced and competent educator, would do well at Herberg, where the current special education teacher was "struggling." The day after Woolis informed Meyer and Case that she declined the transfer, Meyer and Case met with Woolis in the hopes of persuading her to change her mind. When she did not, Meyer handed Woolis a letter stating that he was in any event transferring her to the Herberg position for the 1999-2000 academic year. The teacher whom Woolis was replacing had agreed to a voluntary transfer to Egremont. Meyer testified that "he discussed the matter with the principals at the schools and they agreed to the personnel moves."

Woolis, viewing Meyer's action as an involuntary transfer, filed a grievance challenging the transfer. She also argued to the assistant superintendent and the Department of Education (department) that she was not qualified for the new position. The department determined that Woolis was qualified for the position at Herberg. When she did not succeed in resolving the grievance administratively, Woolis, represented by the union, submitted the dispute to binding arbitration. See note 4, supra. She sought recision of the transfer directive and a restoration of her $2,500 yearly BTI stipend.

The school committee presented the following issue to the arbitrator: "Whether the decision to involuntarily transfer a teacher is arbitrable under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and under state law." The union raised one issue: "Did the administration violate the Collective Bargaining Agreement by the manner in which it transferred Karen Woolis from Egremont Elementary School to Herberg Middle School? If so, what shall be the remedy?" After an arbitration hearing, the arbitrator issued a written decision that set out his factual findings, reasoning, and conclusions, as the agreement required him to do. He determined, first, that the matter was arbitrable because (1) it concerned a grievance based on the provision of the agreement concerning involuntary transfers, and (2) the provision was not invalid under G.L. c. 71, § 59B, as amended by the Reform Act, governing the managerial authority of principals, or the regulations promulgated under St.1972, c. 766, concerning special education. Turning to the merits, he found that the school committee had violated the agreement because it did not transfer Woolis to a comparable position. He ordered Woolis reinstated to the same or a comparable position at Egremont and ordered the school committee to pay Woolis the BTI stipend that she would have received had she remained at Egremont.

The school committee sought to vacate the arbitrator's award in the Superior Court. See G.L. c. 150C, § 11. In an order and memorandum on the school committee's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the judge, reviewing only the question of arbitrability, concluded that, because involuntary transfers implicate district-wide personnel policies, the matter of involuntary transfers is properly within the ambit of collective bargaining and arbitration between the school committee and the union and not contrary to any of the provisions of the Reform Act.

2. Scope of review. Public policy in the Commonwealth strongly encourages arbitration. Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., Inc., 407 Mass. 1006, 1007, 553 N.E.2d 1284 (1990), and cases cited. Arbitration has long been viewed as a particularly appropriate and effective means to resolve labor disputes. See, e.g., G.L. c. 150E (collective bargaining between public employers and employees). Arbitration would have little value if it were merely an intermediate step between a grievance and litigation in the courts. For this reason, the Legislature has narrowly circumscribed the grounds to vacate arbitral awards, and a party challenging such an award faces formidable obstacles. See G.L. c. 150C, § 11⁷; Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., supra. Absent proof of one of the grounds enumerated in G.L. c. 150C, § 11, to vacate arbitral awards, we are strictly bound by the arbitrator's factual findings and conclusions of law, even if they are in error. See Lynn v. Thompson, 435 Mass. 54, 61-62, 754 N.E.2d 54 (2001), and cases cited.

Here, the school committee claims that the matter before the arbitrator is not arbitrable because it concerns a matter — involuntary transfers — that is the exclusive province of school principals pursuant to G.L. c. 71, § 59B. See G.L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) (3). In considering the school committee's claim, "we look only to determine if the arbitrator here exceeded his scope of reference, acted against clearly defined public policy, or ordered conduct prohibited by State or Federal law." Duxbury v. Duxbury Permanent Firefighters Ass'n, Local 2167, 50 Mass.App.Ct. 461, 464, 737 N.E.2d 1271 (2000). See Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., supra at 1007, 553 N.E.2d 1284. Whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Higher Educ. Coordinating Council/Roxbury Community College v. Massachusetts Teachers' Ass'n/ Mass. Community College Council, 423 Mass. 23, 31-32, 666 N.E.2d 479 (1996). For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers...