School Dist. No. 48 of Maricopa County v. Rivera

• Decision Date: 01 March 1926
• Docket Number: Civil 2407
• Citation: 243 P. 609,30 Ariz. 1
• Parties: SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 48 OF MARICOPA COUNTY, Appellant, v. EDUARDO RIVERA, Appellee
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

243 P. 609

30 Ariz. 1

SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 48 OF MARICOPA COUNTY, Appellant, v. EDUARDO RIVERA, Appellee

Civil No. 2407

Supreme Court of Arizona

March 1, 1926

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. Dudley W. Windes, Judge.

Judgment reversed, with instructions.

Mr Arthur T. La Prade, County Attorney, Mr. Gene S. Cunningham Assistant County Attorney, and Mr. C. M. Gandy, for Appellant.

Mr. V L. Hash, for Appellee.

Lockwood, J. McAlister, C. J., and Ross, J., concur.

OPINION

Lockwood, J.

Eduardo Rivera, hereinafter called plaintiff, brought suit against school district No. 48 of Maricopa county, and V. C. White, Walter Dunn and J. R. Steward, as trustees of said district, and also in their individual capacity, to recover damages for the destruction of a building belonging to plaintiff which was burned while used and occupied by the district. The complaint alleged, in substance, that plaintiff was the owner of certain lots in Scottsdale, Maricopa county, with a large wooden house thereon; that about February 6, 1924, the trustees took possession of the house and established a public school therein without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff; that they placed a stove in the house, cutting a hole through the wall for the stovepipe, and later, through the negligence of the janitor employed by the district in caring for the stove, the house was set on fire and destroyed. The damages set up were $ 950, part for rental and part for the value of the building.

The defendants entered a general demurrer and denial, and then set up as a special defense that the year before they had rented the building from the owner for school purposes; that in January, 1924, they again sought to rent it, but, learning that plaintiff was in California, and that the premises had been leased to one Serna, they subleased it from the latter, and were occupying it when the fire occurred. The demurrer was overruled as to the district and the trustees in their individual capacity, but sustained as to the trustees officially. The case went to trial before a jury, and at the close of plaintiff's case the court sustained a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the trustees individually, and a verdict was rendered against the school district in the sum of $ 900. Judgment was duly entered upon the verdict, and, upon the motion for new trial being denied, this appeal was prosecuted by the district.

There are some eight assignments of error; the first being that the complaint does not state a cause of action against the school district. This is based on the theory that a school district, under the laws of Arizona, cannot be sued except when such suit is impliedly or expressly authorized by statute, and admittedly there is no act allowing it where the trustees or their employees have committed a tort.

In the case of State v. Sharp, 21 Ariz. 424, 189 P. 631, we said:

"The question is whether the state is liable to respond in damages for the negligent acts of its agents, servants or employees. As to this question it is well settled by the great weight of authority that the state, in consequence of its sovereignty, is immune from prosecution in the courts and from liability to respond in damages for negligence, except in those cases where it has expressly waived immunity or assumed liability by constitutional or legislative enactment, . . ." -- and this doctrine was reaffirmed in State v. Dart, 23 Ariz. 145, 202 P. 237, and Jones v. City of Phoenix, 29 Ariz. 181, 239 P. 1030.

A school district, under our system of government, is merely an agency of the state. As is said in Freel v. Crawfordsville, 142 Ind. 27, 37 L. R. A. 301, 41 N.E. 312:

"They are involuntary corporations, organized not for the purpose of profit or gain but solely for the public benefit, and have only such limited powers as were deemed necessary for that purpose. Such corporations are but the agents of the state, for the sole purpose of administering the state system of public education. . . . In performing the duties required of them they exercise merely a public function and agency for the public good for which they receive no private or corporate benefit. School corporations, therefore, are governed by the same law in respect to their liability to individuals for the negligence of their officers or agents as are counties and townships. It is well established that where subdivisions of the state are organized solely for a public purpose, by a general law, no action lies against them for an injury received by a person on account of the negligence of the officers of such subdivision, unless a right of action is expressly given by statute. Such subdivisions then, as counties, townships, and school corporations, are instrumentalities of government, and exercise authority given by the state, and are no more liable for the acts or omissions of their officers than the state." Anderson v. Board of Education (N. D.), 190 N.W. 807; Board of Education v. Volk, 72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N.E. 646; McClure Bros. v. School Dist. of Tipton, 79 Mo.App. 80.

Such being true, the overwhelming weight of authority naturally is to the effect that school districts are not liable for the negligence of their officers, agents or employees, unless such liability is imposed by statute either in express terms or by implication....