School Dist. No. 2 In Teton County v. Jackson-Wilson High School Dist. In Teton County, 1917

• Decision Date: 17 December 1935
• Docket Number: 1917
• Citation: 49 Wyo. 115,52 P.2d 673
• Parties: SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 IN TETON COUNTY v. JACKSON-WILSON HIGH SCHOOL DIST. IN TETON COUNTY, ET AL
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

52 P.2d 673

49 Wyo. 115

SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 IN TETON COUNTY v. JACKSON-WILSON HIGH SCHOOL DIST. IN TETON COUNTY, ET AL

No. 1917

Supreme Court of Wyoming

December 17, 1935

APPEAL from the District Court, Teton County, REUEL WALTON, Judge.

Action by School District No. 2, in the County of Teton, State of Wyoming, against Jackson-Wilson High School District, in the County of Teton, State of Wyoming, and another. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

For the appellant there was a brief by Wm. L. Simpson, of Jackson and P. W. Spaulding, of Evanston, and oral argument by Mr Spaulding.

The cause was submitted on the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts. The petition alleges an unlawful transfer of funds by the County Treasurer purporting to act under Section 99-825, which funds have been retained by the high school district. It is alleged that said transfer represented a charge for tuition of pupils residing in the school district. It is also alleged that no tax or appropriation had been made by plaintiff district for the payment of said tuition, and the trustees of plaintiff district never consented to attendance by its pupils at the high school of defendant district. There is also alleged a claim for payment of the items sued for. The answer attempts to justify the transfer of the funds to defendant district on the ground that plaintiff district did not then maintain any high school and the pupils involved had completed the grade school work and were qualified and desired to attend high school in defendant district. The answer was filed out of time and plaintiff filed a motion to strike, but later by stipulation of facts waived the first ground of its motion, and the remaining grounds were considered as a demurrer to the answer. The action was thus submitted to the court on the petition, answer, the motion as a demurrer and the stipulation of facts. The question involves more than a construction of Section 99-325, and includes consideration of the limitation of powers to expend public moneys. The statute 99-334 provides that schools shall be equally free to all children between the ages of 6 and 21 years, subject to regulations prescribed by the Board. And children between the ages of 7 and 16 who have not completed the 8th grade must attend the schools and district officers must provide schooling for them. No debt in excess of the taxes for the current year shall in any manner be created except by the vote of the people. Article XVI, Sec. 2, 4; 90-101 R. S. The statutes relating to high schools and high school attendance are found at Sections 99-501, 503. The maintenance of high schools and a levy of taxes for their support are set forth as Sections 99-520-531, R. S. In transferring the funds complained of, defendants acted under Section 99-825, R. S. The answer bases the rights of defendants to make and accept the transfers of the moneys involved upon Sec. 99-325. See also State v. School District, 18 P.2d 1010. The statute states the requirements to be met before the district of the residence of the pupil may be charged with tuition. The validity of the statute was challenged in State v. Ellis, 37 Wyo. 124. A pupil who has completed the eighth grade where there is no high school in his home district may, under Section 89-825 standing alone, attend a high school in another district at the expense of his home district. The effect of this section is to permit a nonresident pupil to create an indebtedness which his home district is obligated to pay, even though no appropriation has been made therefore. Section 99-317, R. S., vests the power of raising money in the district meeting. The decision of the trial court is contrary to law and the facts on two grounds: (a) There was no written consent or permission for the attendance of the pupils and furnishing them tuition, and (b) Section 99-825 is unconstitutional in so far as it permits the incurring of a debt without action by the governing body of his home district. Counsel for defendant pleads facts which he claims constitutes a waiver by plaintiff district of the requirements of the statute. Plaintiff district had waived its right to stand upon the statute and is now estopped to deny the requirements of the statute are a condition precedent to any liability arising. This point counsel overlooked; see recent decision of this court in Hyde v. Commissioners, 31 P.2d 75. The facts and conditions necessary to constitute an estoppel are stated in 21 C. J. at 1113-1119, and are followed by this court in Seaman v. Big Horn Canal Assn., 213 P. 938, wherein the court distinguished between governmental, and business transactions of a public corporation, holding that it may be estopped as to business, but not as to governmental functions. 213 P. 940. The rule is clearly stated in 21 C. J. 1129. The findings and judgment of the court below should be reversed and judgment entered in this court for the plaintiff.

