School Dist. No. 3 v. Hale

• Decision Date: 19 November 1890
• Citation: 25 P. 308,15 Colo. 367
• Parties: SCHOOL-DIST. NO. 3 v. HALE.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

25 P. 308

15 Colo. 367

SCHOOL-DIST. NO. 3 v. HALE.

Supreme Court of Colorado

November 19, 1890

Commissioners' decision. Appeal from Boulder county court.

This action was brought by James R. Hale against school-district No. 3, to recover $402.50, as the balance due him upon his employment from the 1st of September, 1886, to the 27th of May, 1887, as a teacher in the public schools of that district. His complaint sufficiently set forth the contract of hiring, and his performance, until he was wrongfully discharged in the month of November. It was made to appear that on Sunday, the 28th day of November, at 2 in the afternoon, he was asked to tender his resignation as a teacher. By the same notice he was requested to come before the board, at half past 7 of that day, at the residence of one of the directors. He went, and was again requested to resign. With this request he declined to comply; and thereupon, without further action, and without a hearing, or any other notice, the board assumed to discharge him, and subsequently refused to pay him anything except for the work which he had already performed. The complaint contained all the allegations essential to enable the plaintiff to introduce the proof necessary to his recovery, providing it be unnecessary for him to either allege or prove an appeal by him from the action of the board of directors to the county superintendent, under section 3077 of the General Statutes. The defendant demurred, for failure to make this allegation. The demurrer having been overruled, an answer was filed which set up no defense other than the failure to take the appeal. The record shows that testimony was introduced by the plaintiff in support of his complaint, and that thereupon the school-district refusing to offer testimony, the court rendered judgment for Mr. Hale for the amount claimed. From this judgment the school-district appeals.

Thomas R. Owen and Charles M Campbell, for appellant.

Richard H. Whitely and Richard H. Whitely Jr., for appellee.

BISSELL C., ( after stating the facts as above.)

Upon sufficient proof of the contract, its breach, and the damages sustained, the plaintiff was entitled to recover, unless the statute has established a condition precedent, with which the plaintiff must show a compliance to entitle him to a judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction. That the plaintiff made ample proof of whatever facts were necessary to entitle him to a judgment, other than proof of an appeal taken, must be presumed. The evidence upon which the judgment was rendered is not before this court, either in the abstract or in the record, and the court rendering the judgment being one with jurisdiction of both person and subject matter, it will be presumed that it proceeded regularly, and upon sufficient evidence. There is thus remaining for determination the naked question whether the statute has imposed upon the plaintiff a duty in a case of this description which he has failed to discharge. In the statute relating to schools, the board of directors is given full power to do whatever may be necessary for the due and regular management of the schools of their district. This in terms includes the hiring and discharge of teachers. This power, however, must always be exercised in obedience to the general principles of law governing contracts of this class, unless there be some specific restriction in the statute which prevents their application. There is nothing whatever in the statute which gives the board the right to make a contract for a specific term, at a specified price, which shall not be subject to the legal consequences of a breach. The power of employment and discharge is not in terms beyond the control of the general law. It was always true that where a contract of hiring was entered into between two parties for a fixed period, at a definite price, the employer could not escape liability for a discharge without cause. If the contract was broken by the employer, a cause of action at once arose in favor of the one discharged, who might, upon the expiration of the period of hiring, recover the damages resulting from the breach. Ordinarily these are measured by the amount of the stipulated wages, though the recovery is always subject to mitigation by proof either of earnings or their possibility. Reduction Co. v. Cook, 7 Colo. 569, 4 P. 1111; Pars. Cont. (6th Ed.) pp. 33, 34, and notes. The case, as made by the plaintiff, comes clearly within this well-established rule. He was hired for so many months at $70 per month, and...