Schreckengast v. Hammermills, Inc., 84-683

Citation369 N.W.2d 809
Decision Date19 June 1985
Docket NumberNo. 84-683,84-683
PartiesJohn F. SCHRECKENGAST, Appellant, v. HAMMERMILLS, INC. and Sentry Insurance Company, Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

James E. Shipman and Dean R. Einck of Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Harry W. Dahl, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.

Roger L. Ferris and Sara J. Sersland of Nyemaster, Goode, McLaughlin, Emery & O'Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for amicus curiae Deere & Co.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and McCORMICK, SCHULTZ, CARTER, and WOLLE, JJ.

CARTER, Justice.

Worker's compensation claimant, John F. Schreckengast, appeals from a decision on judicial review affirming the industrial commissioner's denial of worker's compensation benefits. We affirm the district court's decision.

The record reflects that claimant had been employed with the appellee employer for thirty-one years prior to becoming permanently and totally disabled from a mental illness manifested by severe depression and diagnosed as a unipolar affective disorder, depressed type. At the hearing held before the industrial commissioner on the ensuing worker's compensation claim, conflicting medical evidence was presented concerning the extent, if any, to which the circumstances of claimant's employment caused his depression or exacerbated a previously existing depressive disorder.

It is claimant's contention that his condition was caused by or exacerbated by job stress. His duties included considerable travel to meet with prospective customers, designing machines to meet the particular business needs of customers, working up sales quotations in order to market such machines and working with production personnel in order to assure that manufactured items met with the specifications mandated by the individual customers. These work activities required considerable evening and weekend time. Work pressures were intensified because of rather strict project deadlines. One of the first manifestations of claimant's depressive disorder was a fear of airline travel.

The expert medical testimony may be summarized as follows. Three psychiatrists testified that, in their opinion, there was no work-related cause of claimant's depression. Claimant's treating family physician agreed with these conclusions. One of these psychiatrists also testified that, in his opinion, there was no work-related aggravation of claimant's depressive condition. The other psychiatrists were somewhat equivocal as to the possibility that claimant's depression was aggravated by job stress. A clinical psychologist testifying for the claimant stated that, in his opinion, both the original cause of the depressive disorder and a subsequent exacerbation thereof were caused by the stressful conditions of claimant's work environment.

In resolving this conflicting testimony, the industrial commissioner, 1 found that the claimant had failed to establish that conditions associated with his employment caused the onset of his depressive disorder or exacerbated an existing depressive disorder. In considering the claim, the commissioner cited with apparent approval and discussed the case of Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis.2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976). Claimant contended on judicial review in the district court and contends in this court that the standard of legal causation established in Swiss Colony should not be adopted in Iowa because (1) it places too great a burden on claimants, and (2) it denies recovery to claimants who have established causation in fact between the hazards of their employment and an existing disability. 2

In reviewing the decision of the commissioner, we are convinced that it separately considers the issues of (a) legal causation, and (b) causation in fact. 3 The commissioner found that...

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12 cases
  • Dunlavey v. Economy Fire and Cas. Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • January 18, 1995
    ...supported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole. Schreckengast v. Hammermills, Inc., 369 N.W.2d 809, 811 (Iowa 1985) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(f)). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to re......
  • Kostelac v. Feldman's, Inc.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • March 24, 1993
    ...whether the commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency. Schreckengast v. Hammermills, Inc., 369 N.W.2d 809, 811 (Iowa 1985). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion. John Deere Dubu......
  • Sumpter v. City of Moulton
    • United States
    • Iowa Court of Appeals
    • July 11, 1994
    ...L. Prosser, Law of Torts § 41, at 238 (4th ed. 1970). However, causation in fact presents a fact issue. Schreckengast v. Hammermills, Inc., 369 N.W.2d 809, 810 (Iowa 1985). This determination is ordinarily a question for the jury, and may be decided as a matter of law only in exceptional ca......
  • Klein v. Furnas Elec. Co., 85-303
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • March 19, 1986
    ...establish that the evidence required a different finding as a matter of law. Armstrong, 382 N.W.2d at 166; Schreckengast v. Hammermills, Inc., 369 N.W.2d 809, 810-11 (Iowa 1985); Ward v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 304 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Iowa 1981); Wetzel v. Wilson, 276 N.W.2d 410, 41......
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