For the respondent there was a brief by W. W. Neilson, of Jackson, and A. W. McCollough, of Laramie, and an oral argument by Mr. McCollough.

The funds were transferred only after and because of the default of the debtor district and because of its failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sec. 99-825, R. S. Plaintiff district at no time provided a high school. Plaintiff's pupils attended defendant's high school with the full knowledge of the plaintiff Board. Plaintiff district for many years had complied with the law and paid the tuition of its pupils to defendant high school. Defendant's defense is made under Section 99-825, R. S. Plaintiff appears to base its right to recover on the case of State v. School District No. 12, 45 Wyoming 365, which differs from the present case on the facts and is not controlling here. In that case 56 C. J. 824 is quoted. The case of State v. Ellis, 37 Wyoming 124, cited by plaintiff is not in point with the case at bar when the facts involved are considered. The case of Hyde v. Commissioners, (Wyo.) 31 P.2d 75, is also distinguishable from the case at bar. We do not understand that this court in Seaman v. Big Horn Canal Association, 29 Wyo. 397, held that a public corporation may be estopped as to business but not governmental functions. The rule of estoppel as against municipal corporations is applied under numerous, if not all conditions. School v. City, (Ore.) 71 P. 605; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 3d Edition, Sec. 675. The weight of authority on the question is represented in Town v. Hunt, (Ind.) 93 N.E. 173; Blennerhasset v. Town, (Ia.) 91 N.W. 1044; Paine Company v. City, (Wisc.) 61 N.W. 1108; Oliver v. Synherst, (Ore.) 86 P. 376. See also Telephone Company v. City, (S. D.) 116 N.W. 67; Wykes v. Water Company, 184 F. 752; Edwards v. City, (Mo.) 127 S.W. 378; County v. District, (Calif.) 147 P. 1183; Bank v. Village, (Minn.) 139 N.W. 599; 21 C. J. 1195; 10 R. C. L. 694; 67 C. J. 294; Rowell v. District, (Vt.) 10 A. 754; Eastgate v. District, (N. D.) 171 N.W. 96; Parker v. Town, (N. H.) 105 A. 7. By the Wyoming statute then, it is not only mandatory upon a district not maintaining a four year high school, to pay tuition for its pupils who desire to attend high school in another district, but it is also mandatory on a high school district to receive such non-resident pupils upon a cost basis. Plaintiff district has received full value for the $ 1,380.61 and should not recover back the payment of a just and correct account.

BLUME, Justice. KIMBALL, Ch. J., and RINER, J., concur.

OPINION

BLUME, Justice.

This case was submitted to the trial court upon the petition and answer thereto and an agreed statement of facts. The plaintiff, School District No. 2, is a duly organized school district in Teton County, offering courses of study up to and including the 8th grade. Jackson-Wilson High School District, defendant, is a duly organized high school district in that county, and the defendant Scott is the duly qualified County Treasurer. The plaintiff never maintained a high school within the district, and never offered any high school course to any of the children therein, and never provided any attendance at any other high school except in the defendant district. This high school district is the nearest, most accessible and only available high school in the county of Teton or in the vicinity of plaintiff district, at which any children could obtain the privileges of a high school education and courses of instruction. Commencing with 1924, to 1930 inclusive, the plaintiff district had arranged for the attendance of its school children who had completed the course of study offered in the district, at the defendant's high school at Jackson, and had paid the tuition fixed by the latter, without the requirement of any permission mentioned in Section 99-325, Rev. St. 1931. During and for the year 1931-32, however, the plaintiff made no such arrangement. The electors of that district

"had not then or at any other time levied any tax or made any other provision for payment to said defendant High School District of any tuition moneys for attendance in its schools of pupils resident in said plaintiff school district, nor had the trustees of said district ever consented to any such pupils resident therein attending said high school of defendant High School District at the expense of plaintiff school district, nor had the chairman or clerk of plaintiff ever made or executed nor did said pupils or any of them ever present to defendant High School District any written statements or permission signed by said chairman or clerk or either of them that said pupils or either of them so resident in said plaintiff school district could or should attend the schools of defendant High School District."

The plaintiff...